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Can Science Investigate the Supernatural? 
An investigation into the relationship between science, the 
supernatural, and religion. 
Jonathan Peter Winthrop 
 
Abstract 
Throughout the last century there has been much discussion over what it is that 
makes an activity or a theory 'scientific'.  In the philosophy of science, conversation 
has focused on differentiating legitimate science from so-called 'pseudoscience'.  In 
the broader cultural sphere this topic has received attention in multiple legal 
debates regarding the status of creationism, where it has been generally agreed that 
the 'supernatural' nature of the claims involved renders them unscientific. 
 
In this thesis I focus upon the latter of these issues, arguing that although there may 
be merit in the larger demarcation project of separating science from pseudoscience, 
the notion of 'supernaturality' does not belong in this adjudication.  Due to the 
complex cultural issues that have played a role in the history of this topic, this will 
involve a degree of historical and normative analysis alongside more philosophically 
abstract considerations. 
 
Complicating the discussion is the fact that neither the term 'science' nor 
'supernatural' enjoys a widely agreed upon definition.  In order to assess the 
question then, I will survey a wide variety of definitions of each term in order to 
identify areas of potential conflict.  I argue that in none of the prevalent 
understandings can we find impediment to scientific investigation inherent in the 
supernaturality of a claim, but rather posit that where difficulty arises it does so for 
more mundane reasons. 
 
I conclude that not only is there no inherent issue with scientific investigation of the 
supernatural, but that the term 'supernatural' itself is too poorly defined to provide a 
useful role in philosophical discussion.  While I argue that notions of supernaturality 
should be abandoned entirely when assessing demarcation criteria, I concede that 
numerous extraneous factors, including the significant degree of overlap between 
the supernatural and the 'religious', warrant consideration of a compromise position. 
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Introduction 
 
 
We maintain that science and religion embrace two separate and distinct fields of 
thought and learning.  We remember that Jesus said: 'Render unto Caesar the things 
that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' 
– Dudley Field Malone, speaking at the Scopes trial in 1925 
 
 
 
Over the course of the twentieth century, much philosophical discussion has 
attempted to address the so-called 'demarcation debate', delineating between 
legitimate science and 'pseudoscience'.  In parallel to this discussion, and in many 
ways informed by it, there has been much debate in the legal and cultural spheres 
over the scientific status of creationism.  In both of these cases it has often been 
determined that the supernaturality of a proposed hypothesis or phenomenon 
would exclude it from scientific investigation. 
In this thesis I intend to argue that supernaturality should play no role in 
demarcation.  Whilst there may be legitimate reasons to exclude creationism from 
science, the idea that it makes supernatural claims is not among them.  I will argue 
that those arguing for a separationist position, either between science and the 
supernatural, or between science and religion, are misguided in their approach.  
Further, I will argue that the term 'supernatural' plays no useful role in academic 
discourse. 
Discussion of this issue is complicated by the fact that there is little consensus over 
how best to define either of the terms 'science' or 'supernatural'.  In order to 
comprehensively address this question then, it is necessary to unpack both of these 
concepts in a way that identifies the most prominent usages of each.  With these 
established, we will then be able to compare their respective understandings in 
order to identify areas of potential conflict.  Although we will encounter many such 
conceptions, the three that will receive the most attention address issues of natural 
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law, scientific method, and the supernatural understood as that which exists beyond 
space and time. 
In every area of potential conflict, I find that no genuine incompatibility arises.  In 
several cases the conflict itself is incoherent, such as in the many attempts to 
understand the concept of a 'violation' of a natural law.  Even where legitimate 
conflict does seem to arise, this is often due to far more mundane reasons than the 
supernaturality of the phenomena in question. 
Finally, though I argue for the abandonment of the separationist position, I do not 
claim that all supernatural phenomena will be amenable to scientific investigation.  
Many supernaturalist claims, especially those within the domain of religion, may fall 
beyond the scope of science.  We shall see from the very beginning of our discussion, 
where we discuss the complex cultural history of the debate, that the relationship 
between science and religion is neither fully coextensive nor one of mere mutual 
isolation. 
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Chapter 1  
An overview of the debate between science and the 
supernatural today  
 
In this chapter we will examine the relationships between various parties involved in 
the debate over science and the supernatural.  The objective of this examination is 
primarily to contextualise the debate, as well as to highlight its importance.  By 
discussing the various positions that thinkers have adopted, we will also have the 
opportunity to take note of some specific interpretations of the relationship 
between science and the supernatural, which will form the basis for later discussion.  
This chapter will thus be largely descriptive, and is intended to lay the groundwork 
for the critical analysis that constitutes the majority of this thesis. 
 
In this chapter I will present a four category approach to the discussion which I 
believe helps us to understand the debates from both a historical and a philosophical 
perspective.  By dividing the various thinkers in the debate according to two 
orthogonal criteria, namely their position on the existence of the supernatural and 
their position on whether or not science could investigate the supernatural (if it 
existed), we can get a much clearer picture of the motivations and arguments 
involved.  More importantly, this division helps us to properly locate, and ultimately 
reject, attempts at finding a 'middle ground' via appeal to a separationist position 
between science and the supernatural. 
 
In accordance with this objective, the chapter is organised along the four positions to 
be discussed.  After briefly expanding upon the motivations behind this division, we 
shall turn our attention to the 'pro-supernatural, anti-separationist' position.  This 
provides an opportunity to introduce one of the recurring themes of our discussion: 
the scientific status of creationism, particularly in the United States.  As this is a key 
focal point of the thesis, the history of this movement, and its evolution into its 
modern form as 'Intelligent Design', will be given an extended introduction.  This 
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history will largely be anchored in the various key legal decisions regarding the 
movement's scientific status, beginning with the famous Scopes trial in 1925. 
 
Following on from Scopes, we shall discuss the much later case of Epperson v. 
Arkansas (1968), and its role in the move from explicitly religious 'creationism' to the 
purportedly scientific 'creation science'.  We will then outline two cases from the 
1980s: Mclean v. Arkansas and Edwards v. Aguillard.  The former of these decisions 
has particular relevance to our discussion as it introduces a legal conception of what 
it is to be scientific, the elements of which will serve as a partial skeleton for the 
structure of later discussion.  Finally we shall address the 2004 Kitzmiller v. Dover 
Area School District trial, and the shift from 'creation science' to 'Intelligent Design', 
and briefly note some other examples of this first position. 
 
Moving to the opposite corner of the spectrums, the second position we shall discuss 
is that of the 'anti-supernatural, pro-separationists'.  Continuing from the 
creationism discussion, we shall begin with a position outlined by Michael Ruse, who 
contributed heavily to the decision in the McLean case.  Following on from this, we 
will discuss two of the most famous articulations of a separationist position: the 
concepts of 'methodological naturalism' and 'non-overlapping magisteria' (NOMA). 
 
The third group we will address is that of the 'pro-supernatural, pro-separationists'.  
This position is somewhat more reactionary than the other three, and is thus most 
easily discussed in juxtaposition with that which it opposes.  We shall therefore 
address some of the arguments forwarded in response to claims that science has 
eliminated the need for a 'god hypothesis', primarily those of mathematician and 
Christian apologist John Lennox. 
 
Finally, we shall look at the 'anti-supernaturalist, anti-separationist' position.  In 
particular we will return to the arguments mentioned in section three, notably those 
recently forwarded by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow.  We will then, 
considering his cultural relevance to the debate, address some of the contributions 
to the discussion from Richard Dawkins. 
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A secondary focus of this chapter is to introduce key features of the various legal 
debates over creationism which have taken place in the USA.  The conflicts over this 
particular issue highlight much of the cultural importance of this topic, as well as 
providing the primary motivation for conducting this investigation.  All of the 
positions I will be discussing in this chapter have in some way been influenced by the 
creationist movement, and thus they can only be properly understood in light of it.  
In analysing the history of creationism, and the Intelligent Design movement that 
evolved out of it, we will be better equipped to analyse all of the perspectives in the 
larger debate. 
 
The third and final objective of this chapter is to draw attention to, though not to 
solve, some of the normative aspects of the separationism debate.  Scientific 
investigation, rather than being an abstract concept, is an ongoing human 
endeavour.  It makes sense then to ask not just what science can investigate, but 
also what it should be able to investigate.  As we shall see, much of the discussion 
surrounding this debate is subject to some kind of agenda as to what should, and 
should not, fall within scientific domain.  These motivations can be religious, 
political, or even simply moralistic, but nevertheless they have all influenced the way 
that people have attempted to answer this question.  Resolving this debate thus 
requires as much unpicking of these issues from their associated positions as it does 
a measured, analytical approach. 
 
Although there will be some discussion of the legal and political normative issues 
surrounding this question, it is not the primary focus of this investigation.  Instead, 
where I do make normative recommendations for scientific investigation, I will 
usually refer to what best reflects a way for scientists to pursue some kind of truth.  
Without committing myself to any specifically realist doctrine, this thesis will 
therefore assume that search for truth is at least a partial objective of scientific 
investigation.  This assumption is justified by context, as the debate between 
creationism and naturalistic evolution, for example, only makes sense if both parties 
are taken to be attempting to describe the way that reality actually is.  At this stage, 
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however, all of these topics should be considered introductory, and will receive 
greater attention in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
Four positions  
 
As I have suggested, it is possible to divide positions in this debate into four camps, 
based upon where any particular person or group stands on two importantly distinct 
issues.  Firstly, what is their position on the primary topic of this thesis: do they 
consider the supernatural to be beyond the scope of scientific investigation?  
Secondly, and to an extent equally relevantly, what is their position regarding the 
existence of any particular supernatural phenomenon? It is of course possible to be 
agnostic regarding either of these questions, and there is also scope for gradation in 
the certainty with which one answers.  For the most part however, at least for the 
purposes of this chapter, these camps can be relatively easily distinguished. 
 
The purpose of differentiating between these four positions is threefold.  In the first 
instance, it will elucidate our normative discussion of the debate.  A thinker's 
metaphysical commitments frequently impact upon what they believe should be 
scientifically investigable and, as has been discussed, it is important to unpick such 
motivations in order to analyse the debate properly.  Michael Ruse, for example, is 
strongly opposed to the claims of creationism and, as an extension of this, feels that 
they should be kept out of the scientific domain.  In a discussion on creationism in 
science he offered the following remark on just how to achieve such an aim: 
"Popperian falsifiability may be a somewhat rough and ready way of separating 
science and religion, but it is good enough for the job at hand, and in law that is what 
counts" (2014).  We will discuss the veracity of this particular claim in chapter five, 
but for now we can simply observe that even well intentioned participants in the 
debate may have chosen to sacrifice a degree of philosophical precision for what 
they deem to be a worthy cause. 
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The second objective for the differentiation is to illustrate that, in fact, one can 
adopt either a supernaturalistic or a naturalistic metaphysical position and still be 
free to support or deny the possibility of scientific investigation of the supernatural, 
independent of whether or not the supernatural actually exists.  It will thus be 
argued that such motivation is inappropriate in determining one's position in the 
separation debate.  Furthermore, by analysing the four positions, it will be 
demonstrated that the separation of science and the supernatural actually benefits 
neither the supernaturalist nor their detractors.  Thus, if one is to be motivated by 
metaphysical commitments in the debate, then in both cases one should lean 
towards the inclusion of the supernatural within the scope of science. 
 
Finally, this differentiation aims to highlight an error frequently made by proponents 
of separation regarding their position in the debate.  To cite Michael Ruse once 
again, he seems to consider himself to be occupying, or at least advocating, some 
kind of reasoned middle ground at the centre of a one-dimensional spectrum 
between fundamental Christians at one end and the so-called 'New Atheists' at the 
other: 
 
I have drawn the scorn both of the religious extremists – see for example the 
treatment of me by the journalist Ben Stein in the movie Expelled – and of the 
atheists – they contemptuously refer to people like me as "accommodationists" 
or (more hurtfully) as "appeasers".  A middle way showing that one can accept 
science – real science, not science gelded to make it less threatening – and 
genuine religion is needed desperately.  One may not convince the fanatics at 
the ends, but there needs to be a large place where people can perhaps 
disagree on ideas but nevertheless continue to respect opponents.  (Ruse, 2011: 
656) 
 
By understanding these positions as a two-dimensional grid of beliefs, it will I think 
become clear that Ruse's position actually does not represent a middle ground at all.  
On the axis measuring metaphysical commitment, Ruse occupies exactly the same 
position as the atheists, and on the axis measuring separationist tendencies Ruse lies 
in opposition to both fundamentalist Christians and the New Atheists alike.  The 
attempt to set up a place of respectful disagreement in between the camps, whilst a 
noble intent, is thus utterly misguided. 
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By distributing the positions as I have done, I intend to shed some light on the 
normative dimension of the separationist debate, as well as hopefully provide some 
reason for optimism regarding it.  If it can be shown that one's metaphysical 
commitments should not bring to bear on one's attitude towards scientific 
methodology, then perhaps we can carve out an area of agreement between 
conflicting camps without having to reach a compromising middle ground position at 
all.  We can accommodate Ruse's ideals for respectful interaction, but in a way that 
not only properly locates the areas of agreement, but does so for people of all 
metaphysical or religious persuasions. 
 
 
Some preliminary issues  
 
Before moving on to discuss the four camps in turn it is worth making a few 
clarifications.  As noted, there is room for varying degrees of uncertainty regarding 
these questions, and it is hard to delineate perfectly between the camps.  Individual 
thinkers vary in the intensity of their beliefs, and thus it is not always clear which 
category they fall into.  Moreover, there are many occasions where a thinker's 
supernaturalistic tendencies have no bearing on the debate, or are not made readily 
clear.  The issue of where a thinker stands on a particular supernatural issue will only 
be addressed therefore where it is felt that it has influence on their position in the 
larger discussion.  I will also only be referencing certain thinkers in this first chapter 
who represent relatively extreme positions on the grid.  This serves to accentuate 
areas of conflict and concord between camps. 
 
Although it will not play a major role in the current chapter, which serves as an 
overview of the debate, there is a further distinction to be drawn within the 
separationist position itself.  As we shall see, what I call the separationist position 
has been presented in various ways, though these expressions are usually blanket 
statements to the effect that either there is no overlap between science and religion, 
or that science is limited to the realm of the natural.  It is worth however noting that 
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one may take a more nuanced approach to the topic, whereby science is declared 
unable to investigate supernatural hypotheses or explanations, but is able to 
investigate the empirical effects which these hypotheses or explanations are 
intended to address.  For example, one might agree that science can investigate 
whether or not the Earth is young, or investigate the effects of intercessory prayer, 
but deny that science can engage in meaningful dialogue regarding if, how or why 
God did or did not perform such actions.  We shall refer to this position as 'weak 
separationism'. 
 
Complicating the issue further is the difficulty inherent in defining the term 
'supernatural'.  Whether or not it is sensible to use this word is a question that will 
occupy much of this thesis, though will not become a key point of discussion until 
chapter three.  For the purposes of the present chapter, the supernatural will be 
understood in something of a colloquial sense, which is to say that ghosts, angels 
and miracles may be considered 'supernatural', whereas tables, birds and flowers 
may not.  Most importantly, the God of Christian theism may be reasonably taken to 
possess this characteristic for the purposes of our initial discussion. 
 
In addition to this, there is a distinction to be drawn regarding scientific discussion of 
the supernatural in relation to three specific terms: hypothesis, theory, and 
phenomenon.  While there is significant overlap between discussion of these issues 
in the literature, as for example a discussion of creationism may feature all three, we 
should be careful to separate them where necessary.  A supernatural hypothesis will 
be any hypothesis in which the entity or event being suggested is 'supernatural', for 
example the suggestion that a healing was the result of miraculous intervention.  A 
supernatural phenomenon1 shall be understood as any entity or event that is in itself 
supernatural, for example a miraculous healing or a ghost.  A supernaturalistic 
theory shall be taken as any theory which makes reference to either of the former 
two categories. 
 
                                                 
1 I here use the term 'phenomenon' in the colloquial sense of a situation or entity which may require 
explanation, rather than in the more philosophical sense regarding objects of perception. 
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Finally, it is important to be clear that when we describe someone as being either 
pro- or anti-supernatural, we are only referring to a person's stance on a specific 
putatively supernatural issue, rather than an entire metaphysical worldview.  When I 
refer to Ruse, for example, as being 'anti-supernaturalist', this is only to say that he 
rejects the claims of creationism when it comes to the evolution debate.  Similarly, 
where I refer to Intelligent Design proponents as being 'supernaturalist', I am not 
committing them to a belief in phenomena such as extrasensory perception, 
astrology, or ghosts.  Additionally, this thesis makes no comment on whether or not 
supernatural phenomena actually occur.  Therefore, where the investigation of a 
supernatural phenomenon is discussed, it should be understood in generally 
hypothetical terms.  With that in mind, let us now turn our attention to these various 
positions in detail. 
 
 
Pro-supernaturalist, Anti-separationists  
A brief history of creationism  
 
Let us begin our overview with one of the most prominent examples of a 
supernaturalist group who are opposed to the separation of science from the 
supernatural.  Creationism, and the movements related to it, serve as an excellent 
example of how muddied the waters of this discussion can be, with many of its 
current proponents trying to disassociate their views from supernaturalism entirely.  
Its long and convoluted history provides many examples of how the term 
'supernatural' has been understood in both philosophical and legal terms, and also 
offers a series of springboards for debates over the subject.  Many of the viewpoints 
discussed in this thesis can be traced back to reactions to the controversy over 
creationism in the United States, and many of the facets we shall cover explicitly 
invoke claims made during this history. 
 
Creationism and its modern variant, Intelligent Design theory, are an important 
starting point for this discussion because of the broad impact the movement has had 
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on society.  In the USA, as well as in philosophy, creationism has had a serious impact 
in politics, law, and education.  As we shall see throughout this section, much of the 
discussion centres on whether or not creationism, in any of its various forms, should 
be taught in schools, specifically in science classrooms.  The issue goes much deeper 
in North American politics however.  In 2014 a Gallup poll suggested that 42% of 
Americans believed that God created humans in their present form  (Newport, 
2014), and in 2008 a similar poll found that this belief was held by 60% of 
Republicans compared to 38% of Democrats (Newport, 2008). 
 
Although the media coverage and legal attention is perhaps more dramatic in the 
United States, it would be a mistake to think that creationism is a solely North 
American concern.  In 2008 a UK poll found that 29% of teachers at primary and 
secondary schools believed that creationism should be taught in school (Randerson, 
2008).  In 2006, another poll found that 22% of the British population thought that 
creationism "best described their view of the origin and development of life" and a 
further 17% felt the same way about Intelligent Design (BBC, 2006).  We will for the 
most part be discussing creationism in an American context, but it would be 
misleading to suggest that the debates end there. 
 
In order to properly understand the Intelligent Design (ID) movement and why, 
despite its claims to the contrary, it is listed here as a supernaturalist movement, it is 
important to understand its history.  Only by fully appreciating the political and 
social ramifications of ID can we hope to extricate them from the more 
philosophically interesting points that it raises.  Although creationist doctrines can of 
course be traced back much earlier, we shall only need to follow the movement as 
far back as the early twentieth century for now in order to do this adequately.  We 
will turn our attention to more classic discussions of theistic design in chapter six. 
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The Scopes trial  
 
In 1925 the Butler Act was passed in Tennessee.  This made it illegal for any school 
funded by the state "to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine Creation 
of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a 
lower order of animals" (House Bill No. 185: 1925).  The act stated that any teacher 
found to have violated this act would be found guilty of misdemeanour and fined 
between one hundred and five hundred dollars.  Although the act was never 
intended to be enforced, when the American Civil Liberties Union decided to 
organise a test case with substitute teacher John Scopes as the defendant, the 
resulting trial became "the standard to which all subsequent 'evolution trials' have 
been compared" (Moore, 1998a: 488-489). 
 
Lasting only eight days, and described by Time magazine as "the fantastic cross 
between a circus and a holy war" (1925), the Scopes trial was a media frenzy, with 
the attending crowds eventually forcing the proceedings to move outside due to 
concerns about the strength of the courtroom floor (Moore, 1998a: 504).  Scopes 
was found guilty, and made to pay the minimum fine of $100, though this result was 
not surprising as much of the evidence presented for the defence was deemed 
inadmissible, and it was not disputed that Scopes had taught evolution.  As Scopes' 
defence attorney Clarence Darrow summarised for the jury: "We cannot even 
explain to you that we think you should return a verdict of not guilty.  We do not see 
how you could.  We do not ask it." (Scopes, [1925] 2008: 311). 
 
The verdict and Scopes' involvement in the trial are, and were at the time, largely 
irrelevant to the importance of the case.  As historian Edward Larson describes an 
incident on the fourth day of the case, when Scopes was late to proceedings having 
been swimming: "When they finally showed up, Scopes could barely squeeze 
through the packed aisles to the defense table.  'Where the hell have you been?' 
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thundered Hays2, but no one else appeared to notice the defendant's absence." 
(Larson, 1997: 170).   
 
What made the case important was that the defence decided to use it as an 
opportunity to "pit science against Fundamentalism" (Moore, 1998a: 497), much of 
the inadmissible evidence being, to some extent, in support of this cause.  This was 
not to say that the defence wanted to use science to prove religion wrong, but 
rather to keep theological doctrine out of the scientific forum.  As Dudley Malone, a 
key member of the defence team told the court: "science and religion embrace two 
separate and distinct fields of thought and learning […].  [T]here is no conflict 
between evolution and Christianity." (Moore, 1998a: 500).  Here we see our first 
example of an anti-supernaturalist (insofar as he was an opponent of creationism) 
presenting an explicitly pro-separationist claim. 
 
Unlike the defence, it is a little difficult to categorise the prosecution team at the 
trial when it comes to the separation debate.  William Jennings Bryan, in a response 
to Clarence Darrow, another member of the defence team, argued that: "Darrow is 
an atheist, I'm an upholder of Christianity.  That's the difference between us…  If 
evolution wins, Christianity loses." (Moore, 1998a: 497).  Whilst this clearly places 
Bryan in the supernaturalist camp, it is not so obvious where he stood on separation.  
By arguing that evolution stands in opposition to Christianity he implicitly denies 
Malone's claim that science and religion occupy "distinct fields".  However, this is not 
to say that Bryan believed that Christianity could be scientifically verified, or that any 
amount of scientific support for evolution might falsify it.  Whilst the notion of 
evolution standing in opposition to Christianity is key to understanding the 
Intelligent Design movement, in order to see creationism begin to take an explicitly 
anti-separationist stance we need to move our story forward by more than thirty 
years. 
 
                                                 
2 Arthur Garfield Hays was a member of the defence team in the Scopes trial. 
14 
 
Scopes' legacy  
 
In the decades following the Scopes trial, the teaching of evolution in American 
schools, as well as its inclusion in textbooks, was dramatically reduced.  "The best-
selling textbooks downplayed or ignored evolution.  Pro-evolution books did not sell 
well, and the best-selling biology textbook did not include the word evolution." 
(Moore, 1998b: 576, emphasis as original).  This trend continued all the way up until 
1958 when, inspired by fears that the Soviet Union had overtaken the United States, 
particularly following the launch of Sputnik I, President Eisenhower requested that 
the National Science Foundation "develop state-of-the-art science textbooks" 
(Moore, 2002: 33).  The resulting overhaul put evolution squarely back in the biology 
classroom and, as a result, put the debate back into the courtroom. 
 
Following the anti-evolution success in Tennessee, an Act had been passed in 
Arkansas in 1928 prohibiting the teaching of evolution in any state-funded institution 
(Moore, 1998c: 651-657).  Although there had been attempts to repeal the law, it 
was not until 1965 when biology teacher Susan Epperson, backed by the Arkansas 
Education Association, filed the first lawsuit to challenge an anti-evolution law since 
Scopes.  Although Epperson won her case, the decision was reversed by Arkansas 
Supreme court in 1967.  Epperson appealed, and eventually the evolution debate 
reached the United States Supreme Court.  The court deemed that the anti-evolution 
law was unconstitutional both on the grounds of being too vague, and because it 
attempted to establish a religious position in a public school:  
 
The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a 
particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to 
conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular 
interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.  (Epperson 
v. Arkansas (1968) 393 U.S. 97) 
 
The most significant outcome of the Epperson case to our discussion is that it 
deemed the creationist account to be in violation of the First Amendment to the 
Constitution, which states that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion" (US Embassy, 2016).  Publicly funded institutions were 
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thus thought to be unable to teach anything that favoured one particular religion 
over another.  This forced creationists to rethink their strategy if they wanted to 
introduce anything opposing evolutionary theory into a science classroom.  The 
1970s thus saw creationism rebranded as 'creation science', an attempt to get 
around the unconstitutionality of presenting religion in a classroom by arguing that 
there were scientific reasons for opposing the evolutionary account (Moore, 1999: 
14).  This eventually led to our next case, with a court in Arkansas making a decision 
on the very topic of this thesis: 'can a supernatural account of reality be considered 
scientific?' 
 
McLean v. Arkansas  
 
McLean v. Arkansas board of education is perhaps the most important case in the 
history surrounding our topic.  As Randy Moore argues, the trial is "unique and 
remarkably instructive, not just for understanding the evolution/creationism debate, 
but also because it provides legal analysis of what science is and what science isn't" 
(1999b: 92).  As well as including arguments from creationists, now under the banner 
of creation science, the trial also introduced Michael Ruse as an expert witness 
against creationism.  Many of the arguments that will be discussed over the course 
of our discussion have some basis in the testimonies and conclusions of this 
particular trial. 
 
In 1981, the state of Arkansas passed Act 590 into law.  In light of the Epperson case, 
the act prohibited "religious instruction or references to religious writings".  In 
addition to demanding that "public schools within this State shall give balanced 
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science", the Act also included the 
statement that: 
 
Creation-science is an alternative scientific model of origins and can be 
presented from a strictly scientific standpoint without any religious doctrine just 
as evolution-science can, because there are scientists who conclude that 
scientific data best support creation-science and because scientific evidences 
and inferences have been presented for creation-science.  (Arkansas Act 590, 
1981) 
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When the Act was opposed in court by the American Civil Liberties Union, Robert 
Cearley's opening statement argued that "creation science, far from being science, is 
actually religious apologetic" and that it "could not exist in the world of science, and 
does not use the scientific method" (Moore, 1999b: 93). 
 
We see here two important and distinct objections to treating creation science as 
science.  Firstly, that it is religious doctrine and thus teaching it in a classroom would 
be unconstitutional.  This objection requires careful analysis, as it is a very different 
thing to say that creation science should not be taught in schools because it violates 
the separation of church and state, and to say that creation science is not science 
because it contains religious doctrine.  In this section we have seen that a large 
motivation for creationists to appear scientific is that it brings the political benefit of 
allowing their beliefs to be taught in classrooms.  It is very important, in the interests 
of philosophical rigour, not to adopt the contrary approach of dismissing their 
arguments solely in order to keep such beliefs out of classrooms.  It is also, in the 
interest of fairness, worth noting the plausible motivation of separationists to 
conclude that creationism is not scientific for exactly such reasons.  Additionally, and 
as we shall address in much more detail beginning in chapter two and continuing 
throughout our discussion, Cearley's argument that creation science "could not exist 
in the world of science" raises the obvious question of what exactly the world of 
science is, and on what grounds we should exclude creation science from it. 
 
The second objection presented here is the claim that creation science "does not use 
the scientific method".  This argument raises yet another question: even if we 
assume that creation scientists had not up until that point been using the scientific 
method, is there any reason in principle to suppose that they could not ever be 
capable of doing so?  I will discuss this kind of objection later in this chapter and 
throughout the thesis, but for now we shall focus on the answers given by the court. 
 
Regarding the first objection, Judge William R. Overton began by concluding that 
according to the definition given in Act 590, creation science was religious in nature.  
"Both the concepts and wording [...] convey an inescapable religiosity [...].  Every 
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theologian who testified, including defence witnesses, expressed the opinion that 
the statement referred to a supernatural creation which was performed by God" 
(Dorman, 1996).  As well as deeming that teaching creation science in public schools 
was thus unconstitutional, he went on to outline five criteria which a theory must 
satisfy in order to be scientific, and against which, he argued, creation science fails: 
 
(1) It is guided by natural law; 
(2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natur[al] law; 
(3) It is testable against the empirical world; 
(4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word; and 
(5) It is falsifiable.  (Dorman, 1996) 
 
We can see that the criteria (1) and (2) are an extension of Cearley's first objection, 
and also are a concrete example of an answer to the question of this thesis.  The 
McLean v. Arkansas case concluded that science was limited to an investigation of 
the natural world, and natural explanation.  Religious and, more specifically, 
supernatural hypotheses were not within the domain of science.  This is the second 
time in this chapter that we have seen a pro-separationist stance being taken in a 
courtroom, and questioning the validity of this claim is the primary focus of this 
thesis. 
 
The final three criteria presented by Judge Overton are a more explicit wording of 
Cearley's second objection: that creation science fails to conform to scientific 
method.  These criteria suggest that even if creation science could, in principle, be 
categorised under the domain of science, there are methodological reasons for its 
exclusion.  This sort of objection will be given less attention than the first for most of 
this investigation, but will be discussed in detail in chapter five. 
 
Both of these types of objection were raised again in the case of Edwards v. Aguillard 
in 1986 when a similar case made it to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Notably, an amicus 
curiae brief was agreed upon by 72 Nobel Laureates, 17  state academies of science, 
and seven other scientific organisations.  This brief included the statement that 
"Science is devoted to formulating and testing naturalistic explanations for natural 
phenomena [...].  Science is not equipped to evaluate supernatural explanations for 
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our observations; without passing judgment on the truth or falsity of supernatural 
explanations, science leaves their consideration to the domain of religious faith"  
(Edwards v. Aguillard , 1986).  By the late 1980s, the idea of science as a naturalistic 
enterprise was well entrenched in U.S. law. 
 
The rise of Intelligent Design  
 
In light of the Epperson, McLean and Aguillard cases, it should be becoming apparent 
why so-called Intelligent Design theorists attempted to distance themselves from 
any religious connotations.  In 1989 a biology textbook was published entitled Of 
Pandas and People, which advocated Intelligent Design.  The book was arguably the 
first to use the phrase 'Intelligent Design' in its current form, and defined it as 
follows: 
 
Intelligent Design means that various forms of life began abruptly through an 
intelligent agency with their distinctive features already intact – fish with fins 
and scales, birds with feathers, beaks and wings, etc.  (Davis and Kenyon, [1983] 
2004: 99-100) 
 
A decade and a half later, in 2004, Dover Area School District issued a press release 
stating that teachers at Dover High School would have to read the following 
statement to ninth grade biology students: 
 
The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin's 
Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of which 
evolution is a part. 
 
Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evidence 
is discovered.  The Theory is not a fact.  Gaps in the Theory exist for which there 
is no evidence.  A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a 
broad range of observations. 
 
Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from Darwin's 
view.  The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for students who 
might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design 
actually involves. 
 
With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind.  
The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to individual students and 
their families.  As a Standards-driven district, class instruction focuses upon 
19 
 
preparing students to achieve proficiency on Standards-based assessments.  
(Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District [2005a] 04cv2688) 
 
When the constitutionality of the press release was brought into question at the 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial in 2004, the plaintiffs opposing the 
release brought early manuscripts for Of Pandas and People as exhibits.  They 
showed that in between 1986 and 1987, around the time that Edwards v. Aguillard 
had deemed teaching creation science unconstitutional, the title of the manuscript 
had changed from Biology and Creation to Of Pandas and People.  It was also found 
that cognates of the term 'creationism' had been replaced with the phrase 
'intelligent design', including in the definition presented above (Scott and Matzke, 
2007: 8674).  Regardless of its proper definition, Intelligent Design is clearly 
historically rooted in creation science and, by extension, creationism. 
 
The court ruled that the policy laid out by the Dover Area School District was 
unconstitutional because Intelligent Design forwarded a religious agenda.  In 
addition to this, as in the McLean v. Arkansas case, the court also made a 
determination on whether Intelligent Design counted as science.  Judge John E. Jones 
III concluded that "ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking 
and permitting supernatural causation" (Wexler, 2006-2007: 94).  Once again, we see 
that a U.S. court advocated a pro-separationist position. 
 
Although legal decisions do not necessarily have to adhere to philosophical 
standards, it is worth noting that the courts have gone above and beyond the legal 
requirements in order to determine that Intelligent Design is not science.  As 
Professor of Law, Jay D. Wexler argues: "The overall question posed to a court is 
whether teaching ID endorses religion, not whether ID is or is not science.  The part 
of Kitzmiller that finds ID not to be science is unnecessary, unconvincing, not 
particularly suited to the judicial role, and even perhaps dangerous both to science 
and to freedom of religion." (2006-2007: 93). 
 
I intend to argue throughout this thesis that the courts have, over the course of its 
history, been wrong to deny that Intelligent Design and its predecessors could qualify 
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as science in principle.  Before moving away from Intelligent Design however, let us 
note two important points.  Firstly that Intelligent Design, as a direct descendent of 
creationism, is a pro-supernaturalist position.  This is illustrated in the legal history 
we have just outlined, and although one could theoretically adopt a non-
supernaturalist position in defending ID, both the literature and this thesis ignore 
this possibility.  In the case of this discussion, the possibility of non-supernaturalistic 
ID being scientific is of little concern to us, as I am specifically arguing for the 
possibility of supernaturalistic hypotheses being scientific (potentially including 
supernaturalistic ID), which is a more difficult position to defend.  Secondly, the fact 
that creation science and ID are supernaturalist positions has been a key factor in the 
legal determinations that they are not science.  In particular, this has involved the 
objection that supernaturalist claims violate natural laws; an objection that will be 
discussed much more fully in chapter four. 
 
Other Pro-Supernaturalist, Anti-Separationist positions  
Although thus far I have given much attention to the creationist movement 
(understood as opposing the claims of evolutionary theory), they are not alone in 
advocating scientific investigation of the supernatural.  Christian philosopher of 
religion Alvin Plantinga has expressed his support for guided evolution and, although 
it is sometimes unclear whether he himself is strictly anti-separationist, he has 
offered some arguments in favour of such a position. 
 
Plantinga argues that if one assumes that supernatural phenomena lie beyond the 
scope of scientific enquiry, then one is faced with a problem if any supernatural 
claim happens to be true.  As he argues: "If you exclude the supernatural from 
science, then if the world or some phenomena within it are supernaturally caused 
[…] you won't be able to reach that truth scientifically" (2006).  This is a reasonable 
objection, and it is important to stress here that the intent of this thesis is not to be 
critical of supernaturalistic positions.  Although much attention is paid to 
creationism, a particularly derided form of supernaturalism, I hope to argue against 
separationism in a way that can be accommodated equally by the supernaturalist 
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and the naturalist.  Abandonment of the separationist position not only allows us the 
opportunity to criticise supernaturalist claims scientifically, but also to defend them, 
provided that evidence in either direction is actually accessible. 
 
In his 2011 book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga argues further that 
supernatural phenomena cannot constitute violations of laws of nature.  He argues 
that scientific laws, at least when understood classically, apply only to closed 
systems, and that in an event such as a miracle, where God has intervened to alter 
some state of affairs, then the system in question is no longer causally closed.  He 
concludes that it is therefore inaccurate to describe miracles as violations of laws of 
nature: 
Miracles are often thought to be problematic, in that God, if he were to 
perform a miracle, would be involved in "breaking", going contrary to, 
abrogating, suspending, a natural law.  But given this conception of natural law, 
if God were to perform a miracle, it wouldn't at all involve contravening a 
natural law.  That is because, obviously, any occasion on which God performs a 
miracle is an occasion when the universe is not causally closed; and the law says 
nothing about what happens when the universe is not causally closed.  (2011: 
82-83) 
 As I have already stated, the concept of supernatural phenomena as being violations 
of laws of nature will be the subject of a later chapter, but we can see here one of 
the potential avenues that one might take in response to the conclusions of, for 
example, the Arkansas case. 
 
Alternative, and less theistic, examples of notable pro-supernaturalist positions can 
be found discussed in much of the literature on 'pseudoscience',  with perhaps the 
most common example being that of astrology.  The discussion as to the exact 
nature of 'pseudoscience' and the accompanying 'demarcation debate' is something 
that we will inevitably encounter often throughout this investigation.  I will not, 
however, be offering a great deal of explicit input on this subject until the end of our 
discussion.  Nonetheless we will touch upon these other examples of supernatural 
phenomena, as well as the demarcation debate, in chapters two and three. 
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Finally, and perhaps controversially, I will argue that we can trace an anti-
separationist position, both from pro-supernaturalists and anti-supernaturalists, 
back to the classic arguments surrounding natural theology.  I will argue that while 
the contemporary Intelligent Design movement has clear roots in more historical 
design arguments, one can find similar relationships to scientific method in 
contemporary cosmological arguments, as well as in the modern evidential problem 
of evil;  I shall tentatively develop this argument in chapter six. 
 
The normative aspect of the debate  
Before moving on to the three remaining positions in the debate, I wish to address 
one final point on the political ramifications of Intelligent Design.  Even if we grant 
that Intelligent Design theory, or even unabridged creationism, were scientifically 
investigable, this does not necessarily imply that they should be taught in science 
classrooms.  As we shall see in our discussion of the anti-supernatural, anti-
separationist position, granting that supernatural phenomena might be scientifically 
investigated does nothing to suggest that upon such investigation they will be 
scientifically supported. 
 
Of course, conversely, if Plantinga is correct then perhaps scientific investigation 
would lead to such support.  The only reason then to exclude the supernatural from 
science would appear at least to be political in nature, and this is exactly the kind of 
motivation that this chapter aims to extract from our discussion.  If we wish to treat 
science as in some way pursuing truth, and we show that supernatural phenomena 
or hypotheses can be scientifically investigated, then we should allow that such 
investigation can occur.  This is to say nothing regarding our expected outcome of 
such investigation, and is I hope a normative claim that can be accepted by both 
proponents and opponents of supernaturalistic belief. 
 
I would argue further that we do not need to go so far as to establish that 
supernatural phenomena or hypotheses can be scientifically investigated in order to 
reject a separationist position, but only that there is no justification for assuming 
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that they cannot be investigated.  Throughout this thesis we will encounter 
situations in which the only way to establish whether or not certain criteria for 
science can be applied to scientific hypotheses will be to actually investigate the 
hypothesis in question first.  Therefore unless we have a priori reasons for accepting 
the separationist position, which is a claim I intend to refute, then we should not 
adopt it.  Given the legal and political ramifications associated with the exclusion of 
the supernatural from science, I suggest that the burden of proof lies with the 
separationist in establishing their view and, I will argue, it is one they have not met.   
 
This issue is of particular import when we come to more esoteric conceptions of 
criteria for science.  At some points in our discussion I will concede that the 
separationist could establish that science cannot investigate the supernatural by 
relying on a definition of 'science' which is highly controversial, or relatively 
unknown.  However, while such approaches are philosophically interesting and offer 
potential avenues for future research, I would argue it is irresponsible to extend 
them beyond the sphere of philosophy and into legal and political discourse at this 
stage in the debate.  
 
Intelligent Design represents but one facet of the supernaturalist, anti-separationist 
camp, but it serves well to illustrate the motivations that might bias such a position, 
as well as hint at those of its detractors.  This has particularly been the case in the 
United States, where one of the most religious cultures in the developed world (Gao, 
2015) arguably finds itself at odds with its own constitution.  It would be easy to 
assume that the Machiavellian approach taken by some leading proponents of 
Intelligent Design represents the only strong bias in this debate, but this would be 
unfair.  Let us now turn our attention then to the completely opposite camp, where 
anti-supernaturalist, pro-separationists defend their position equally fiercely. 
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Anti-supernaturalist, Pro-separationists  
Ruse and nonoverlapping magisteria  
 
I mentioned in the previous section that one of the key witnesses in the McLean v. 
Arkansas case was philosopher of science, Michael Ruse.  As well as being an atheist 
and a proponent of separation between science and religion, Ruse is also a 
vehement opponent of the Intelligent Design movement.  Although as noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, he has attempted to adopt a 'middle ground' position 
more recently, during the trial his arguments came from a far less balanced 
perspective.  As Ruse himself acknowledges when discussing the 1981 case: "I cannot 
pretend that I thought all that deeply about the issues, at least not at a philosophical 
level.  For me, it was less an intellectual experience and more a crusade against 
something I regarded (and still so regard) as an insult to all of the learning I hold dear 
– an insult to nonbeliever and believer alike." (2011: 656).  Bearing this in mind, let 
us consider some of Ruse's arguments in favour of excluding Intelligent Design from 
the domain of science. 
 
Unsurprisingly given his involvement in the Arkansas case, Ruse's arguments have 
mirrored to a large extent the conclusions of Judge Overton.  In a 1982 article in 
which he discussed some of his reasoning during the case, Ruse echoed Overton's 
conclusion: "Religious beliefs frequently allow or suppose events outside law or else 
events that violate law (miracles) […].  This is not to say that religion is false, but it 
does say that religion is not science." (1982a: 73).  This is yet another example of 
Cearley's first objection being made, this time in an explicitly philosophical context. 
 
This kind of objection can be summarised by the claim that, as philosopher Robert T. 
Pennock argued at the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District trial: "a characteristic 
of modern science is a commitment to what's called methodological naturalism" 
(Kitzmiller v. Dover, 2005b).  That is to say that science operates under the 
methodological assumption that naturalism is true, and must refer only to natural 
causes and explanations.  As Plantinga describes it: 
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The philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism holds that, for any 
study of the world to qualify as "scientific," it cannot refer to God's creative 
activity (or any sort of divine activity).  The methods of science, it is claimed, 
"give us no purchase" on theological propositions--even if the latter are true--
and theology therefore cannot influence scientific explanation or theory 
justification.  Thus, science is said to be religiously neutral, if only because 
science and religion are, by their very natures, epistemically distinct.  (1997: 
143) 
 
In addition to conformity to natural law, Ruse lays out a series of other criteria for 
science, which he feels are lacking in the case of Intelligent Design.  These go beyond 
Judge Overton's five criteria and are, in the order presented by Ruse: "explanation 
and prediction", "testability, confirmation and falsifiability", "tentativeness", and 
"integrity" (1982a: 75-76).  Each of these criteria shall be discussed individually in 
chapter two, and then the more complex issues arising from them given further 
attention in  chapters four and five. 
 
Nonoverlapping magisteria  
 
Since the 1981 trial, Ruse's views have softened significantly.  In a very similar 
manner to the intentions of this chapter, he has tried to pull apart the biases and 
confusions surrounding the debate.  Describing the period when Intelligent Design 
was beginning to emerge, Ruse writes: 
 
Many of us in the business were still accepting some version of the 
independence theory, but uncritically.  This was shown dramatically by Stephen 
Jay Gould's Rocks of Ages (1999), which argued that science and religion are 
nonoverlapping "Magisteria", but which then took away from religion the right 
to make any ontological claims about the existence of God and His creative 
power and so forth.  Part of the problem here was that many if not most people 
writing on science and religion — I exclude the full-time historians who were a 
different (and much better) matter — simply did not have the needed training 
in philosophy and theology.  (2011: 658) 
 
Gould's concept of nonoverlapping magisteria (NOMA) is frequently cited in 
discussions of science and religion, and it neatly summarises the separationist 
position.  He argues that science and religion, whilst both valid pursuits, ask different 
questions and occupy different intellectual spaces: 
26 
 
The net of science covers the empirical universe: what is it made of (fact) and 
why does it work this way (theory).  The net of religion extends over questions 
of moral meaning and value.  These two magisteria do not overlap, nor do they 
encompass all inquiry (consider, for starters, the magisterium of art and the 
meaning of beauty).  To cite the arch clichés, we get the age of rocks, and 
religion retains the rock of ages; we study how the heavens go, and they 
determine how to go to heaven.  (1997: 17-18) 
 
This NOMA principle, as expounded by Gould, is often forwarded as a way for 
science and religion to live harmoniously with one another, and as a way to 
encourage amicable dialogue between the two domains.  This is in sharp contrast to 
the situation we saw in the debate between evolution and Intelligent Design.  As 
Gould describes it: "Here, I believe, lies the greatest strength and necessity of 
NOMA, the nonoverlapping magisteria of science and religion.  NOMA permits — 
indeed enjoins — the prospect of respectful discourse, of constant input from both 
magisteria toward the common goal of wisdom" (1997: 62).  It is rejection of the 
NOMA principle that pits creationism against evolution. 
 
We have seen that Ruse now feels that NOMA strips religion of its ontological force.  
Moreover, if we remember Plantinga's concerns regarding the imposition of 
limitations on science in a situation where a particular supernatural proposition 
happens to be true, then we see that from a religious perspective, NOMA could be 
an incredibly damaging proposition.  The creationist is thus not entirely unjustified in 
rejecting it.  We shall see towards the end of this chapter that the principle has also 
received harsh criticism from the extremely anti-religious as well.  However, as 
illustrated by the legal history of the discussion, as well as numerous statements 
from organisations such as the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, and the National Academy of Science to the same effect (Fishman, 2009: 
814-815), the position has found heavy favour in prominent non-philosophical 
circles, as well as still receiving support (to be discussed) from various 
representatives of the philosophical community.  Before getting to those objections 
and their accompanying supporting arguments however, let us now turn to the third 
camp on our list. 
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Pro-supernaturalist, Pro-separationists  
Don't poke the bear  
 
Supernaturalist supporters of separation are, arguably, the least proactive 
participants in this debate.  Unlike the Intelligent Design theorists, they see no 
conflict between science and religion, and thus are unthreatened by the propagation 
of evolutionary theory.  Religious views presented in a church face none of the 
opposition they would in a science classroom, nor in a courtroom.  Equally, unlike 
non-supernaturalistic advocates of separation, they have no need to keep anyone 
out.  There is no equivalent to the Intelligent Design movement attempting to force 
evolutionary theory into weekly mass. 
 
Where supernaturalist supporters of separation do become vocal however is when 
they feel that science is stepping on religion's toes.  Though there is no counterpart 
to the ID attempts to insert themselves into the science-occupied domain of a 
science classroom, such potential impositions can be seen to occur in the public 
domain.  A notable recent example of this occurred in 2010 when physicists Stephen 
Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow published The Grand Design, in which they made 
the claim that scientific progress had eliminated the need to appeal to a divine 
creator of the universe: 
 
Because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and will create itself from 
nothing [...].  Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than 
nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist.  It is not necessary to invoke 
God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going.  (2010: 227) 
 
News of the book's contents preceded its release, and it led to an outcry from 
numerous religious leaders.  On the 3rd of September 2010, six days before the book 
was released, The Times ran a front page story entitled: 'Hawking: Archbishop leads 
religious response'.  The article included quotes from various sources including Dr. 
Rowan Williams, the then Archbishop of Canterbury: 
 
Belief in God is not about plugging a gap in explaining how one thing relates to 
another within the Universe.  It is the belief that there is an intelligent, living 
agent on whose activity everything ultimately depends for its existence.  Physics 
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on its own will not settle the question of why there is something rather than 
nothing.  (Devlin and Gledhill, 2010) 
 
The article also contained a quote from Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, who took a 
more explicitly separationist view: 
 
Science is about explanation.  Religion is about interpretation [...].  The Bible 
simply isn't interested in how the Universe came into being.  (2010) 
 
Hawking and Mlodinov's scientific rejection of God echoes another oft cited story of 
a scientist 'eliminating' the need for divine providence.  So the story is told, Emperor 
Napoleon I asked Pierre Simon LaPlace why there was no mention of a creator in his 
account of the workings of the solar system, Exposition du système du monde (1796).  
LaPlace simply responded: "Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là" [I had no 
need of that hypothesis] (Wagner and Briggs, 2016: 261). 
 
In God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God?, Lennox argues that approaches such 
as those of Hawking, Mlodinow and LaPlace are misguided.  He gives the example of 
a woman, Aunt Matilda, who has baked a cake.  According to Lennox, scientists could 
break down the cake via the methods of physics or chemistry, and give a very 
detailed description of the cake.  They would not, however, be able to tell us why 
she baked the cake.  "In fact, the only way we shall ever get an answer is if Aunt 
Matilda reveals it to us.  But if she does not disclose the answer to us, the plain fact 
is that no amount of scientific analysis will enlighten us." (2007: 40). 
 
Lennox offers a second example, involving the analysis of a Ford motor car: a person 
who has never seen such a machine takes it apart in order to see how it works.  First 
suspecting that there might be a god inside the engine, making it work.  On 
investigation, he finds no such being, and furthermore: 
 
His grasp of the impersonal principles of internal combustion would be 
altogether enough to explain how the engine works.  So far, so good.  But if he 
then decided that his understanding of the principles of how the engine works 
made it impossible to believe in the existence of a Mr Ford who designed the 
engine in the first place, this would be patently false – in philosophical 
terminology he would be committing a category mistake.  (2007: 44) 
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Turning his attention explicitly to LaPlace, Lennox argues that there is no more 
reason for God to appear in a mathematical description of the workings of the solar 
system, than there would be reason for Henry Ford to appear in a scientific analysis 
of internal combustion (45).  He then quotes Austin Ferrar in A Science of God?: 
 
Since God is not a rule built into the action of forces, nor is he a block of force, 
no sentence about God can play a part in physics or astronomy…  LaPlace and 
his colleagues had not learned to do without theology; they had merely learned 
to mind their own business.  (1966: 29-30) 
 
I will not attempt to refute the claim that some supernatural phenomena lie outside 
of the reach of science.  There is plausibly little reason to suppose that a scientist 
should be able, as in the example put forward by Lennox, to discover anything about 
Henry Ford from the workings of internal combustion, beyond perhaps his 
proficiency at engineering.  Though it should be noted that such reasoning lies in 
direct opposition to the design inferences forwarded by some in the pro-
supernaturalist, anti-separationist camp, and attempts at inferences of this sort will 
be discussed in chapter six.  What I hope to argue instead, over the course of this 
work, is that this limitation is not the result of a phenomenon being supernatural.  
Indeed, this becomes especially apparent with the Ford example in mind, as the 
difficulty for science there has nothing to do with supernaturalism.  Conversely, I will 
argue, there are some phenomena which may defensibly be thought of as 
'supernatural' which could fall into the scientific domain.  Thus the property of being 
supernatural is neither a necessary, nor sufficient criterion for exclusion from 
scientific investigation. 
 
By believing that science could eliminate the need for God in understanding the 
universe, Hawking, Mlodinow and LaPlace have all implicitly placed themselves into 
our final category of thinker.  A better understanding of their views will help 
elucidate some of the limitations of Lennox's argument.  Let us therefore now lastly 
turn our attention to anti-supernaturalist opponents of the separation of science and 
the supernatural. 
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Anti-supernaturalist, Anti-separationists  
Where Dawkins and Intelligent Design agree  
 
As I said in the introduction to this chapter, by 'anti-supernaturalist' I only mean to 
imply opposition to any particular supernatural phenomena being discussed.  It is 
partly for this reason that I employ the term 'anti-supernaturalist', rather than simply 
'naturalist'.  There is however a group of thinkers, most vocally represented by the 
so-called 'New Atheists', who feel that scientific investigation has actively disproved 
the existence of supernatural phenomena.  For them, putatively supernatural claims, 
such as the existence and action of a divine creator, are not things on which science 
has nothing to say.  Rather, like the existence of phlogiston and the ether, they fall 
within the domain of scientific investigation, but the evidence has weighed against 
them. 
 
We have seen that Hawking and Mlodinow implicitly adopted this approach in The 
Grand Design, and there is some weight to the idea.  If scientific investigation can 
fully explain the universe in natural terms, then this would suggest that invoking 
supernatural causation would seem to overdetermine the universe.  At the very least, 
it would render inferences to a theistic creator – a topic we will discuss in chapter six 
– harder to justify. 
 
The indirect form of investigation demonstrated by both LaPlace's comments and 
those articulated in The Grand Design does not explicitly suggest that science can 
investigate the supernatural, but rather that science is not mute on the subject of 
supernatural phenomena when their existence would contradict established 
scientific theory3.  If, for example, we reject the possibility that an event can have 
two independently sufficient causes, or at least consider this to be highly 
unparsimonious, then evidence in favour of one particular cause will necessarily be 
evidence against another.  This is a similar conclusion to that drawn by creationists 
when they felt that evolutionary theory was incompatible with, and thus threatening 
                                                 
3 Note that this is not unique to the investigation of supernatural phenomena.  Consider for example 
the competitive relationship between phlogiston theory and Lavoisier's theory of combustion. 
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to, the Biblical account of creation told in Genesis.  Though in many such cases the 
conflicts are somewhat deeper, particularly in the sub-category of creationists who 
believe in a young Earth.  The universe cannot be both six thousand and fourteen 
billion years old. 
 
It is worth noting that this kind of analysis is one-directional.  Evidence in favour of a 
theory is weighed against other theories to the extent that if, say, it were confirmed 
with absolute certainty that evolution were true, we could be equally certain that 
creationism was false.  This does not apply in the case where evidence counts 
against a particular theory.  Disproving evolutionary theory could only confirm the 
truth of creationism if there were only two possible options available.  It is not 
sufficient to show that one of two suggested options is false.  It is a frequent, and 
misguided, approach of creationists to attempt to defend their theories by exactly 
this method (Pennock, 2006: 468-471). 
 
The indirect rejection of supernatural explanations by confirming natural ones is a 
fairly cumbersome and inefficient method of investigation.  If one is tasked with 
discrediting some supernatural explanation (such as divine creation of the universe), 
then one must come up with a full, well-supported model of how such an event 
happened naturally.  Moreover, once again remembering Plantinga's objection, it 
offers no recourse for science if any supernaturalist claim happens to be true.  One 
would have to eliminate all naturally possible models before arriving at the 
conclusion that a nonnatural model must be correct, and then still have no obvious 
method for establishing which nonnatural model is indeed correct4. 
 
If this analysis holds true, then it seems that it would be of benefit both to 
supernaturalists and anti-supernaturalists if science were able to investigate 
supernatural phenomena.  As stated in the previous section, I will not attempt to 
argue that all supernatural phenomena might be investigable by scientific means.  
                                                 
4 The Roman Catholic Church does adopt a method similar to this in establishing the occurrence of a 
miracle for the purposes of beatification and canonisation.  We shall touch upon this issue again in 
chapter four. 
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Lennox's Henry Ford problem is not one that I wish to refute in its entirety.  
However, it can be argued that some supernaturalist claims could, in principle, be 
scientifically tested.  This is a claim that has been very popular amongst the 'New 
Atheist' movement. 
 
Richard Dawkins' philosophical credentials have received frequent criticism, even 
from fellow atheists.  As Michael Ruse (2009) expresses his opinion on the matter: 
"Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion would fail any introductory philosophy or 
religion course.  Proudly he criticizes whereof he knows nothing".  However, he is 
unquestionably one of the key current figures in the debate, and it would be remiss 
of me not to mention him here.  In addition, Dawkins occupies the opposite extreme 
to creationists on the spectrum in which Ruse wishes to find himself a 'middle 
ground', despite apparently agreeing with them on the subject of separationism, so 
it is useful that we understand exactly what such a view actually entails. 
 
Dawkins is strongly opposed to Gould's NOMA principle, and he argues against it in 
two distinct ways.  The first, while not important to our core question, is relevant to 
the issue of bias in the debate and thus does warrant brief mention here.  Dawkins 
argues that the only reason that those in the pro-supernaturalist, pro-separationist 
camp endorse NOMA is because there is no evidence in favour of what he calls 'the 
God hypothesis': 
 
Did Jesus have a human father, or was his mother a virgin at the time of his 
birth?  Whether or not there is enough surviving evidence to decide it, this is 
still a strictly scientific question with a definite answer in principle…  To 
dramatize the point, imagine, by some remarkable set of circumstances, that 
forensic archaeologists unearthed DNA evidence to show that Jesus really did 
lack a biological father.  Can you imagine the religious apologists shrugging their 
shoulders and saying anything remotely like the following?  'Who cares?  
Scientific evidence is completely irrelevant to theological questions.'  (Dawkins, 
2006: 59) 
 
Dawkins is of course engaging in sheer speculation here, but the point he raises is 
compelling.  We have seen throughout the course of this chapter that it is natural for 
a person to rush to defend their position with whatever evidence is available to 
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them.  We have already seen that Ruse was willing to employ Popperian falsifiability 
against creation science despite it being, in his words, a "rough and ready" approach.  
It is thus certainly worth being aware that pro-supernaturalist supporters of 
separation may be being swayed in exactly the way that Dawkins suggests. 
 
Dawkins' second objection to NOMA is more philosophical, and is more akin to a 
form of argument that I will defend throughout this thesis.  He argues that the 
NOMA principle only applies to a weak kind of theism, one that eliminates miracles, 
and that this is not the kind of theism we see in practice: 
 
The moment religion steps on science's turf and starts to meddle in the real 
world with miracles, it ceases to be religion in the sense Gould is defending and 
his amicabilis concordia is broken.  Note, however that the miracle-free religion 
defended by Gould would not be recognized by most practising theists in the 
pew or on the prayer mat.  (2006: 60) 
 
Dawkins' point can, I will argue, be extended to any supernatural phenomenon that 
has an empirically testable effect on the universe.  This is a claim that is 
advantageous to both supernaturalists, under Plantinga's argument, and anti-
supernaturalists who wish to refute such phenomena.  As Larry Laudan, who was 
highly critical of Ruse's arguments in the Arkansas trial, notes: "By arguing that the 
tenets of Creationism are neither testable nor falsifiable, Judge Overton […] deprives 
science of its strongest argument against Creationism" (1982: 17).  If we do not allow 
science to directly examine the evidence for and against supernatural phenomena 
and hypotheses, then we lose any ability to address claims such as the truth of 
creationism using scientific evidence.  From a normative perspective, again, science 
should be allowed to investigate supernatural claims.  Moreover, if this analysis is 
correct, then it applies even to weak forms of separationism.  The critique is not 
simply that scientists could investigate empirical claims, but that this investigation 
would allow us at least some degree of insight into the supernatural hypotheses and 
explanations they relate to. 
 
I will spend much of the following discussion defending this particular argument, so I 
will not delve into it more deeply here.  Let us for now note that we find here an 
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agreement between Richard Dawkins, one of the most vitriolic opponents of both 
creationism and religion of modern times, and the very Intelligent Design theorists 
he most strongly opposes.  It is thus absurd to suggest that the NOMA principle 
represents in any way an amicable middle ground between the two positions.  
Rather than divided by questions over what science can investigate they are, as is 
perfectly scientifically valid, in opposition over who has the better evidence. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Over the course of this chapter we have seen that the debate over separationism can 
be more clearly understood if we divide the participants in the discussion along two 
orthogonal axes: firstly according to their position regarding whether or not science 
can investigate the supernatural, and secondly according to their position regarding 
the existence of any particular supernatural phenomenon.  This approach allows us 
not only to analyse the discussion with greater clarity, but also helps us to highlight 
the difficulty in defending the separationist position as an amicable compromise 
between competing positions. 
 
From a normative perspective we can observe that the separationist position, rather 
than acting as a middle ground encouraging the kind of "respectful discourse" 
proposed by Gould (1997: 62), actually does nothing of the sort.  By viewing the 
discussion as divided into the four camps I have outlined, we can see that the 
separationists actually occupy one side of a two dimensional grid of beliefs.  
Moreover, both proponents and opponents of separationism are divided in their 
religious commitments.  Rather than eliminating an area of potential conflict 
between the religious and the scientific, the separationist actually adds an extra 
layer of division to the discussion.  By insisting that science and religion occupy 
distinct spheres they erect an artificial barrier to discussion between those who 
might otherwise engage in it. 
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We have seen that, historically, United States courtrooms have tended to favour a 
pro-separationist position when analysing the debate.  However, this is to some 
extent going beyond the jurisdiction of a courtroom, as the only legal matter in 
question during these cases is whether or not a certain theory has endorsed a 
religion, and not whether or not it constitutes science.  These responses have 
developed and progressed alongside the evolution of creationism from an explicitly 
religious position to the more purportedly scientific and religiously neutral Intelligent 
Design movement, though its status on both of these points has been highly (and 
rightly) criticised to the extent that I include it with other examples of the pro-
supernaturalist, anti-separationist position. 
 
Support for an anti-separationist position has, interestingly, been most vocally 
expressed by those furthest apart on the supernaturalism spectrum.  Creationists, 
insistent in their modern form that there is scientific justification for belief in a 
designer, are met with agreement on the scientific investigability of God by those 
who, like Dawkins, believe that science has shown that belief in Him is unjustified.  
Though these camps perhaps shout loudest, they should not be considered alone, 
with similar arguments being forwarded by people such Plantinga, Laudan and 
(implicitly) Hawking and Mlodinow. 
 
Although much of our initial discussion has served to outline the status of the debate 
from a primarily cultural perspective, as well as to lay the groundwork for 
philosophical analysis in later chapters, there are some preliminary conclusions that 
can be drawn.  Most importantly, that the separationist principle does not serve as a 
middle ground between competing positions, but rather indicates a position on one 
extreme of a continuum of views.  Additionally, and in a way that somewhat informs 
this point, we must approach arguments regarding this debate with caution.  The 
subject of our discussion is the debate over separationism which, despite being 
orthogonal to the debate over the existence of the supernatural, is deeply connected 
to it from a historical, cultural, and political perspective, and as such is one where 
people on all sides bring non-philosophical baggage to the discussion.  
36 
 
Chapter 2  
Defining science  
 
In the previous chapter we frequently employed the terms 'science' and 
'supernatural'.  In the following two chapters, we shall attempt to address the 
question of what exactly is meant by these  terms.  I intentionally here use the 
passive voice, as I will not be forwarding any arguments regarding what it is that 
these terms mean in the sense of adopting a position on the demarcation debate.  
Rather, I will be outlining a variety of understandings as to what might be thought to 
be captured, or intended to be captured, by these terms when discussed in the 
context of the separationism debate.  It is not my aim here to solve the problem of 
demarcation, nor even to affirm that such a problem exists.  Rather I hope to show 
that, if such a problem does exist, then the concept of supernaturality does not  play 
a useful role in resolving it. 
 
Before discussing putative definitions for science, we will first briefly explore the 
context of the discussion in terms of demarcation and pseudoscience.  As we have 
seen, the cultural and normative factors influencing discussions of these topics play a 
significant role in its history, and it is important to understand the rough context of 
these issues before progressing.  The demarcation debate, along with the particularly 
negative connotations associated with the term 'pseudoscience', offers a good deal 
of insight on this subject.  We will return to this issue towards the end of our analysis 
in chapter seven. 
 
In order to make the incredibly wide-ranging nature of the discussion manageable, 
this chapter will be divided into several sub-sections.  Most broadly, we shall discuss 
potential understandings of science in terms of three categories: content, 
methodology, and social structure.  The first of these categories will be further 
subdivided into reference to natural law, reference to the natural world, and appeal 
to mathematics.  Each shall be discussed in some detail, though the topics of both 
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natural law and the natural world will also receive a more detailed analysis in 
chapters four and six respectively. 
 
The second broad category for science, that of methodology, will also be subdivided.  
We shall first address the notion of 'testability', though this will be one of many 
discussions on this concept throughout our investigation.  Following on from 
testability we will consider the idea that explanation and prediction are integral to 
the scientific method, though again these are notions which will be appealed to 
throughout our discussion.  Next we will briefly look at methodological naturalism as 
a principle in itself, followed by a short discussion of metaphysical assumptions in 
general, with specific reference to anti-realist approaches to science.  Finally, we will 
discuss tentativeness and integrity as key elements in the practice of science. 
 
The final broad category for science, that of social structure, shall be discussed in less 
detail than the other two.  Even though it is arguably no less significant an element in 
discussing the nature of science, either historically or in terms of abstracted 
philosophy, it is somewhat tangential to our discussion.  As with tentativeness and 
integrity, I will argue that the social structure of science does not in principle 
necessitate the exclusion of the supernatural from science, even if there are de facto 
sociological reasons that it does not currently inhabit the scientific sphere.  This 
represents an area of significant divergence between our discussion and the 
demarcation debate, where such criteria are often appealed to in differentiating 
science from other activities. 
 
 
What is science?  
Intuition and pseudoscience 
 
In spite of the ease with which we use the term 'science' it is extremely difficult to 
pin down a widely agreed upon definition of the word.  We do, for the most part, 
have a clear idea of examples of things which are science, and things which are not 
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science.  As Peter Godfrey-Smith outlines his intuitions: "The work done by physicists 
and molecular biologists when they test hypotheses is science.  And playing a game 
of basketball, no matter how well one plays, is not doing science.  But in the area in 
between these clear cases, disagreement reigns." (2003: 3).  John Dupré, drawing a 
comparison to American Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's comments5 on 
obscenity ("I know it when I see it"), outlines a similar schema: 
 
As with obscenity, there are some hardly disputable examples (sexualized 
violence against children; molecular genetics), some questionable cases (Anaïs 
Nin's erotica; evolutionary psychology), and some cases clearly outside the 
domain (Sesame Street; Tarot reading).  (2001: 114) 
 
Similarly, William Newton-Smith writes: 
 
The dominant  tendency at the moment is to reject the question...  Science has 
no essence.  We have constituted our idea of science around a list of paradigm 
exemplars (including biology, chemistry, geology, medicine, physics, zoology) of 
particular disciplines.  (2001: 2) 
 
Although I do not share Dupré's intuitions that Tarot reading is quite so clear a case 
of non-science (as will be discussed throughout this thesis), the overall principle 
outlined here at least grants us the ability to utilise the word 'science' in an effective, 
albeit loose, communicative capacity.  We will however require a much more specific 
definition if we are to offer substantive commentary on the proper inclusion, or 
exclusion, of the supernatural from this domain. 
 
There are, as we shall see over the course of this chapter, a variety of methods by 
which one might try to distinguish science from non-science while using a system 
that is less reliant on personal intuitions.  These attempts are complicated however 
by the sheer breadth of activities that we would hope to include under such a 
definition.  Although Godfrey-Smith's examples draw to mind laboratory workers 
studying entities and processes at the microscopic scale, we would certainly not wish 
to limit science to such activity, as this would exclude field work, psychology, 
cosmology and a whole range of other activities commonly held to be 'scientific'.  
                                                 
5 Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1964). 
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Compounding this issue is the fact that science is not limited to any obviously 
specific field of enquiry, with investigations ranging from the furthest stars to the 
smallest microorganism and perhaps even into the human psyche.  Approaches to 
the definition of science have thus been extremely varied, ranging from matters of 
the content of scientific theories, through methodology, to social aspects of the 
scientific process. 
 
Due to the complexity of the issue, it may well be impossible to arrive at any set 
definition of what science is, and this issue is compounded by the fact that much 
philosophical discussion has instead centred on what science is not.  The 
demarcation debate between science and non-science has received much attention 
in recent decades, and is largely focused on differentiating science from so-called 
'pseudosciences'.  As we saw in the last chapter, much of this discussion has involved 
cultural and legal issues.  This is not limited strictly to discussion of the supernatural, 
but is deeply entrenched in discussion of science and pseudoscience generally.  The 
term 'science' is a loaded one, with an air of grandeur about it, and it is highly 
tempting to think that if an approach is 'scientific' then this in some way validates it 
as a way to establish truth.  In one of the most influential and controversial 
discourses on the topic, Laudan summarised this attitude towards science thusly: 
 
We live in a society which sets great store by science.  Scientific 'experts' play a 
privileged role in many of our institutions, ranging from the courts of law to the 
corridors of power.  At a more fundamental level, most of us strive to shape our 
beliefs about the natural world in the 'scientific' image.  If scientists say that 
continents move or that the universe is billions of years old, we generally 
believe them, however counter-intuitive and implausible their claims might 
appear to be.  Equally, we tend to acquiesce in what scientists tell us not to 
believe.  If, for instance, scientists say that Velikovsky was a crank, that the 
biblical creation story is hokum, that UFOs do not exist, or that acupuncture is 
ineffective, then we generally make the scientist's contempt for these things 
our own, reserving for them those social sanctions and disapprobations which 
are the just desserts of quacks, charlatans and con-men.  (1983: 111) 
 
Compounding the positive connotations of the word 'science', the term 
'pseudoscience' is itself notably derogatory; pseudoscience is not merely non-
scientific, but negatively so.  A pseudoscience is not just an activity which 
approaches questions with a different methodology to science, as do (arguably) 
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religion or metaphysics for example, but it approaches these questions in a way 
which is quantifiably inferior to science.  As Sven Ove Hansson (2008) notes: "It 
would be as strange for someone to proudly describe her own activities as 
pseudoscience as to boast that they are bad science." 
 
Conversely, and to add complication to the issue, there are negative connotations to 
the word 'science' as well.  As Godfrey-Smith notes: "[O]ccasionally, a person might 
call an investigation scientific in order to say something negative about it — to 
suggest that it is dehumanizing, perhaps.  (The term 'scientistic' is more often used 
when a negative impression is to be conveyed.)" (2003: 3).  Moreover, an 
overconfidence in science, or excessive attachment to it, draws similar ire, with 
Dupré offering a particularly scathing appraisal: 
 
[W]hat I call scientism, an exaggerated and often distorted conception of what 
science can be expected to do or explain for us.  One aspect of scientism is the 
idea that any question that can be answered at all can best be answered by 
science.  This, in turn, is very often combined with a quite narrow conception of 
what it is for an answer, or a method of investigation, to be scientific [...].  
Together these ideas imply a narrow and homogeneous set of answers to the 
most diverse imaginable set of questions.  (2001: 1-2) 
 
Whilst I sympathise with perspectives on both sides of the debate over the status of 
science, it is important to note that our present discussion is intentionally trying to 
remove such opinion from the issue.  I make no claims as to whether or not science 
can be successful in the goals it pursues, nor do I wish to propound or dispute any 
supposed benefits of the scientific method, if such a beast exists at all.  The focus of 
this discussion is specifically directed at the implications of 'supernaturality' (for 
want of a better term) for a particular hypothesis or phenomenon's viability as a 
subject for scientific analysis.  If a scientific method is (un)successful or (un)desirable 
in a naturalistic context then it will, in general, be similarly (un)successful or 
(un)desirable in a supernaturalistic context. 
 
Although 'pseudoscience' is by no means synonymous with 'investigation of the 
supernatural', there is a clear overlap between the extensions of the two terms.  
Whilst there are many putative examples of non-supernatural 'pseudosciences', such 
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as ufology or holocaust denialism, a large proportion of those pursuits regarded as 
pseudoscientific contain at least some supernatural elements.  Hansson (2008) 
identifies astrology, dowsing and, as we have seen, creationism as examples, but as 
we saw earlier even Dupré, who is strongly opposed to scientism, considers Tarot 
reading to be clearly unscientific (though perhaps not 'pseudoscientific'). 
 
These examples reflect a common consensus, rather than a reasoned taxonomy.  
Hansson loosely defines a pseudoscience as an activity which is not scientific but 
whose "major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific" (2008).  
Though he continues on to observe that such a definition neither seems necessary 
nor sufficient in identifying those practices which we wish to call pseudoscientific.  
On the one hand, astrologists are not known for claiming themselves to be scientists.  
On the other, accepting this definition would compel us to refer to those committing 
scientific fraud as practicing pseudoscience.  Hansson is however just one of a great 
number of people who have attempted to properly define the term, and we will 
encounter several potential approaches throughout the discussion. 
 
Given the above considerations it is likely both imprudent and unnecessary for me to 
embroil myself in a debate which, as Laudan famously argued, may ultimately prove 
unresolvable: "The evident epistemic heterogeneity of the activities and beliefs 
customarily regarded as scientific should alert us to the probable futility of seeking 
an epistemic version of a demarcation criterion" (1983: 124).  Rather than attempt to 
provide any set definition of what science is, or what it is not, I will instead collate a 
'shopping list' of qualities which science has been thought to possess over the course 
of the debate, in order to determine whether or not any of them prove incompatible 
with supernatural investigation.  In addition to this, due to the great disparity in 
phenomena considered to be supernatural, a similar list of qualities will be required 
in that regard in chapter three. 
 
In order to be as comprehensive as possible in appraising the compatibility of science 
and the supernatural, I shall not overtly challenge any particular definition.  For 
example, whilst there have been numerous criticisms laid against Popperian 
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falsifiability, I shall grant it the maximum benefit of the doubt.  The question is not 
whether or not falsifiability is an attribute of science but rather, if it were an 
attribute of science, would this preclude supernatural investigation?  I will however 
occasionally identify where a criterion would preclude a particularly obvious example 
of a scientific endeavour, in order to show that it is inconsistent, or at least 
contentious, to reject the supernatural on the basis of this criterion alone. 
 
It is worth noting here that this approach is not intended as an endorsement of the 
possibility of necessary and sufficient criteria for science.  Modern approaches to the 
demarcation debate are not always construed in this way, and it would be a 
disservice to them to suggest that the only demarcation attempts made have been in 
such terms.  As Massimo Pigliucci presents a response to Laudan's condemnation of 
the demarcation problem: "Demarcation should not be attempted on the basis of a 
small set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions because 'science' 
and 'pseudoscience' are inherently Wittgensteinian family resemblance concepts" 
(2013: 25).  One might reasonably treat the NOMA principle in such a manner, with 
the borders of magisteria being fuzzier than so far presented.  However, in the 
context of the specific discussion of separation regarding the supernatural, it does 
not seem that such an approach properly reflects the history of the debate.  We are 
discussing an area in which, implicitly or explicitly, 'supernaturalism' has been 
considered a sufficient condition for exclusion from science (or, alternatively, in 
which non-supernaturalism has been considered a necessary condition for inclusion 
in science).  That said, the possibility of a more flexible approach to demarcation will 
be discussed in the closing chapter. 
 
Finally, I must clarify that when I speak of 'compatibility' between science and the 
supernatural, this is not to say that scientific findings will be in accord with 
supernatural claims, but simply that science is capable of investigating them.  As 
Lewis Wolpert describes the motivations behind creationism: "Scientific evidence is 
in direct conflict with the Scriptures.  Humans, so science claims, are closely related 
to the apes, and women do not come from Adam's rib." (1992: 148).  As we saw in 
the previous chapter, an abandonment of separationism may be of benefit to both 
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the advocate and the critic of supernaturalism.  If a supernaturalist claim is correct, 
then I am arguing that the believer should be afforded the opportunity to 
demonstrate this scientifically.  If it is incorrect, then the same opportunity should be 
afforded to their opponent. 
 
With the goals of the following two chapters established, let us turn to the potential 
definitions of what it means for something to be called 'science'. 
 
 
The content of scientific theory  
 
Before discussing the relationship between content in science and the supernatural, 
we should first acknowledge a separate distinction that is often drawn between 
science and certain other disciplines.  Though similarly hard to define, there is a 
commonly perceived divide between the 'sciences' and the 'humanities', as Hansson 
describes it: 
 
Today, "science" refers to the disciplines investigating natural phenomena and 
individual human behaviour and to some of the disciplines studying human 
societies.  Other disciplines concerned with human societies and culture are 
instead called humanities.  Hence, according to the conventions of the English 
language, political economy is a science (one of the social sciences) but classical 
philology and art history are not.  (2013: 63) 
 
The vagueness of this distinction is reflective of the discussion regarding the 
definition of science in general.  As Hansson himself argues, historically the term 
'science' could have applied to a much broader category of activity, including that 
which now falls under the banner of 'humanities'.  This is of particular importance to 
us because the term 'pseudoscience', rather than 'pseudohumanity', is often 
attributed to activities which would otherwise fall under the domain of the 
humanities, for example holocaust denialism (2013: 65). 
 
Fortunately, although there is significant overlap between our present discussion 
and the demarcation debate, we are not burdening ourselves here with the task of 
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establishing a correct definition of 'pseudoscience'.  It is not important to us whether 
holocaust denialism is rightly thought of as a pseudoscience, nor even whether or 
not creationism falls into that category.  Rather, we are concerned with whether or 
not creationism might be considered a science.  Given this task, we might ask 
ourselves what definition of science is being implied.  Are we asking whether 
creationism is a science in the modern, narrow sense, or in the broader historical 
one? 
 
Though the blurriness of the distinction between narrowly construed sciences and a 
broader set of activities including the humanities renders this question somewhat 
difficult to answer, we will be roughly assuming a narrower sense of the term for the 
purposes of this discussion.  This is informed mostly due to context, with the most 
pressing issue being the discussion of creationism and its insertion into science 
classrooms, in which it would perhaps be even less appropriate to see a discussion of 
art history than a discussion of the Biblical account of the origin of life.  This 
blurriness will become more pertinent in chapter six however where we will consider 
arguments from natural theology, which in a modern context would be more 
traditionally located in a philosophy classroom than one dedicated to science.  We 
shall leave this consideration aside for now however, and focus instead on the 
content of more widely accepted scientific disciplines. 
 
Natural Law  
 
We saw in the previous chapter that Ruse and Overton argued that supernatural 
hypotheses and phenomena were excluded from scientific investigation because 
science makes reference to 'natural law'.  According to Ruse's understanding of both 
science and religion: 
 
Religion does not insist on unbroken law.  Indeed, religious beliefs frequently 
allow or suppose events outside law or else events that violate law (miracles).  
Jesus feeding the 5,000 with the loaves and fishes was one such event.  This is 
not to say that religion is false, but it does say that religion is not science.  
(1982a: 73) 
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This is certainly a prima facie plausible understanding of both science and, if not 
religion, then at least miracles.  The feeding of the 5,000 is considered miraculous 
precisely because it seems to violate natural law, in this case the conservation of 
energy.  It is worth remembering that not all events that are considered 'miraculous' 
feature such a violation, but in the interests of fully addressing potential conflicts we 
shall focus primarily on cases where a natural law is claimed to have been breached. 
 
Although this understanding might be prima facie plausible, in order to make any 
real progress we will need to clarify exactly what we mean by 'natural law' and if it 
makes sense to discuss a 'violation' of such a law under any given definition.  If, for 
example, we consider natural laws to be universal truths, then it makes no sense to 
speak of a 'violation'.  If there exists a counterexample to any particular law, say the 
feeding of the 5,000 and the conservation of energy, then this example would be a 
defeater to the law, rather than a violation of it.  Indeed, if we are to consider the 
possibility that miraculous events actually occur, then it seems highly questionable 
that any scientific evidence could point towards a universal law of which it could be a 
violation. 
 
There have been many suggested accounts of both what natural laws actually are, 
and how we come to understand them.  In order to address this particular issue fully 
we will need to investigate each in turn and assess whether any of them could be 
considered 'violable' and whether any phenomenon we consider to be supernatural 
could constitute a violation of such a law.  Due to the scale of this discussion it shall 
be the focus of a later chapter, and thus we shall move on to other concerns for 
now. 
 
The natural world  
 
Related to, but distinct from, the idea that supernatural phenomena violate natural 
law, is the idea that supernatural phenomena lie beyond the natural world.  This can 
be interpreted quite literally, with beings posited to exist 'outside' of the 
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spatiotemporal boundaries of our universe, or it can be interpreted in a more 
figurative sense, with supernatural phenomena lying outside of the 'world' of 
empirical science, as in this statement from the [American] National Association of 
Biology Teachers (NABT): 
 
Explanations employing nonnaturalistic or supernatural events, whether or not 
explicit reference is made to a supernatural being, are outside the realm of 
science and not part of a valid science curriculum. Evolutionary theory, indeed 
all of science, is necessarily silent on religion and neither refutes nor supports 
the existence of a deity or deities.  (National Academy of Sciences, 1998) 
 
Of course, as we saw in the previous chapter, there are many reasons that a body 
such as the NABT might wish to make such a claim, especially when making specific 
reference to evolutionary theory.  It is worth noting that this statement transitions 
seamlessly from "nonnaturalistic or supernatural" to "religion" when discussing that 
which lies outside of the domain of science.  Indeed, the statement not only 
conflates these terms, but omits any definition for them.  This supports my earlier 
suggestion that the literature has tended to treat the concepts of the supernatural 
and the religious with a great degree of interchangeability. 
 
 The fact that such definitions are omitted however, should come as little surprise.  
Although, as with science, we have a reasonable sense of those things we consider 
'natural' (tables, elephants, atoms) and those which we consider 'supernatural' 
(ghosts, prophecies, spirits), we do not have terribly precise criteria for either of 
these categories.  This problem is exacerbated by the fact that putative definitions 
for each tend to be framed in terms of the other.  For example, as David Papineau  
summarises the views of self-proclaimed naturalists: "[R]eality is exhausted by 
nature, containing nothing 'supernatural', and that the scientific method should be 
used to investigate all areas of reality, including the 'human spirit'" (2007).  We see 
that naturalism is understood to be the view that the natural world is all there is, 
there are no supernatural entities.  However, once again we do not see any concrete 
definition of 'supernatural' presented, with the closest reference being a later 
comment on the potential for such entities to have causal efficacy: 
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After all, there seems nothing a priori incoherent in the idea of radically 
'supernatural' events exerting a causal influence on ordinary spatiotemporal 
processes, as is testified by the conceptual cogency of traditional stories about 
the worldly interventions of immaterial deities and other outlandish beings.  
(Papineau,  2007) 
 
We would not, I think, want to attempt to construct any definition for the 
supernatural using such a subjective notion as 'outlandishness', particularly in a 
world where modern science quite happily embraces the kinds of notions found in 
modern cosmology and quantum mechanics.  Although we might be able to build 
such a definition whilst utilising 'immateriality', it will require significant expansion.  
We do not commonly consider abstract entities such as numbers to be 'supernatural' 
even on a Platonic account.  Nor, I would argue, should we consider a dualist view of 
minds to be necessarily supernaturalist (even if we might consider it to be 
nonnaturalist).  We shall discuss the notion of immateriality in further detail in 
chapter three. 
 
As Papineau defines naturalism in terms of the rejection of supernatural entities, so 
do others define the supernatural in terms of the natural.  Paul Draper posits that if 
an entity (x) is supernatural, then: "x is not a part of nature and x can affect nature" 
(2005: 277).  Similarly, Pennock argues that: "The first and most basic characteristic 
of supernatural agents and powers is that they are above and beyond the natural 
world and its agents and powers.  Indeed, this is the very definition of the term.  
They are not constrained by natural laws or chance processes." (2006: 471). 
 
 Not only do these definitions fail to present us with any more useful method for 
differentiating supernatural phenomena from natural ones, but Draper's latter 
observation, namely that supernatural phenomena "affect nature", actually 
highlights a further difficulty we have in doing so.  If supernatural phenomena were 
understood to be outside of the natural world in the sense of being isolated from the 
causal mesh of our universe, then it would, at least in principle, be extremely easy to 
differentiate between the supernatural and the natural; we could simply point to 
those phenomena which fall outside of the causal mesh in which we find ourselves.  
As Papineau observed however, this is simply not a convincing account of what we 
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mean when we refer to supernatural phenomena.  Most, if not all, posited 
supernatural entities demonstrate at least some causal relation to us simply by being 
observed, and many are thought to do significantly more than that.  This point is 
especially forceful in light of the fact that creationists, who are positing a cause for 
the very existence of human life, are being excluded from science on the grounds of 
supernaturality. 
 
This inability to define the supernatural in isolation from the natural presents an 
extremely difficult challenge to separationists such as the NABT quoted earlier.  We 
might, in other circumstances, have identified the natural world with that which can 
be investigated by science.  However, if we are defining the natural as that which can 
be investigated by science, and the supernatural as that which is not natural, then to 
say that science cannot investigate the supernatural is just to say that science cannot 
investigate that which cannot be investigated by science.  While this is of course 
true, and tautologously so, it carries no normative force whatsoever.  Although 
separationism would be consistent according to such a definition, it would offer us 
no tools to differentiate between what can and cannot be investigated by science.  
We need, as we shall attempt to find over the course of this thesis, an understanding 
of supernaturality which is independent of science, but which also precludes 
scientific investigation if a separationist position is to be held without circularity. 
 
As well as being problematic in itself, considering the supernatural to lie outside of 
the natural world may, indirectly, undermine the idea we discussed earlier about 
such phenomena being violations of natural law.  As we saw Plantinga observe in the 
previous chapter, natural laws are classically taken to operate within a closed 
system.  In the case of natural laws, that system is the universe itself.  As God lies 
outside of the universe, then it makes no sense to speak of Him as 'violating' those 
laws. 
 
This understanding of God lying outside of the universe can avoid the notion of 
violating natural laws in three distinct ways.  We might understand God, or some 
other extra-universal entity, as obeying natural law, but accept that the universe 
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does not represent a closed system.  For example, whilst a pot of water is subject to 
the laws of thermodynamics, it is possible to increase the energy within that system 
by introducing an external heat source.  Similarly, whilst it is impossible to increase 
the mass of a given body of loaves and fish (except under extremely unusual 
conditions) to the extent that one could comfortably feed 5,000 people, this is in no 
way a problem if we simply allow for an external source of the mass.  The laws 
pertaining to the universe can be thought to hold in the same way as they do the pot 
of water.  When no outside influences are affecting the universe, then we can expect 
the contents of the universe to behave in a certain way.  When an outside influence 
is affecting the universe (for example, if God is intervening in some way), then we 
can expect the contents of the universe to behave differently, but still in accordance 
with natural law as applied to the larger system.  
 
Alternatively, we might say that natural laws apply only to the empirical universe, 
but that those laws represent a special instance of more general laws.  In this way, 
the laws of the universe relate to God in the same way that Newtonian physics 
relates to Einsteinian physics.  The principles of relativity theory do not reflect 
violations of classical mechanics, but rather classical mechanics reflects the 
approximate instantiation of relativistic principles under specific circumstances.  
Similarly, natural laws may represent the instantiation of more general principles, 
whilst limited to a narrow range of conditions.   
 
Finally, we might argue that natural laws are only those laws which apply within our 
empirical universe, but that our universe's laws represent only one set of laws 
among many.  God, though subject to some set of laws (or not), is not subject to the 
laws that apply within our universe.  However, as the laws of our universe are only 
thought to hold while the universe is a closed system, God's actions within our 
universe still do not constitute a violation of those laws, even though his actions are 
both (partially) within our universe and not in accordance with the laws that apply to 
it. 
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In each of these interpretations then, we see that there is no violation of natural law 
on God's part, however there are two important objections to note here in the 
context of the separationist debate.  Firstly, that not all supernatural phenomena are 
obviously external to the closed system of the universe: ghosts, spirits, psychic 
phenomena and so on, albeit non-physical in a sense, do appear to exist 'within' the 
boundaries of the universe.  Although one might argue that science can only 
investigate the physical universe, this seems unsupportable.  If we suppose, for 
example, that a mental realm exists, then psychology serves as a fairly clear cut 
example of scientific investigation into it.  The delineation between physical and 
non-physical in terms of scientific investigation thus seems arbitrary, at least in 
terms of distinguishing between supernatural and natural non-physical investigation.  
If there is an impediment to the scientific investigation of the non-physical, then this 
does not seem to hinge upon notions of supernaturality. 
 
Pursuant to this objection is the fact that, even supposing that supernatural entities 
do lie beyond the boundaries of a closed 'universe system', they quite clearly 
produce effects within that system.  These effects, by virtue of existing within the 
universe, thus seem perfectly investigable by science, at least by the standards so far 
outlined.  Even God, our paradigmatic example of an extra-universal entity, is 
thought to produce quite clearly intra-universal effects, including the existence of 
the universe itself.  Creationists express no intention to investigate God directly, but 
rather posit God as an explanation for phenomena which biologists investigate as a 
matter of routine.  Thus, whilst one may well wish to argue that science cannot 
investigate phenomena that lie beyond the boundaries of the natural world, this is 
not the kind of investigation being discussed by either the proponents of 
supernatural investigation or those opposing them.  In other words, one cannot 
avoid this problem by appealing to the weaker form of separationism mentioned in 
the previous chapter. 
 
As stated, we shall look further into the notion of supernatural phenomena as being 
violations of natural law in chapter four.  We shall also address the notion of God, or 
any other phenomenon, lying outside of the universe in chapter six.  For now 
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however, let us turn to one final aspect of our 'content' approach to categorising 
science: the use of mathematics. 
Mathematics  
 
Godfrey-Smith (2003: 10-11) argues that one potentially notable aspect of scientific 
theory, and in particular in the success of scientific theory, is the usage of 
mathematical tools in describing and predicting the universe.  He bolsters this 
suggestion with a quote from Galileo: 
 
Philosophy is written in this grand book of the universe, which stands 
continually open to our gaze.  But the book cannot be understood unless one 
first learns to comprehend the language and to read the alphabet in which it is 
composed.  It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are 
triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is humanly 
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about 
in a dark labyrinth.  ([1623] 1990: 237-38) 
 
Although the charge of lack of mathematical rigour has not been overtly levelled 
against the investigation of the supernatural in the literature, this certainly captures 
some of the attitudes that we have seen during our discussion: the notion that 
science is systematic and objective, relying quite literally upon facts and figures, as 
opposed to the more 'mystical' and 'spooky' realm of supernaturalism.  While this 
kind of distinction might seem superficially appealing, a mathematical approach 
seems to be neither necessary, nor sufficient, for the exclusion of the supernatural 
from science.  As Godfrey-Smith observes regarding Darwin's On the Origin of 
Species, which is the antithesis of creationism, the arguments within the treatise do 
not rely heavily on mathematics, but we would surely not take this as reason to think 
it unscientific (2003: 11-12). 
 
Conversely, there are many instances of supernaturalists employing almost 
exclusively mathematical arguments in advocating the existence of supernatural 
beings.  This is seen prominently in the work of Intelligent Design theorists in their 
contention that the probability of life originating unaided is insurmountably low.  As 
we shall discuss in chapter six, it is also seen in arguments regarding the 'fine-tuning' 
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of the universe which, although they are less frequently cited in cultural or 
philosophical discussion of the topic, bear a striking resemblance to both Intelligent 
Design arguments and those involved in at least some forms of multiverse theory.   
 
One might argue that Intelligent Design theorists are not, in fact, utilising 
mathematics to establish the existence of supernatural phenomena, but rather doing 
so to undermine a naturalistic theory.  Thus they are not practising supernaturalistic 
science, but simply naturalistic science.  Even granting that their arguments confirm 
that a designer of life as we know it must exist, there is nothing to support the idea 
that this being must be supernatural in nature, with ideas such as panspermia 
providing a viable alternative hypothesis.  This would align with the kind of 'weak' 
separationism discussed earlier. 
 
However, as we shall again discuss in chapter six, Intelligent Design theorists, as well 
as defenders of other natural theological arguments, claim that there are reasons 
not simply to dismiss proposed naturalistic explanations, but to posit supernatural 
ones.  Although the relationship between natural theology and science is a 
somewhat murkier discussion than other issues we shall consider, it is simply 
factually incorrect that supernaturalists have not employed mathematics to defend 
their positions.  Thus we cannot justifiably exclude supernaturalist hypotheses from 
scientific investigation on the grounds that they are not spoken in Galileo's language 
of the universe; for one because this is not something we demand of scientific 
theories elsewhere, and for two because this is simply an unfair assessment of the 
state of the debate. 
 
 
The methodology of science  
 
The second of our potential categories for science is that of methodology.  This is an 
extremely appealing category for demarcation in many ways, and we make frequent 
usage of the term 'scientific method' in everyday discourse on the subject.  It is not 
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in practice, however, such an easy term to pin down.  "Although describing a special 
scientific method looks like a natural thing to try to do, during the twentieth century 
many philosophers and others became sceptical about the idea of giving anything 
like a recipe for science.  Science, it was argued, is too creative and unpredictable a 
process for there to be a recipe that describes it – this is especially true in the case of 
great scientists like Newton, Darwin or Einstein." (Godfrey-Smith, 2003: 7).  As with 
our discussion of content let us again, rather than attempt to outline any concrete or 
accepted understanding of 'the scientific method', address some of the features 
which have been thought to comprise it, and potentially conflict with supernatural 
investigation. 
 
Testability  
 
To once again return to the criteria for science laid out by Ruse and Overton, we shall 
begin with their suggestion that a scientific hypothesis or theory must, at least in 
principle, be testable and falsifiable.  As Ruse makes the point: "A genuine scientific 
theory lays itself open to check against the real world: the scientist can see if the 
inferences made in explanation and prediction actually obtain in nature" (1982a: 73). 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Ruse considers the falsifiability criterion laid out 
by Karl Popper, to be a "rough and ready" approach.  Popper's account is by no 
means uncontroversial, and shall receive a more thorough treatment, alongside 
several other of the methodological approaches to science, in chapter five.  For now 
however, let us grant that science could, in principle, have a falsifiability criterion, 
and that any hypothesis or theory which does not satisfy it falls outside of the 
domain of science. 
 
It is not obvious that even granting falsifiability as a criterion for science demands 
the exclusion of the supernatural.  Many supernaturalistic claims have, at least by 
the standards adopted by a very general 'mainstream' scientific community, been 
both tested and satisfactorily falsified.  As Hansson (2008) observes: "Astrology, 
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rightly taken by Popper as an unusually clear example of a pseudoscience, has in fact 
been tested and thoroughly refuted".  One may adopt a similar position regarding 
creationism, as indeed Ruse himself seems to have: "I believe Creationism is wrong; 
totally, utterly, and absolutely wrong.  I would go further.  There are degrees of 
being wrong.  The creationists are at the bottom of the scale." (1982b: 303). 
 
Even though we can see that at least some supernatural claims are commonly held 
to be falsifiable, Ruse's criterion for science does not actually seem so strong as to 
demand it.  The description of scientific standard outlined seems to simply require 
that there be some empirical support for a scientific claim, with a particular 
emphasis on prediction.  However, predictive success does not imply that a theory is 
falsifiable.  A successful prediction does not prove a hypothesis, because another 
incompatible hypothesis may make the same prediction, and a failed prediction does 
not disprove a hypothesis unless it is impossible for the hypothesis to be true and 
the prediction to fail, which will in practice never be the case due to the number of 
auxiliary assumptions involved in scientific testing. 
 
This weaker standard might seem tempting when one thinks about theistic claims, in 
particular when one considers creationism.  We simply cannot go back and check if 
God created complex life fully formed and, unlike naturalistic evolutionary theories, 
there is no reason to suppose any evidence in favour of such a hypothesis would 
obtain in the present day.  Miraculous events, at least on a primary reading6, 
represent one-off interventions in the natural course of history, without any obvious 
method for scientific appraisal.  As Stephen Schafersman argues: "If supernaturalism 
were true, miracles would allow unique, non-repeating, and non-controllable events 
to cause natural effects that would be incomprehensible using empirical methods of 
investigation" (1997). 
 
Despite these concerns, I would argue that not only is such a criterion unreasonable 
as a basis on which to exclude the supernatural in general from science, but will not 
                                                 
6 The nature of miracles, and whether such an interpretation is appropriate will be discussed in 
chapter four. 
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even exclude creationism itself.  Many apparently supernatural claims have 
obviously empirically testable elements ("Look, there is a ghost over there!"), 
including many relating directly to theistic doctrine.  Although we might not expect 
there to be any evidence remaining from an act of divine creation, save perhaps for 
the absence of, for instance, transitional forms in the fossil record, we would most 
certainly expect to find evidence of a worldwide flood having occurred at some point 
in the past 6,000 years.  As will become a repeated feature of our investigation, we 
find that although some specific supernatural phenomena may prove unable to 
admit of empirical testing, this is not a direct result of their supernaturality, but 
rather due to other factors. 
 
To consider this point in terms of creationist doctrine, one of the most prominent 
arguments put forward by Intelligent Design theorists has been the notion of 
"irreducible complexity", first introduced by Michael Behe: 
 
By irreducibly complex I mean a single system composed of several well-
matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, wherein the 
removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease 
functioning.  An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced directly (that 
is, by continuously improving the initial function, which continues to work by 
the same mechanism) by slight, successive modifications of a precursor system, 
because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is 
by definition nonfunctional.  An irreducibly complex biological system, if there is 
such a thing, would be a powerful challenge to Darwinian evolution.  (1996: 39) 
 
Although, as many have7, one might object to the notion that any example of such 
an irreducibly complex system actually has been demonstrated to exist, there is 
nothing in principle to say that such a system could not exist and be the result of a 
supernatural creator.  More importantly however, such an objection says nothing as 
to whether or not a supernatural creator hypothesis, based upon irreducible 
complexity, is scientific on Ruse's standard.  Let us now look at each of our 
interpretations in turn, as they raise different concerns. 
 
                                                 
7 As Judge John E. Jones concluded at Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District: "We therefore find that 
Professor Behe's claim for irreducible complexity has been refuted in peer-reviewed research papers 
and has been rejected by the scientific community at large." (Monroe, 2012: 29). 
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Taking Ruse to be implying some variant of Popperian falsifiability, we can see that 
the previous objection actually supports the claim that irreducible complexity, and by 
extension Intelligent Design, can be scientific.  If we take any particular system 
posited to be irreducibly complex and find that we can remove a part of it and still 
find a functioning system, then we have falsified the claim that the system was 
irreducibly complex.  Thus by disproving the claim that a system is irreducibly 
complex, we have confirmed that the hypothesis met the scientific standard 
currently in question. 
 
One might object that this claim has not falsified the existence of irreducible 
complexity, but merely falsified the claim that the specific system in question is 
irreducibly complex.  Thus, whilst one can make falsifiable claims utilising Behe's 
concept, the proposition itself, and its implication that life requires a designer, is not 
falsifiable.  This objection, however, is irrelevant to the question regarding 
separationism.  The distinction is being drawn between two claims: "Some systems 
in nature are irreducibly complex, and require a supernatural designer" and "This 
particular system in nature is irreducibly complex, and requires a supernatural 
designer".  According to this objection, whilst the latter of these claims is falsifiable, 
the former is not, and thus only the latter is scientifically investigable.  However, 
both of these claims are supernaturalistic, and thus clearly the property of 
supernaturality is not the determining factor in whether or not either claim is 
scientific.  Rather, the former claim is simply an example of an unrestricted claim 
such as "There is a comet", and it is by virtue of this that the claim is rendered 
unfalsifiable (Martin, 2002). 
 
Let us turn then to the second interpretation of Ruse's criteria, that of being open to 
empirical checking.  It seems obvious that if we can falsify a claim that it is thus open 
to such checking, but there are two key issues that arise here.  Firstly, whilst we 
might be able to falsify the claim that a specific system is irreducibly complex, it is 
not so clear that if we fail to do this we have therefore shown that the system is 
irreducibly complex.  It will always be epistemically possible that some unknown 
function to a reduced system exists, and thus we could never actually confirm that 
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any irreducibly complex system existed.  Once again, however, this objection is much 
more general to scientific enquiry, and the supernaturality of the claim plays no role 
in the difficulty posed. 
 
The second issue that arises is slightly more problematic.  Even if we grant that some 
system has been confirmed to be irreducibly complex, this does not necessarily imply 
that it is the result of supernatural intervention.  Thus whilst we might accept 
irreducible complexity as a scientifically investigable phenomenon, there is no 
inherent supernaturality to this concept8, and therefore we can maintain a perfectly 
consistent weak separationist position by admitting that irreducible complexity is 
scientific, but maintaining that any hypotheses regarding a supernatural source of 
this complexity is not. 
 
This approach is not, however, in line with Ruse's outline for how we should 
understand scientific investigation.  Ruse makes no demand that a phenomenon 
should be directly observable or testable, which would prove devastating to a vast 
array of scientific theories, but only that testable predictions should be derivable 
from scientific hypotheses.  As Laudan notes: "It is now widely acknowledged that 
many scientific claims are not testable in isolation, but only when embedded in a 
larger system of statements, some of whose consequences can be submitted to test" 
(1982: 17).  Thus neither strong nor weak separationism can be justified on such 
grounds. 
 
This, however, is exactly what irreducible complexity does.  Whilst I do not wish to 
speak for Behe's motivation in arriving at the concept, we can quite comfortably 
presume (based on our discussion in chapter one) that much of the Intelligent Design 
movement has been forwarded as an attempt to make religious claims scientific.  
This means that Intelligent Design theorists are positing that if a supernatural creator 
of complex life exists, then there will be evidence of design in that life, with 
                                                 
8 As we saw in the previous chapter, removing supernatural elements from the claims made in 
opposition to evolution was a driving force behind the shift from creationism to creation science and 
Intelligent Design. 
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irreducible complexity being a posited example of such evidence.  Thus the existence 
of irreducible complexity in life represents exactly the kind of predictive claim that 
Ruse is demanding, and it is a prediction based on a supernatural hypothesis. 
 
Before moving on to our next methodological description of science, it is worth 
noting here that not only are we unable to utilise untestability as a method for 
excluding the supernatural from science, but we are also unable to use it a means of 
defining supernaturality itself.  We saw earlier in the chapter that attempts to define 
the supernatural in terms of that which is not natural leads to circularity, and 
although we might simply stipulate that the supernatural is that which cannot be 
investigated by science, we would then be unable to justify the exclusion of any 
phenomena from scientific investigation solely on the grounds of supernaturality.  
However, if we take science to necessarily involve testability, then we encounter a 
further problem as untestability is not limited to phenomena that we wish to refer to 
as supernatural. 
 
Perhaps the most famous example of an untestable object is Russell's teapot: "If I 
were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving 
about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion 
provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our 
most powerful telescopes" (1952: 547-548).  This presents a clearly untestable 
phenomenon, but unless we wish to commit ourselves to referring to this teapot as 
being in some way supernatural, then we cannot commit to both a necessary 
testability criterion for science and a definition of supernaturality which refers solely 
to that which cannot be scientifically investigated. 
 
Explanation and prediction  
 
Perhaps, rather than focusing on the testability aspect of Ruse's criteria, we might 
instead focus on the explanation and prediction.  If we return to the idea that 
supernatural phenomena are in some way unbound by the laws of nature, then we 
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may conclude that this renders them necessarily unpredictable.  As both making and 
testing predictions constitutes a large part of scientific method, we might thus be 
inclined to reject the supernatural on this basis. 
 
Again, I do not wish to delve too deeply into the question of whether or not such a 
criterion is actually a requirement for science, but it is worth noting that such a 
condition could potentially pose problems for several phenomena which we would 
like to investigate scientifically.  One-off occurrences such as the Big Bang and the 
origin of life, and arguably unpredictable phenomena such as some of those seen in 
chaos theory and quantum mechanics all pose problems for an account of science 
that demands predictability, yet we would not consider these phenomena to be 
beyond scientific appraisal.  Instead we make inferences regarding these 
phenomena, and attempt to investigate them with whatever degree of predictability 
we can attain. 
 
Moreoverhere does not seem to be any obvious reason to assume that those 
phenomena we commonly consider to be supernatural should be unpredictable.  
Indeed, without submitting such phenomena to scientific testing, how could we 
possibly determine that they did not conform to any predictable laws, natural or 
otherwise?  What is there in our understanding of ghosts or deities that demands 
that they should act entirely erratically — or erratically at all?  Even supposing that 
some aspects of 'supernatural' phenomena will forever remain beyond our 
comprehension, it does not then follow that no aspect of those phenomena should 
be subject to scientific enquiry.  Surely we would need to do much scientific 
investigation of these phenomena before we could ever make such a strong claim as 
to deem them not just unpredictable in practice, but in principle?   
 
For centuries scientists have recognized a difference between establishing the 
existence of a phenomenon and explaining that phenomenon in a lawlike way.  
Our ultimate goal, no doubt, is to do both.  But to suggest… that an existence 
claim is unscientific until we have found the laws on which the alleged 
phenomenon depends is simply outrageous.  Galileo and Newton took 
themselves to have established the existence of gravitational phenomena, long 
before anyone was able to give a causal or explanatory account of gravitation.  
(Laudan, 1982: 18) 
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Even if we disregard such considerations, and take Ruse and Schafersman's criteria 
to reflect requirements for being science, it is not obvious that the supernatural 
phenomena with which we are familiar fail to meet such conditions.  The previous 
discussion of irreducible complexity, as well as cosmological and fine-tuning 
arguments, hinge on the idea that acts of a transcendent creator do offer 
explanatory power.  Even the more fantastical tales of ghosts and ghouls do not 
display any obvious traits of unpredictability, with such phenomena behaving largely 
as one would expect any other creature to, albeit non-corporeally.  Moreover what, 
if anything, could better reflect an example of testable and predictable claims than 
those made by astrologists and psychics9? 
 
Although we might argue that supernatural phenomena could offer explanatory 
power, we saw in the previous chapter that many supernaturalists actually reject 
such an understanding.  For example we heard from Chief Rabbi Sacks arguing that 
religion is about interpretative, rather than explanatory, understanding of the world 
around us.  This may very well be true, and we shall discuss the idea that an 
explanatory approach to an understanding of religious claims is misguided in chapter 
seven.  However whilst a religious person, speaking in a particular religious context, 
may well be disinterested in discussing God as an explanation for the universe, this in 
no way prevents anyone else from approaching the topic from that perspective.  We 
can grant Lennox's argument that science cannot investigate why Aunt Matilda 
baked the cake, without having to grant that they cannot investigate if she made it.  
That religion is focused on the former question in no way suggests that science must 
therefore ignore the latter. 
 
Methodological naturalism and explanation  
 
Rather than argue that supernatural phenomena cannot be understood as scientific 
explanations, we might argue that there are reasons that we should exhaust all 
                                                 
9 This is approaching the issue from a theoretical perspective.  In practice, the vagueness of the claims 
made may render them untestable, although this has nothing to do with the supernaturality of the 
phenomena in question. 
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possible naturalistic explanations before positing supernaturalistic ones.  I will 
discuss three such arguments here, though the first two shall be treated as a pair. 
 
The first argument for adopting methodological naturalism before looking for 
supernaturalistic explanations is that we have good inductive reasons for thinking 
that a naturalistic explanation will be found.  This argument appeals to the historical 
success of such explanations, and an interpretation of the history of science whereby 
scientific understandings of, say, earthquakes, have replaced supernatural ideas.  In 
that particular case the discovery of plate tectonics overturning notions of angered 
deities.  I will not discuss the accuracy of such a historical interpretation here, though 
the popular impression of scientific discoveries conflicting with and usurping 
religious understandings is by no means uncontroversial.  As Gary Ferngren argues: 
 
[T]he growing recognition among historians of science [is] that the relationship 
of religion and science has been much more positive than is sometimes 
thought.  Although popular images of controversy continue to exemplify the 
supposed hostility of Christianity to new scientific theories, studies have shown 
that Christianity has often nurtured and encouraged scientific endeavour, while 
at other times the two have co-existed without either tension or attempts at 
harmonization.  If Galileo and the Scopes trial come to mind as examples of 
conflict, they were the exceptions rather than the rule.  (2002: ix) 
 
The second argument for adopting methodological naturalism for as long as possible 
is that supernaturalistic explanations represent 'science stoppers'.  This is the idea 
that supernatural hypotheses, by virtue of lying beyond scientific testing, and 
offering no predictable implications, put a stop to any further scientific investigation.  
As Plantinga describes the problem: "How does it happen that there is such a thing 
as light?  Well, God said, 'Let there be light' and there was light.  This is of course 
true, and of enormous importance, but taken as science it isn't helpful; it doesn't 
help us find out more about light, what its physical character is, how it is related to 
other things, and the like." (1997: 152). 
 
Although both of these arguments might support an initial methodological 
naturalism and, perhaps, support the notion that a supernatural explanation is 
unlikely, neither seem to suggest that a supernatural explanation could never be 
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acceptable.  We might, based on the first argument, wish to say that we would never 
reach a stage in practice where we would be justified in accepting a supernaturalistic 
explanation, as there may exist an unknown naturalistic explanation.  However, even 
accepting this conclusion, there is no reason to infer from this that supernaturalistic 
explanations are unscientific, for one could equally claim this about any number of 
naturalistic explanations which are also deemed unlikely.  It is hard to imagine, given 
our current knowledge, a situation whereby we accepted a theory of combustion 
that relied on the existence of phlogiston, but this by no means suggests that 
phlogiston-based theories lie beyond the scope of scientific procedure. 
 
Moreover, one might argue that these arguments misunderstand supernaturalist 
claims.  In Plantinga's example regarding the origin of light, God is being treated as a 
temporally prior cause to the existence of light, effectively 'flicking the switch' and 
then playing no further explanatory role; He is only being posited as a last resort 
once all of the alternative avenues of investigation have been exhausted, filling in 
the gaps where naturalistic science has failed to find a solution.  However, neither of 
these modes of thought adequately reflect the attitudes of a theistic belief in God, 
nor the theistic understanding of God's relation to the universe10.  As Plantinga goes 
on to argue: "The Christian community knows that God is constantly active in his 
creation, that natural laws, if there are any, are not independent of God, and that 
the existence of God is certainly not a hypothesis designed to explain what science 
cannot" (1997: 150). 
 
Plantinga does, however, acknowledge a third potential argument for 
methodological naturalism, derived from the work of Pierre Duhem: "If theoretical 
physics is subordinated to metaphysics, the divisions separating the diverse 
metaphysical systems will extend into the domain of physics.  A physical theory 
reputed to be satisfactory by the sectarians of one metaphysical school will be 
rejected by the partisans of another school" ([1906] 1991: 10-11).  In other words, 
science would not be able to function if everyone involved in it brought disparate 
                                                 
10 I will discuss religious attitudes towards the relationship between science and religion in chapter 
seven. 
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metaphysical assumptions to the table when assessing a hypothesis.  Plantinga 
responds to this argument by suggesting that we distinguish between two forms of 
scientific practice: Duhemian science where everyone works under the same 
metaphysical framework, and non-Duhemian science where smaller groups can 
practice scientific enquiry according to their own metaphysical structures.  This is a 
suggestion that will require further discussion later in the chapter when we discuss 
the social structure of science, but while we are on the subject of metaphysical 
assumptions, this is a useful juncture to briefly discuss anti-realist approaches to 
science. 
 
Anti-realist approaches to science and the supernatural  
 
We are, for the purposes of this discussion, assuming that science aims to capture 
'truth' or, perhaps less ambiguously, that scientific theories in some way correspond 
to reality.  Without this assumption it is difficult to see in what way science and 
religion could be thought to conflict.  If the theory of evolution is not thought to 
describe a real history of the world then it is impossible for it to contradict with 
creationist doctrine which is also being understood in this fashion (for which reason 
we must also assume that supernaturalist claims are thought in some way to 
correspond to 'reality').  That said, the language and concepts we associate with the 
supernaturalist debate have echoes of the debates over 'unobservables' in 
discussions of scientific realism.  Although the notion of scientific realism is 
somewhat broad, we shall roughly understand it as the notion that science is able to 
make claims regarding the existence of unobservable phenomena.  As Michael Devitt 
defines the concept: 
 
Scientific realism: Most of the essential unobservables of well-established 
current scientific theories exist mind-independently.  (2008: 225) 
 
Though it would be imprudent to suggest that this definition covers the entirety of 
thought on the subject, it serves as a sufficient illustration for our purposes.  What is 
important to our discussion is not the specific terminology involved in defining 
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realism, but rather the shared emphasis on observable and unobservable aspects of 
reality.  As Richard Boyd summarises: 
 
[M]ost define scientific realism in terms of the truth or approximate truth of 
scientific theories or certain aspects of theories.  Some define it in terms of the 
successful reference of theoretical terms to things in the world, both observable 
and unobservable [...].  Others define scientific realism not in terms of truth or 
reference, but in terms of belief in the ontology of scientific theories.  What all 
of these approaches have in common is a commitment to the idea that our best 
theories have a certain epistemic status: they yield knowledge of aspects of the 
world, including unobservable aspects.  (2011) 
 
Although we have not encountered an explicit definition of the 'supernatural' that 
relies on supernatural phenomena being unobservable, I do not think it a stretch to 
draw a connection here.  Particularly in the area of theism, the literature frequently 
brings the two into comparison, if not implicitly conflating them: 
 
We should not suppose that the problem with predictive expansion, as it 
pertains to purported supernatural explanations, lies merely in the fact that 
God, as a supernatural cause, is in principle unobservable.  (Corner, 2007) 
 
In both the dispute over the unobservable entities posited by scientists and the 
dispute over whether there is a God, there is, of course, an agnostic position, 
namely suspending judgement.  (Forrest, 1996: 2) 
 
There is not space here for a thorough treatment of the debate over scientific 
realism, though we will encounter some overlapping issues with regard to inferences 
to best explanation in later chapters.  To briefly summarise, we might defend realist 
supernaturalistic explanations in science in the same way that a defence of a realist 
view of electrons might follow from the aptly named 'no-miracles' argument 
forwarded by Hilary Putnam: "Realism is the only philosophy that does not make the 
success of science a miracle" (1975: 73).  Of course, such an argument could only 
apply if supernatural hypotheses served to provide similar predictive success as 
those regarding electrons. 
 
Alternatively, as we shall discuss in chapter six, many of the arguments on what we 
might consider the borderlines between science and religion may be understood to 
be structured in the form of inferences to best explanations, rather than the kind of 
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testable hypotheses we might see in a hypothetico-deductive model.  Indeed, we 
have seen the beginnings of this discussion in our earlier overview of creationism 
and its inference to a designer from observations in the natural world.  Later we shall 
see this in arguments from fine-tuning, as well as anti-supernaturalist arguments 
such as the evidential version of the problem of evil.  We might therefore be able to 
argue that if science can utilise such inferences in naturalistic hypotheses, then it 
could do the same for supernaturalistic ones. 
 
Inferences to best explanations have not been without controversy.  Bas Van 
Fraassen, a notable critic of scientific realism, has argued that even if we grant that 
inferences to best explanations are a worthy rule of inference, then the realist still 
requires an extra premise in order to defend their position, namely that we need to 
be committed to one of a range of hypotheses being true.  However there is no 
requirement, in van Fraassen's view, that we should make such a commitment: "I am 
committed to the view that T is true or T is false, but not thereby committed to an 
inferential move to one of the two!  The rule operates only if I have decided not to 
remain neutral between these two possibilities." (1980: 22). 
 
In contrast to the realist view, van Fraassen argues for 'constructive empiricism', the 
view that: "Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and 
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate" (1980: 
12).  Here, a theory is empirically adequate if the claims it makes regarding 
observable entities are true, but this need not be the case for the unobservable 
ones, if any such entities do indeed exist.  Thus whilst we might consider an 
inference to the existence of some unobservable entity to be the best explanation 
for the truth of our observations, we are not committed to such reasoning.  So long 
as the theory is empirically adequate regarding observables, we need make no 
inferences regarding its non-observable content. 
 
In the context of our discussion, we are assuming that science makes claims 
regarding unobservables which are in fact true, or at least are intended to be 
regarded as true.  However, we might be inclined to adopt a weak separationist 
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position on similar grounds to van Fraassen.  We can commit to the truth of scientific 
claims regarding observable (natural) entities, without having to accept that science 
makes truth claims regarding unobservable (supernatural) entities.  The NOMA 
principle here can be read to indicate that science can make truth claims regarding 
the natural realm, but not the supernatural realm, in the same way that it can make 
truth claims about the observable effects of combining sodium chloride and silver 
nitrate, but not about the supposedly underlying interactions between particles 
posited by chemists to explain those effects.  If no truth claims are made regarding 
the supernatural realm by scientists, then there can be no conflict, and indeed no 
interaction at all, between science and supernaturalism.  This echoes the work of 
Duhem, who wrote in 'Physics of a Believer' that: 
 
[M]etaphysical and religious doctrines are judgments touching on objective 
reality, whereas the principles of physical theory are propositions relative to 
certain mathematical signs stripped of all objective existence.  Since they do not 
have any common term, these two sorts of judgments can neither contradict 
nor agree with each other.  ([1906] 1991: 285) 
 
While this might make some sense of the NOMA principle, it suffers from several 
major flaws in the context of our discussion.  Firstly, from a normative perspective, 
we simply cannot justify applying a separationist position in any kind of legal capacity 
by such an appeal.  Van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, or any form of anti-
realism, has gained nowhere near enough support within the philosophy of science 
(let alone the scientific community) to warrant the kind of exclusionary policies at 
hand.  Although we cannot dismiss the possibility that anti-realism is indeed a 
'correct' approach to science, and perhaps will one day be a prevailing viewpoint, it 
is not the case at present that anti-realism is successful enough to stand as a basis 
for the exclusion of creationism from science. 
 
More problematically, and more fundamentally, the separation between science and 
religion affected by the debate between realism and anti-realism doesn't depend on 
anything to do with the supernatural.  Whether or not science can investigate 
unobservables is an issue which has bearing on whether or not science can 
investigate supernatural phenomena, but it does not do so by virtue of them being 
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supernatural.  Thus, while this is an interesting issue, it isn't relevant to the subject of 
discussion at hand.  Even if it were, the adoption of anti-realism seems a high price 
to pay in order to avoid perceived conflict between science and the supernatural. 
 
Finally, while an anti-realist approach to the supernatural in science cannot conflict 
with a realist approach to the supernatural, it would be wrong to summarise the 
anti-realist position as analogous to the kind of exclusion being forwarded by 
separationists.  Separationists have not just argued that science makes no claims 
regarding the truth of supernaturalist or religious claims, but that supernatural or 
religious hypotheses can play no role in scientific theory outright.  This is equivalent 
not to saying that we should remain agnostic regarding truth claims concerning 
electrons, but to saying that electrons should not appear at all anywhere in scientific 
theory.  Clearly this is a significantly stronger, and significantly less palatable, claim.  
If supernaturalist theories provided the kind of 'empirical adequacy' that van 
Fraassen is seeking, then agnosticism regarding their truth value does not prevent 
them from playing a role in scientific theory. 
 
Tentativeness and Integrity  
 
In his commentary on the Arkansas case, Ruse argues that science differs from both 
philosophy and religion because scientific theories are adjusted in the light of new 
empirical evidence: "Scientists differ from both the philosophers and the 
theologians.  Nothing in the real world would make the Kantian change his mind, and 
the Catholic is equally dogmatic." (1982a: 73).  I would like to address this issue in 
two different ways, firstly on the assumption that Ruse is correct in his claim that 
science is necessarily free from dogmatism, and then by asking whether this 
assumption is a warranted or even desirable one. 
 
Let us assume then that Ruse is correct.  As Judge Overton argued in the Arkansas 
trial: "A theory that is by its own terms dogmatic, absolutist, and never subject to 
revision is not a scientific theory" (Dorman 1996).  I will not deny that if this 
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summary is accurate then religious fundamentalism may indeed be regarded as 
unscientific for precisely these reasons.  Nor will I deny that a great many of the 
prominent creation scientists or Intelligent Design theorists fall into exactly this 
category regardless of any pretensions to performing open-minded enquiry.  What I 
will argue however, is that this conclusion fails to undermine the status of 
creationism as science, let alone undermine the status of supernatural claims in 
general. 
 
Firstly it must be noted that a lack of tentativeness is not a defining characteristic of 
all creationists.  As Stephen Jay Gould observed: "Creationists have tightened their 
act.  They now argue that God only created 'basic kinds', and allowed for limited 
evolutionary meandering within them." (1983: 257).  Now it should be made clear 
that Gould was not defending creationism here, and was in fact one of its strongest 
opponents, but this point does show that on some level creationists are willing to 
adapt their ideas in order to deal with overwhelming scientific opposition.  Perhaps 
not enough to be deemed scientific by the standards Ruse and Overton intended to 
imply, but they are capable of adjusting their position, at least to a small degree. 
 
Although this may seem a trivially small concession, absolute tentativeness is not a 
defining characteristic of the majority of accepted scientists.  As Laudan observes: 
"Are quantum mechanicians willing to contemplate giving up the uncertainty 
relation?  Are physicists willing to specify circumstances under which they would give 
up energy conservation?"  (1982: 17).  Indeed, in Darwinism Defended, Ruse himself 
argues that: "evolution is fact, fact, FACT!" (1982b: 58, emphasis as original).  Even if 
one defends the idea that scientists in general are willing to give up their most 
ardently defended beliefs more easily than creationists, it is not so clearly a 
distinguishing feature of 'genuine' science as seems to be implied.  Absolute 
tentativeness thus seems a poor basis on which to argue that creationism is 
unscientific, but any lowered standard of tentativeness is one that creationists may 
already have passed. 
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There is a related issue with this type of objection to creationism that should be 
addressed now as it pervades the discussion, and that is the accusation that 
creationists are not scientists because a necessary feature of a scientist is integrity.  
As Ruse scathingly claims: "Creation scientists use any fallacy in the logic books to 
achieve their ends.  Most particularly, apart from grossly distorting evolutionists' 
positions, the creation scientists frequently use inappropriate or incomplete 
quotations." (1982a: 76).  Generalisations aside, I do not believe that Ruse is being 
particularly unfair here.  For example, Ben Stein's 2008 film Expelled: No Intelligence 
Allowed presented numerous inaccuracies regarding both evolution and the debate 
in order to make its point.  This included incomplete accounts of personal stories to 
suggest that anyone in the scientific community who voices sympathy for Intelligent 
Design is immediately ostracised, with selectively edited interviews (including with 
Dawkins himself) to suggest that the interviewee might support Intelligent Design, 
and even editing a passage from Darwin's On the Origin of Species in order to imply a 
direct link between Darwin's views, Nazism and eugenics (Mirsky, 2008). 
 
Although these actions by the makers of Expelled seem quite clearly to lack the sort 
of integrity Ruse suggests is required of science, it should also be clear that even this 
anecdotal evidence is a reflection on specific supporters of creationism, and not 
creationism itself.  We saw in the previous chapter that much of the discussion over 
supernaturalism in science has been muddied by other factors and that it is the aim 
of this thesis to try to extract those issues from the discussion.  However, we must 
take care not to eliminate theories or entire ontologies from science solely on the 
grounds that some or even all of their proponents have been seen to act without 
integrity.  Moreover, as I noted earlier in this chapter, while it would seem at least 
instinctively inappropriate to class scientific fraud as pseudoscience, it would 
certainly be inappropriate for scientific fraud to render the field in which it occurs 
pseudoscience.  One person intentionally misrepresenting geological data is no 
reason to class geology as a pseudoscience11.  In the same way it is inappropriate to 
reject creationism as science because of the actions of specific creationists. 
                                                 
11 Ironically enough, some ID proponents still (misleadingly) cite the infamous case of 'Haeckel's 
embryos', in which Darwin unknowingly used falsified evidence for evolution as support for his 
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If neither integrity nor tentativeness are an appropriate criteria for excluding the 
supernatural from science, on the grounds that it seems perfectly possible for 
supernaturalists to demonstrate these qualities to the same degree as any other 
practitioner of science, then it would seem prudent to move on at this stage.  
However, as I noted at the start of this section, one might argue that actually 
tentativeness is not a desirable criterion for science.  If this is the case then even if 
supernaturalists were inherently incapable of tentativeness, either through dogmatic 
commitment to religion or for any other reason, then even this would not necessarily 
force their exclusion. 
 
We saw earlier in the chapter that there are arguments in favour of 'methodological 
naturalism' in science.  Specifically we saw that we have inductive reasons for 
believing that for any given unexplained phenomenon, we should suppose its 
explanation to be natural and thus aim to exhaust naturalistic explanations before 
looking for supernaturalistic ones.  Here we see an argument that actively 
discourages tentativeness in scientific practice, instead endorsing the assumption of 
naturalism until it is no longer possible to do so.  Indeed, Kuhn argued that in periods 
of "normal science", scientists should not question any of the central tenets of a 
theory: "On the contrary, when engaged with a normal research problem, the 
scientist must premise current theory as the rules of his game" (1974: 801). 
 
One might extend this argument and suggest that naturalism, in modern Western 
science, represents a kind of Kuhnian paradigm.  In which case, again, tentativeness 
regarding supernatural phenomena is entirely within the scope of legitimate 
scientific methodology.  However, one must be careful in doing so, and moreover, 
one must be honest about it.  Kuhnian paradigms are not understood as merely 
pragmatic assumptions, but rather as prevailing scientific theories which, in the 
context of this thesis, are to be taken as attempted approximations of 'truth'.  Prior 
                                                                                                                                            
theory, as a justification for writing off evolution: "Haeckel's embryos seem to provide such powerful 
evidence for Darwin's theory that some version of them can be found in almost every modern 
textbook dealing with evolutionary theory [...].  Although you might never know it from reading 
biology textbooks, Darwin's 'strongest single class of facts' is a classic example of how evidence can be 
twisted to fit a theory." (Wells, 2000: 82-83). 
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to relativity, conformance to Newtonian mechanics was not a mere practical 
assumption made for the purposes of efficient scientific methodology, but rather 
taken to accurately describe the nature of reality.  Interpreting naturalism as such a 
paradigm would then not be a determination that supernaturalism was not part of 
science, but rather that supernaturalism was false. 
 
The notion that supernaturalism is, in fact, false is often flirted with in the literature 
but not made explicit.  As Pennock argues: 
 
Take the geocentric view of the world, which is still advanced by some 
creationists.  While one may say that such a claim was historically scientific or 
even that it remains scientific in the abstract sense that it is testable, it would 
nevertheless be fair to conclude, because this claim has been decisively 
disconfirmed (at least under the assumptions of MN), that it is unscientific to 
continue to hold and teach it today.  The scientific picture of the world does not 
include claims that have been decisively refuted and effectively relegated to the 
dustbin of scientific history.  (2009: 557) 
 
Pennock argues that creationist claims share this feature, and thus should not be 
considered "scientific" for the same reasons.  While this may, defensibly, be a charge 
laid against the specific claims made by creationists to date, it does not seem to be a 
charge generalisable to creationism itself, and certainly not to the supernatural as a 
whole (which with the limiting "under the assumptions of MN", Pennock seems to 
acknowledge).  Indeed, the idea that supernaturalism, and even creationism in 
particular, are comparable to geocentrism, is a claim that would be taken by many as 
a deeply offensive notion.  Of course, offensiveness here has no bearing on whether 
the comparison is valid. 
 
We might grant that creationism shares the same empirical credibility as 
geocentrism, and for this reason is "unscientific" in a relevant sense.  But even if this 
is the case, then considerations of non-overlapping magisteria, scientific method, 
natural law, supernaturalism and all of the other baggage associated with the debate 
are utterly irrelevant.  Creationism, according to Pennock's suggested conception of 
"unscientific", is not unscientific because it is supernaturalistic, but rather it fails to 
be science because it is false.  The supernatural separationist debate, and even the 
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more general demarcation debate which Pennock was attempting to address, have 
no bearing on this whatsoever. 
 
What we can draw from these considerations is that one cannot dismiss 
supernaturalists from science for their lack of tentativeness, because a lack of 
tentativeness, particularly regarding core assumptions, is entirely consistent with 
scientific practice.  Moreover one cannot attempt to reframe the dismissal in terms 
of tentativeness regarding matters which are contrary to the dominant paradigm of 
the time.  If one does so, then one is not saying that supernatural claims are not 
scientific because they are supernatural, but rather that they are not scientific 
because the scientific community considers them not to be true. 
 
Given that a scientific consensus that supernaturalism was false would not be 
consistent with the notion of exclusion from scientific investigation that we are 
discussing, I shall not pursue this line of thought any further.  For the purposes of 
this thesis, a scientific conclusion that supernaturalism was false would constitute 
supernatural investigability by science.  It would also be entirely in opposition to the 
idea of "respectful discourse" to which Gould appealed in defending his NOMA 
principle (1997: 62).  Bearing that in mind, this should not be confused with scientists 
as a community who happen to believe supernaturalism was false for other, non-
scientific reasons (for example emotional, philosophical, or aesthetic ones).  This 
distinction brings us to the final of our three main categories of what science is: 
social structure. 
 
 
Science and social structure  
 
While we have spoken of the content of scientific theories and the methodology 
used to arrive at them, it is important to remember that 'science' is not an 
independent force or entity existing in isolation from those who engage in it.  
Without scientists, there would be no science.  Throughout this discussion we have 
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compared science to other kinds of human activity and investigation, notably to 
religious, philosophical and 'pseudoscientific' endeavours.  Perhaps then we might 
best understand what it is to be scientific by considering the ways its practitioners 
interact with each other.  As Steven Shapin argues, scientific knowledge is more than 
just the aggregate knowledge of those we call scientists; without the trust and 
cooperation of those who have scientific knowledge it would be impossible for 
scientific progress to move beyond that of the knowledge of an individual: 
 
Take any practical action or cultural move in science; then imagine that all 
trusting relationships were canceled.  Consider the void that would be left.  Our 
prevalent understanding of science – though not, of course, science itself – is 
thus deeply paradoxical.  We traditionally and formally warrant scientific truth 
by pointing to individual empirical foundations, yet nothing recognizable as 
scientific knowledge would be possible were that knowledge actually to be 
individually sought and held.  (Shapin, 1994: 27) 
 
There are a number of ways in which we might interpret science as reliant on social 
structure.  Firstly, as Shapin has done, we could do so in a way that treats the social 
structure as an integral part of the epistemic justification.  Indeed, the concept of 
'peer review' as a strength of science and academia in general is something I would 
consider not only uncontroversially a strength, but also relatively uncontroversially 
an absent feature of many of the pseudosciences.  As Martin Mahner notes:  
 
Dowsers share some information, but most have their own private theories 
about the alleged laws and mechanisms of dowsing [...] there is no general 
theory shared by a community of dowsers, no mutual evaluation methods and 
theories, no collective mechanism of error correction, and so forth.  So the lack 
of a research community is a clear indication that what these people do is not a 
science.  (2013: 38). 
 
Mahner observes that whilst the dowsers do not share the kind of communal 
mechanisms shared by legitimate scientists, creationists in a sense do.  "For example, 
creationists organize congresses and publish their own peer-reviewed journals" 
(2013: 42).  However, he argues that these activities are isolated from other research 
communities, and thus creationism constitutes an independent entity, rather than "a 
proper subcommunity of the international scientific community" (2013: 42).  While 
this is an interesting and plausible criticism, it is, as with tentativeness and integrity, 
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wholly tangential to the issue of supernaturalism.  That creationists are not a proper 
part of the scientific community currently is not to say that they never could be.  
Indeed, given the prevalence of separationist attitudes within the scientific 
community, it is actually somewhat difficult to blame the creationists for their own 
isolation. 
 
Alternatively, we might consider the notion that 'what science is' is determined 
socially, by the consensus of those we consider scientists, or simply as a matter of 
wider cultural language norms.  As Godfrey-Smith observes: 
 
Some writers use terms like "science" or "scientific" for any work that assesses 
ideas and solves problems in a way guided by observational evidence.  Science 
is seen as something found in all human cultures, even though the word is a 
Western invention.  But there are also views that construe "science" more 
narrowly, seeing it as a cultural phenomenon that is localized in space and time.  
For views of this kind, it was only the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries in Europe that gave us science in the full sense.  (2003: 4) 
 
These views are not mutually exclusive, but offer us differing ways to approach the 
problem.  If we accept the latter approach, then it may simply be true by consensus 
that supernatural phenomena are not a part of science.  We saw in the previous 
chapter that legal decisions have tended to conclude that this was the case, as have 
various scientific and educational organisations such as the National Association of 
Biology Teachers mentioned earlier in this chapter.  Could it be that the conclusion 
of those courts was valid not because the courts had understood the 'true' nature of 
science, but instead because their decision rendered the nature of science to be so? 
 
Although this understanding might put us in a position to say definitively that 
supernatural phenomena are not within the domain of science, it does not seem a 
particularly satisfying answer.  Supernatural phenomena are excluded here for no 
other reason than because it has been decided by some people that this should be 
the case.  Moreover, if science is interested in seeking truth, as we are supposing it 
to be, this move would arbitrarily delineate between truths that science can reach, 
and those that it cannot.  Surely we want to say that science is special in some way, 
that there is something about science that makes it so successful in truth seeking, 
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and that those things which are not considered science are excluded on the basis 
that they do not exemplify this property.  That the supernatural is excluded from 
science by mere consensus rather than argument seems to be at best a hollow 
victory for the separationist. 
 
Even more problematic for such a position is that even if such a consensus exists, it is 
a relatively recent one.  As Richard Noakes observes: 
 
Recent scholarship has rightly argued that since the Victorian period witnessed 
such fierce scientific, intellectual and theological debates over the boundaries 
between science and Spiritualism, science and pseudo-science, we cannot take 
such boundaries for granted in our historical analyses.  These boundaries are 
the explanandum not the explanans.  One of the most important benefits of this 
scholarship is that it draws attention to the complexity of the debates out of 
which these boundaries emerged and shows that controversies over 
Spiritualism were not, as traditional historiography suggests, struggles between 
proponents of 'science' and 'pseudo-science', but fights between individuals 
who disagreed on what counted as the proper scientific approach to the spirit 
world.  (2004: 24, emphasis as original) 
 
While it is of course possible that a modern consensus that science cannot 
investigate the supernatural represents academic progress, this would be a claim 
that requires defending.  Indeed, it is also the very claim that this thesis seeks to 
undermine.  If the separationist can rely on neither argument nor tradition to 
support their view, then it seems that this approach collapses into mere collective 
assertion.  Moreover, if we do accept those views identified by Godfrey-Smith which 
take science to be a "cultural phenomenon that is localized in space and time", and 
also accept Noakes' account of the Victorian approach to spiritualism, then this 
seems to entail that there are times when science can investigate the supernatural. 
 
Turning then to Shapin's interpretation of the relationship between social structure 
and science, we can consider the notion that "trust" might be this special property 
which differentiates science from non-science.  Or, at the very least, that it 
constitutes a necessary property of what it is to be scientific.  As we have discussed, 
Ruse argues that "integrity" was a necessary part of the scientific enterprise and 
that, whilst individual scientists might sometimes act fraudulently, the scientific 
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community as a whole requires honesty to function.  "Good science – like good 
religion – presupposes an attitude that one might describe as professional integrity 
[...].  Science depends on honesty in the realm of ideas" (Ruse, 1982a: 74, emphasis 
as original). 
 
We have seen in our discussion of the history of Of Pandas and People, and in the 
Expelled movie, that creationists are not entirely innocent of dishonest behaviour.  
However, even granting that honesty and integrity are essential to science, and 
granting even further that no creationist anywhere possesses honesty and integrity 
(a ludicrous claim), we would still only be able to determine that creationists are not 
scientists, not that creationism was not scientific.  We thus see no more reason here 
to exclude creationism from the domain of science (let alone the supernatural in 
general) than we would to exclude quantum physics if all of the quantum physicists 
in the world were suddenly rendered pathological liars.  As Laudan argues: "What 
counts is the epistemic status of Creationism, not the cognitive idiosyncrasies of the 
creationists" (1982: 17). 
 
Shapin's notion that trust is an integral part of science does not seem therefore to 
conflict with the possibility that supernatural phenomena might be considered 
within the domain of science.  That creationists fall outside of the social structure of 
science says nothing against the possibility that those within that social structure 
might discuss creationist topics scientifically.  Indeed, it is because the ideas of 
creationists have been discussed within the social structure of science that the 
scientific community has been able to reject them. 
 
There is a third way that we might understand the relationship between science and 
social structure that we should consider, that of the 'goals' which scientists aim to 
achieve.  However, unlike our currently painted picture of science, the supernatural 
does not reflect a body of people, and is instead a putative characteristic of a certain 
group of phenomena.  In order to meaningfully differentiate between science and 
supernatural investigation on the grounds of 'goals', we need to turn to organised 
and normative structures revolving around supernatural beliefs.  This brings us 
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neatly, and unavoidably, to the subject of religion.  Before discussing whether or not 
science and religion do differ in goals however, we should first discuss the definition 
of the supernatural more fully.  We shall thus return to both of these points in the 
following chapter. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has raised multiple possible conceptions of what it is for something to 
constitute science.  These lists are neither exhaustive in scope, nor do they expound 
upon all of the particulars of each conception listed.  What I have provided here is 
rather an overview of the most prominent potential avenues one might pursue in 
order to forward a separationist position.  I make no comment here as to whether or 
not any conception is better justified, or more promising than any other, but rather 
offer them all as viable candidates for the source of incompatibility currently in 
question. 
 
We have discussed three broad areas by which we might demarcate science: 
content, methodology, and social structure.  In the first category we saw that 
potential incompatibility between science and the supernatural may arise either 
through the concept of natural law, the natural world, or mathematics.  The first two 
of these conceptions will require significantly more analysis, and will be discussed in 
chapters four and six respectively.  The third was seen to be unsuccessful as a means 
for excluding the supernatural from science, representing neither a necessary nor 
sufficient criterion for considering a discipline scientific, nor being a criterion which 
supernatural investigation could not accommodate. 
 
In the second category we addressed the ideas of testability, explanation and 
prediction, methodological naturalism, anti-realism, and tentativeness and integrity.  
The first and second of these notions will be discussed in much greater detail in 
chapter five.  Methodological naturalism is an issue which we will encounter 
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throughout this thesis, but for now the arguments presented in favour of it support 
at best a tentativeness regarding accepting supernatural hypotheses, rather than the 
complete separation outlined by the NOMA principle.  That said, it does raise 
interesting questions regarding the relationship between metaphysical assumptions 
and science, which will be returned to in chapter six, although they broadly lie  
beyond the scope of this investigation.   
 
Anti-realism presents an area of discussion which is of some interest to our debate, 
particularly given the overlap between entities we often think of as 'supernatural' 
and 'unobservables'.  However, while this is a potential area for future research, it is 
not relevant enough to our current discussion to warrant further investigation here.  
Tentativeness and integrity, whilst perhaps qualities which have been lacking from 
prominent supernaturalists claiming to be scientific, are not qualities universal to 
scientists, nor qualities absent from the supernaturalist community.  While these 
concepts might be appealed to in order to deny the status of specific 
supernaturalists as scientists, it does nothing to determine the status of the 
supernatural as unscientific. 
 
Finally we looked at the relationship between science and social structure.  Although 
it may well be true that supernaturalists have not engaged with the scientific 
community to the extent that they could fall under a sociological definition of 
science, and further that scientists have in general rejected the claims of 
supernaturalists, this does not provide us grounds to defend separationism as a 
principle rather than a description of the current state of science's relationship to 
the supernatural.  Science was historically considered capable of investigating 
phenomena we would commonly consider to be supernatural, and there seems little 
to say that this could not be the case in the future.  In order to address the more 
social aspects of this discussion however we will need to turn to the supernaturalist 
side of the debate, and eventually the issue of religion.  
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Chapter 3  
Defining the supernatural  
 
In the previous chapter we collated a list of potential conceptions of science in order 
to evaluate their compatibility with the supernatural.  In this chapter we shall 
approach the discussion from the other direction and address potential conceptions 
of the supernatural in order to evaluate their compatibility with science.  As before 
we will not focus on whether or not any particular conception is viable, as such an 
analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Rather we will simply outline prominent 
ways in which we might understand the supernatural in order to see whether or not 
they provide any reason to adopt a separationist position. 
 
We will first address two distinctions drawn by Steve Clarke between the 
supernatural and the "merely nonnatural", and between relative and non-relative 
accounts (2007).  These distinctions add a layer of complexity to the discussion which 
it is important to acknowledge, though they will not hugely interfere with our ability 
to address the issues at hand.  This is briefly followed by an acknowledgement that 
we might be able to construct a definition of the supernatural as that which is not 
investigable by science, though such a definition is fruitless here due to the inherent 
circularity it raises.   
 
Three more promising conceptions of the supernatural will then be discussed which 
relate back to the discussion regarding the definition of 'science': firstly the idea that 
the supernatural is that which 'violates' natural law; secondly the notion that the 
supernatural is somehow not part of the physical realm; and thirdly that the 
supernatural exists beyond the borders of space and time.  As previously stated, the 
issue of natural law will be afforded its own chapter.  The relationship between the 
supernatural and the physical is not a discussion that I will engage in specifically at 
great length however.  While there is certainly a degree of overlap between those 
phenomena commonly thought of as the supernatural and the non-physical, they are 
by no means coextensive categories.  Moreover, many of the issues pertaining to the 
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issue of physicalism are addressed in the discussions on natural law and the 
supernatural as that which is beyond space and time.  This latter topic will be given a 
fuller discussion, alongside natural theology, in chapter six. 
 
The final section of this chapter shall draw a further distinction that it is important to 
acknowledge: that between the 'supernatural' and the 'religious'.  Although the 
specific topic of our discussion relates to the former, the sheer degree of overlap 
between the two in terms of both content and references within the debate means 
that we cannot avoid simultaneously discussing the latter.  I will therefore discuss 
two potential distinctions between science and religion in terms of the goals and 
epistemology of each discipline.  Generally speaking, while there are differences in 
the approaches of science and religion, these distinctions do not preclude science 
from addressing at least some of the questions that fall into the religious domain.  
This discussion will be returned to in chapter seven. 
 
Finally, we will address an argument from Plantinga (1983), which points to the 
different ways in which we might arrive at religious belief, independently of any 
assumption about the methodology of science.  While this is an argument which I do 
not oppose, it does not impact upon science's ability to arrive at its own answers to 
the questions posed by religion. 
 
 
What is the supernatural?  
The supernatural and the nonnatural  
 
We mentioned earlier that the supernatural, even if understood as being 
meaningfully distinct from the natural, is still a difficult notion to pin down.  In the 
same way that we discussed with science, perhaps we can identify a common trait 
that differentiates the supernatural from the natural, and does so in a way that 
precludes it from scientific investigation.  As before, rather than attempt to establish 
any 'correct' definition of the supernatural, I shall instead collate a series of potential 
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meanings, and discuss where potential incompatibilities with scientific investigation 
might arise.  Before doing this however, it is worth discussing briefly some further 
distinctions which go beyond a simple supernatural/natural dichotomy. 
 
Clarke (2007) outlines two important distinctions regarding our conception of the 
supernatural.  The first is between relative and non-relative understandings of the 
supernatural, and the second between the supernatural and the nonnatural.  
Relative conceptions of the supernatural depend on the definition of what is natural, 
such as we saw earlier in the definition outlined by Draper.  If our conception of 
what is natural changes, so too does our conception of the supernatural.  Non-
relative conceptions adopt a more fixed conception of the supernatural as occupying 
a separate "realm" to the natural, most apparently observed in the Christian 
conception of God as existing distinct from the spatiotemporal manifold we inhabit.  
On this understanding, no matter what we take to be 'natural', the supernatural 
realm remains clear and distinct, at least in principle. 
 
Clarke's second distinction highlights the idea that supernatural phenomena are 
supposed to stand in a specific relation to the natural; specifically they are supposed 
to stand "above" nature in some meaningful sense.  He distinguishes between the 
notion of God as creator, standing above the natural universe and "a possible world 
that is wholly unconnected to the natural world and is not based on a spatio-
temporal system at all" (2007: 282).  The former, he suggests, we would consider 
supernatural, but the latter he terms "merely nonnatural".  Clarke argues that these 
two categories are both subcategories of the nonnatural, and that we should not 
confuse them: "It seems that we must recognize the possibility of the nonnatural 
that is inclusive of the supernatural and the nonnatural that is exclusive of the 
supernatural.  The natural and the supernatural are contraries, but they are not 
contradictories." (2007: 282).  This echoes Draper's suggestion that some entity (x) is 
supernatural if "x is not a part of nature and x can affect nature" (2005: 277).  If x is 
not a part of nature, but x cannot affect nature, then it would be merely nonnatural 
rather than supernatural. 
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I do not wish to defend or deny Clarke's summary of the spread of supernatural 
conceptions beyond noting that I consider it a plausible account.  These distinctions 
are important to note as we shall address both relative and non-relative conceptions 
of the supernatural throughout the discussion, as well as the nonnatural and the 
supernatural.  Where possible, I will treat the supernatural as being as large a 
subcategory of the nonnatural as is reasonable.  The broader an understanding of 
the supernatural that falls plausibly within the domain of science, the stronger the 
case against separationism becomes.  As the arguments we are discussing specifically 
refer to the exclusion of the supernatural however, I shall not expand the discussion 
to cover the entirety of the nonnatural.  With that in mind, let us turn to a relative 
conception of what it is to be supernatural. 
 
The supernatural as that which cannot be investigated by science  
 
We have encountered the above definition before and, in the context of this thesis, 
this might seem a strange definition of the supernatural, as it leads to an obvious 
circularity.  If we define the supernatural in terms of what cannot be investigated by 
science, then separationism offers us no independent justification to exclude 
phenomena from scientific investigation on the grounds of supernaturality.  
However, outside of the context of this discussion, this stands as a legitimately 
tempting account.  We have seen that there are many conceptions of what science 
is, and that supernatural phenomena are considered to be 'beyond' their scope.  On 
this understanding, supernatural phenomena would simply be whatever lay beyond 
the scope (in principle) of empirical investigation and scientific method.  This would 
provide a clear-cut distinction between the natural world (the realm of science), and 
the supernatural world (not the realm of science). 
 
As discussed, this would be a relative account of the supernatural, and some entities 
previously considered supernatural may become naturalised as we expand our 
notion of what science can investigate.  This is not to say that supernaturality is 
temporally or culturally relative, for example in the sense that lightning was once 
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supernatural in nature, but became naturalised as our capacities to understand it 
evolved.  Rather it is to say that, whatever the theoretical limits to our scientific 
capacities are, that which lies beyond them is the realm of the supernatural.  If 
Popperian falsifiability did prove to be a proper demarcation between the domain of 
science and that which is not science, then supernatural phenomena would be those 
which were not falsifiable in principle, not simply those phenomena which we are 
not presently able to falsify. 
 
Unfortunately, of course, this cannot be the meaning employed in the discussions 
given so far.  If we understand the supernatural in this way then the proclamations 
made by the various courts and scientific organisations which have decreed 
creationism unscientific because it is supernatural would be fatally circular.  As 
Maarten Boudry argues: "To give substance to such a territorial demarcation claim, 
one needs to come up with a coherent and nontrivial definition of natural versus 
supernatural that does not already presuppose the demarcation between science 
and non-science" (2013: 85, emphasis as original).  Therefore, while this stands as a 
potentially viable definition of what it is to be supernatural outside of the 
separationism debate, it cannot be used to argue for a separationist position without 
circularity, and thus is not a definition that is useful to our discussion. 
 
It should be noted here that while this definition is not useful for our discussion, as it 
offers none of the normative force required for the kind of exclusion we are 
discussing, it may have use elsewhere.  Recall our two-dimensional grid from chapter 
one, which divided views according to whether or not somebody held a separationist 
view, and whether or not they accepted a particular supernatural claim.  If we 
understand separationism in a descriptive sense, rather than a normative one, there 
will be people who non-trivially occupy the quadrant which answers both questions 
in the affirmative.  In other words, they will believe that supernatural entities are 
those things which cannot be investigated by science, and also believe that such 
entities exist.  Though they will not have grounds for what Boudry describes as a 
"territorial demarcation claim", it is not so simple to dismiss their position. 
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The supernatural as that which violates the laws of nature  
 
We have already noted that the suggestion that science relies on appeal to natural 
law has been proposed as a defence of the separationist position.  This does, of 
course, rely on the notion that supernatural phenomena are understood to involve 
such violations. 
 
There are multiple facets to this particular conception of the supernatural, but from 
an initial intuitive and etymological perspective it does seem highly plausible.  The 
supernatural being that which is 'super', which is to say 'above' the natural, suggests 
phenomena that are not bound by the laws governing the natural realm.  As 
theologian Horace Bushnell expressed the term: 
 
That is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural 
cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect, in nature, from 
without the chain.  (1958: 37) 
 
With that said, we must also observe that many supernatural phenomena and beings 
are not considered to consistently violate natural laws.  In the popular culture for 
example, while vampires are often thought to behave in many ways that are 
inconsistent with natural law, they are still thought to be subject to the effects of 
gravity.  In more philosophical and theological circles, many have taken God to act 
through natural mechanisms, as is the case with a theistic evolutionary perspective.  
As Pope Francis, speaking in October 2014, phrased the position: 
 
When we read about Creation in Genesis, we run the risk of imagining God was 
a magician, with a magic wand able to do everything.  But that is not so.  He 
created beings and let them develop according to internal laws which He gave 
every one, so they would develop, so they would reach maturity.  (Davies, 2014) 
 
For the purposes of addressing the separationist charge, we shall discuss the idea 
that the supernatural involves some violation of natural law in chapter four.  
Usefully, this particular area of supernaturalism has been given much attention 
thanks to David Hume's famous discussion 'Of Miracles', in which he employs the 
definition that "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature" ([1777] 2004: 73).  This 
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will afford us ample scope to address the separationist argument from the 
perspective of understanding supernaturalist claims in such terms. 
 
The supernatural as non-physical  
 
One might wish to suggest that supernatural phenomena can be understood as 
being non-physical phenomena, or as being distinct from the physical universe.  This 
is a compelling idea, it captures classically supernaturalistic entities such as ghosts, 
spirits, and certain gods, and it also neatly delineates between body and soul.  This 
latter distinction is particularly relevant to our discussion as it is an obvious example 
of a realm where scientists (biologists and physicians) are granted dominion over the 
body, and non-scientists (theologians and other religious experts) are granted 
dominion over the soul. 
 
This is a complex discussion that overlaps with several of the issues to be discussed 
in this thesis, but it is worth noting some prima facie objections to dividing the 
supernatural from the natural in this way.  Firstly, we do not assume that non-
physical phenomena are 'supernatural'.  Minds and abstract objects, even if taken to 
be actually existent independent entities, are not usually considered to be 
supernatural phenomena, falling either into a broader conception of the 'natural' or 
else into Clarke's "merely nonnatural".  Despite this, abstract objects (and possible 
worlds) lie even further outside the sphere of the natural than that which we 
consider supernatural, given that abstract objects do not stand in the kind of causal 
relations with the physical that we discussed earlier in the chapter (Craig, [1984] 
2008: 108).  
 
We do not consider all non-physical phenomena supernatural, nor do we assume all 
supernatural phenomena to be non-physical.  Many of the most commonly 
conceived fantastical supernatural beings seem to be very much physical in nature.  
Unicorns, goblins, fairies, and even the gods of the ancients all display physical 
characteristics.  Even ghosts appear to be detectable by the senses, and have some 
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kind of spatial location and extension.  We thus find that non-physicality is neither 
sufficient, nor necessary, to determine an entity's supernaturality, at least as far as 
our intuitions carry us. 
 
Of course, this is only a superficial treatment of the discussion.  One might defend 
the distinction as valid, but argue that goblins, unicorns, minds and abstract objects 
are simply 'mislabelled'.  Alternatively, one might simply dissolve the distinction 
between nonnatural and supernatural phenomena, determining that everything 
which is both existent and nonnatural is in fact supernatural.  Finally, one might 
argue that important additional criteria have been overlooked, and that a more 
sophisticated account of the distinction can be successfully applied.  That said, even 
if we allow for these possibilities, and discount any possible objections to the 
distinction, there is a more fundamental problem with this conception of the 
supernatural with regards to our discussion: namely that science is not limited to the 
investigation of physical effects. 
 
As we discussed earlier, psychology is an example of a discipline which we could 
plausibly consider 'scientific' (or at the very least, a discipline that one could practise 
scientifically).  However psychology studies the mind which, if it is an actually 
existent independent entity, would seem to constitute a non-physical phenomenon.  
While one might once again wish to argue that we are simply 'mislabelling' 
psychology here, it is worth noting that even physics was at one time thought 
capable of investigating non-physical phenomena: 
 
The nineteenth-century discovery of the conservation of energy continued to 
allow that sui generis non-physical forces can interact with the physical world, 
but required that they be governed by strict force laws.  This gave rise to an 
initial wave of naturalist doctrines around the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  Sui generis mental forces were still widely accepted, but an extensive 
philosophical debate about the significance of the conservation of energy led to 
a widespread recognition that any such mental forces would need to be law-
governed and thus amenable to scientific investigation along with more familiar 
physical forces.  (Papineau, 2007) 
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Here we see once again the suggestion that a phenomenon need only be amenable 
to investigable laws in order to be considered scientific, we also see that there was 
initially no assumption that non-physical phenomena should be considered beyond 
such laws.  Indeed, it seems that unless it were possible to investigate these 
phenomena scientifically, how could we know that they do not conform to lawlike 
behaviour?  What knowledge of ghosts do (or could) we possess that allows us to 
determine both that they do not conform to predictable laws, and also that they are 
not within the realm of scientific investigation?  If such knowledge is possible, then 
by what means other than scientific investigation could we arrive upon it? 
 
Again, we will discuss the suggestion that supernatural phenomena violate the laws 
of nature in the next chapter, so we will leave these questions for now. 
 
The supernatural as that which exists beyond space and time  
 
Clarke's account of a non-relative conception of the supernatural derives from the 
notion that "we inhabited a mechanistic universe in which Nature was conceived of 
as being a discrete orderly realm governed by immutable laws [...].  By providing us 
with a clear sense of the natural, Newton and others paved the way for the 
widespread usage of a reasonably clear sense of the supernatural, as that which has 
its recent origin in powers that are not part of the natural realm." (2007: 279-280).  
Put loosely, if we take our understanding of the natural universe to be that outlined 
by our scientific conception (a multi-dimensional spacetime manifold potentially 
originating at the Big Bang), then nonnatural phenomena are those things which 
exist beyond that universe.  These nonnatural phenomena can then be divided into 
the supernatural and the "merely nonnatural" in terms of which ones have causal 
efficacy in our universe. 
 
This notion, and its difficulties, is summarised in Bede Rundle's criticism of the 
coherence of supernatural intervention: 
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The difficulty with a supernatural agent is that it requires one foot in both 
domains, so to speak.  To qualify as supernatural it must be distanced from any 
spatio-temporal character which would place it in our world, but to make sense 
to us as explanatory of changes therein it must be sufficiently concrete to 
interact with material bodies, and the more convincingly a case is made for the 
former status, the greater the difficulty put in the way of the latter.  (2004: 27-
28) 
 
Here we see that for Rundle, for an entity to qualify as supernatural it must in some 
way exist externally to space and time, and yet also have causal efficacy within it, 
and these two requirements work in opposition to each other.  While Rundle views 
this as problematic, others have employed the notion in order to argue in favour of 
belief in the supernatural.  William Lane Craig, in his defence of the kalam 
cosmological argument, has argued that the universe requires a cause for its 
existence, and that by necessity, that cause will not be part of the spatio-temporal 
manifold: 
 
Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the 
universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and 
enormously powerful. 
 
This, as Thomas Aquinas was wont to remark, is what everybody means by 
"God."  (Craig and Sinclair, 2009: 194) 
  
A discussion of whether or not supernatural entities might be thought to exist 
external to, but causally efficacious in, the spatio-temporal manifold will take more 
space than is available  here.  This is compounded by the fact that such a conception 
does, as Craig says, seem heavily implicit in the common conception of "God".  We 
shall thus return to this topic in chapters four and six.  This is however a prudent 
juncture to return to an important distinction mentioned at the end of the previous 
chapter: that between the 'supernatural' and the 'religious'. 
 
 
Differentiating the supernatural from the religious  
 
As we saw in chapter one, in the section on pro-supernaturalist, pro-separationist 
arguments, Lord Jonathan Sacks argued that religion was about "interpretation", 
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rather than "explanation".  Throughout the chapter, we also saw that a primary 
motivation for this discussion is due to the First Amendment to the American 
Constitution, which specifically prohibits the establishment of a "religion" by 
Congress.  While this is indeed a key factor in our discussion, it is important to note 
that the terms 'supernatural' and 'religious' are not synonymous.  Ghosts, goblins 
and unicorns are all supernatural phenomena according to the common 
understanding, but they are not limited to the domain of religion.  Pursuant to this, 
arguably, not all religious beliefs are supernatural.  Gillette (2006) for example has 
defended the possibility of religious naturalism. 
 
Statements such as those made by Sacks add a further layer of complexity to the 
discussion.  Although we are discussing the exclusion of 'supernatural' phenomena 
from scientific investigation, a term that can be discussed independently of the 
various aims and practices of religion, it is undeniable that much of the content of 
our discussion will regard claims that are religious in nature.  Indeed, given that our 
focus on creationism is so inextricably linked to the God of Christianity, it may not be 
possible in practical terms to separate our discussion from religion at all.  With that 
in mind then, let us consider Lord Sacks' claim, and those like it, in more detail.  We 
shall approach this in two ways, firstly by addressing a difference in the social (or 
rather, teleological) aspect of religious discussion, and secondly by considering a 
potential difference in the epistemology of religious thought. 
 
The goals of science and religion  
 
An important difference between religion and science is that practitioners of religion 
have different goals when it comes to their approach to knowledge.  Scientists, at 
least for the purposes of our discussion, can generally be understood to be primarily 
concerned with truth.  Science, in an explanatory capacity, aims to arrive at true 
propositions about the way the world is.  Or, more humbly, science aims to provide 
explanations for true observations of the world.  Although religion is also concerned 
with this, it is arguably a secondary concern.  As Mikael Stenmark argues: 
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We could say that religion has a soteriological goal.  In Christianity this typically 
means that salvation lies in a personal relationship with God through Jesus of 
Nazareth.  Science, on the other hand, is generally understood to lack this kind 
of concern.  (2007: 780) 
 
Pursuant to this, although both science and religion operate communally, they 
arguably approach the increase of knowledge differently.  Where science seeks, as a 
cooperative enterprise, to increase the cumulative knowledge of the society in which 
it is located, religion aims to increase the individual knowledge of each of its 
practitioners.  As Stenmark continues: 
 
A crucial difference between the epistemic goals of the two practices is then 
that in science the aim is to increase the general body of knowledge about the 
social and natural world, whereas in religion it is to increase the knowledge of 
each of its practitioners to such an extent that they can live a religious life 
successfully.  To contribute to the epistemic goal of religion is first of all to 
increase, up to a certain level, the religious knowledge (say, at least to the level 
necessary for salvation) of as many people as possible (although Judaism is one 
exception to this rule).  It is not, as in science, to move the frontiers of 
knowledge of nature and society forward as much as possible.  (2007: 780) 
 
What this implies with regards to discussion is that although there may well be 
significant overlap in the topics discussed in scientific and religious circles, say the 
origin of the first human, the approach to these topics as well as the questions that 
are asked will be significantly different.  This returns us to Gould's argument from 
chapter one regarding non-overlapping magisteria: "[W]e study how the heavens go, 
and they determine how to go to heaven" (1997: 18). 
 
In our terminology from chapter one, this distinction can be seen in the arguments 
from the pro-supernaturalist, pro-separationists.  As Sacks argues: "There is 
absolutely nothing in science – not in cosmology or evolutionary biology or 
neuroscience – to suggest that the universe is bereft of meaning, nor could there be, 
since the search for meaning has nothing to do with science and everything to do 
with religion" (2011: 27).  For them, achieving a personal relationship with God is not 
contingent on how life arose, but rather why life arose.  It is not the distinction 
between natural and supernatural that distinguishes the magisterium of science 
from the magisterium of religion (both 'how' God created life and 'why' God created 
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life require supernaturalist answers), but rather the type of question being asked.  
Thus, even if there is a genuine reason to accept the NOMA principle, this does not 
imply that science cannot investigate supernatural claims, even ones of a religious 
nature. 
 
Although there is scope to distinguish religious discussion from scientific discussion 
by acknowledging that certain 'why-questions' might lie beyond the reach of science, 
it is important to recognise that this does not imply that all why-questions lie beyond 
the reach of science.  As van Fraassen observes, a why-question is simply a particular 
type of request for an explanation.  If there is a car crash in which someone is killed, 
and we ask a physician 'why did that person die?', then we are asking them to 
explain that person's death.  This would also apply if we asked the same question of 
a mechanic, but they would give a different answer.  There is no appeal to a 
supernatural or teleological explanation implied in either of these questions, and we 
would not expect one: 
 
The physician explains the fatality qua death of a human organism, and the 
mechanic explains it qua automobile crash fatality.  To ask that their 
explanations be scientific is only to demand that they rely on scientific theories 
and experimentation, not old wives' tales.  (Van Fraassen, 1993: 282) 
 
Similarly, for a supposedly 'religious' why-question to be scientific, it needs only to 
appeal for an explanation framed in scientific terms.  Or, at least, it only needs to be 
possible to satisfactorily answer the question in scientific terms.  If one asks 'why are 
we moral?', a sphere of discussion classically reserved for religion and philosophy, 
then a potential scientific answer might appeal to something along the lines of 
evolutionary benefits to certain types of social behaviour: "Many of us believe that 
among our various moral duties, we have special and stringent duties toward family 
members.  Might this 'moral intuition' be attributable, at least in part, to an evolved 
tendency to favour members of one's kin group over others, analogous to similar 
traits in other animals?" (FitzPatrick, 2008).  The scientist, the philosopher and the 
theologian may provide different answers, but all three seem perfectly entitled to 
attempt to answer the question. 
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Of course, while a 'scientific' interpretation of the question, and a similarly 'scientific' 
answer may be proposed, this is not to say that either of these approaches will lead 
to a correct answer.  If our morality is indeed derived from a supernatural deity, 
existing beyond the realm of empirical investigation, and for the purposes of 
achieving salvation, then a scientific investigation may be ultimately fruitless.  That is 
not, however, to suggest that such an investigation should be pre-emptively 
discouraged, nor that it should not be considered scientific.  Even if we accept the 
NOMA principle to the extent of allowing for religious and scientific approaches to 
differ in the same way as those of van Fraassen's physician and mechanic, we see no 
reason to take this to imply the kind of separationism that would preclude any kind 
of scientific approach to the question whatsoever. 
 
We see then that although why-questions pose a potentially valid area of exclusivity 
for religious, rather than scientific, discourse, these questions are not determined by 
their supernaturality, but rather by the type of question being asked.  Moreover, we 
should not leap to conclude that prima facie religious why-questions, such as those 
regarding the nature of morality, lie beyond the scope of scientific investigation.  We 
shall return to this subject in our concluding chapter when we discuss religious 
approaches to the separationism debate.  For now however let us turn away from 
the type of questions being asked by science and religion, and instead to the method 
of arriving at answers. 
 
Religious beliefs as "properly basic"  
 
We will discuss in chapter six what I shall refer to as 'atheological arguments' from 
observation of the natural world.  In brief terms, these are evidential arguments 
from which it is argued one can conclude either that there is no such being as God, 
or else that belief in the existence of God is unjustified or irrational.  However, we 
must be aware that this evidentialist approach is not philosophically conclusive, and 
there are other epistemological avenues that might be taken.  We might 
acknowledge that scientific methodology can be employed in investigating 
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supernatural claims, and that scientific conclusions may be drawn from such 
investigations.  However, it would be remiss to assume that such conclusions must 
therefore be accepted as a requirement of rationality. 
 
As Plantinga ([1983] 2000: 46-49) argues in discussing the evidential problem of evil 
(see chapter six), we may well accept that the probability that God exists is low with 
respect to our knowledge of the amounts and varieties of evil in the world, without 
being obliged to accept that it is therefore unlikely that God exists with respect to 
the total sum of knowledge available.  He compares the situation to that of Feike, a 
member of the Frisian population, only one tenth of whom can swim.  Given this 
information, he argues, one might conclude that it is unlikely that Feike can swim.  
However, Feike is also a lifeguard, ninety-nine per cent of whom can swim.  With 
respect just to the information about Feike being Frisian, it is unlikely that Feike can 
swim.  But with respect to the sum of our knowledge about Feike, it is highly likely 
that he can swim. 
 
Similarly, we might consider a non-scientific basis for belief in God to counterbalance 
a scientific basis for disbelief in God.  One avenue for which Plantinga argues is a 
rejection of both evidentialism and what he refers to as "classical foundationalism", 
which he takes to be the position that any rationally held foundational belief will be 
either "self evident or evident to the senses or incorrigible" ([1983] 2000: 82).  
Instead, he argues for a version of "reformed epistemology", according to which one 
can be warranted in holding to a belief that is neither self-evident, evident to the 
senses or incorrigible, nor follows from a belief that is self-evident, evident to the 
senses, or incorrigible.  Further, he argues that belief in God is an example of such a 
"properly basic belief"12. 
 
Plantinga's position is worth noting in regards to two distinct issues.  Firstly, the 
general philosophical issue that science is not, outside of a fairly extreme form of 
scientism, taken to be an exclusive source of knowledge.  Moreover, it is not much 
                                                 
12 Or, rather, that belief in God follows from other such basic beliefs, such as "God is speaking to me" 
or "God disapproves of what I have done" ([1983] 2000: 88). 
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less controversial to hold that science represents the most reliable source of 
knowledge.  It may well be the case that there are beliefs which run contrary to the 
findings of the scientific community and yet which one may be rationally justified in 
holding.  We shall discuss this issue further in chapter seven. 
 
More specific to the discussion at hand is consideration of something like John 
Calvin's sensus divinitatis: 
 
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness 
of divinity.  This we take to be beyond controversy.  To prevent anyone from 
taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all 
men a certain understanding of his divine majesty [...].  Men of sound judgment 
will always be sure that a sense of divinity which can never be effaced is 
engraved upon men’s minds.  Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who 
though they struggle furiously are unable to extricate themselves from the fear 
of God, is abundant testimony that this conviction, namely, that there is some 
God, is naturally inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very 
marrow.  ([1536] 1960: 43, 45-46) 
 
Although Plantinga does allow for the possibility of evidence weighing against 
properly basic beliefs, that the theist may appeal to a source of warrant which is not 
only non-evidential, but perhaps not even reliant on the senses as conceived of in a 
non-theistic picture at all, illustrates a potential deep divide between science and 
religion.  This problem is compounded even further by the complex notion of 'faith' 
within theistic thought, as we shall discuss further in chapter seven. 
 
The possibility that religious views might be construed as differing from scientific 
accounts in this way however does not grant sufficient motivation for the 
separationist position.  Even while defending belief in God as properly basic, 
Plantinga allows for the possibility that sufficient counter-evidence might undermine 
that belief.  He argues that justification conditions for a properly basic belief offer 
prima facie, rather than ultima facie justification for belief: 
 
My being appeared to treely gives me a prima facie right to take as basic the 
proposition I see a tree.  But of course this right can be overridden; I might 
know, for example, that I suffer from the dreaded dendrological disorder, 
whose victims are appeared to treely only when there are no trees present.  
([1983] 2000: 90) 
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We can see then that if Plantinga is correct, then even though one might arrive at a 
religious position through non-scientific methods, this does not render science mute 
on the subject.  To return to the creationist position, one might hold a basic belief of 
the sort "God has told me that the Earth is 6,000 years old".  Clearly however, 
science is not mute on this topic, and neither the 'basic' epistemological nature of 
the claim, its religious nature, nor its supernatural nature, render it otherwise. 
 
What we might concede to the creationist however, is that they are perfectly at 
liberty to maintain their belief in spite of the scientific evidence.  Contra the 
separationist, this does not imply that science has nothing to say on the subject of 
the creationist position: it absolutely does.  However, that science has something to 
say does not imply that what science says is therefore definitive.  One may well 
argue that there are other paths to knowledge, and that science has not won the 
battle for epistemological supremacy just yet.  Regardless of how one feels about the 
status of science in this regard however, "[e]volution is one of the most robust and 
widely accepted principles of modern science" (AAAS, 2006).  Whether religious (or 
philosophical, or aesthetic, or moral) views may be derived non-scientifically, or 
whether there are alternative avenues to finding truth than those followed by 
science, has no bearing on this whatsoever. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we have identified a few distinctions which further complicate our 
understanding of the separationist position.  There are important distinctions to be 
made between the 'supernatural' and the 'nonnatural', and the 'supernatural' and 
the 'religious'.  While these distinctions do not bear hugely on the overall direction of 
our investigation, partly due to overlap between the concepts themselves and their 
relationship to science, and partly due to overlap between the treatment of the 
concepts in the literature surrounding the debate, it is useful to acknowledge them 
at least for the sake of philosophical accuracy.  They will also be of particular interest 
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in chapter six when we come to discuss multiverse theory, and in chapter seven 
when we discuss the limitations to scientific investigation. 
 
It may be possible to construct a definition of the supernatural as "that which cannot 
be investigated by science".  In fact, of the definitions we have covered so far, this 
seems to be one of the most promising.  Unfortunately this definition offers the 
separationist no normative support, as it renders any prescriptive exclusion of the 
supernatural from science inherently circular.  An alternative definition is, as we 
have seen many times, that which violates the laws of nature.  Whether or not this 
definition adequately captures either the popular or religious understanding is 
controversial and, again, shall be addressed in full in the following chapter. 
 
We might also understand the supernatural as in some way not being a part of the 
natural world.  This might be understood in terms of being non-physical, or in the 
more literal sense of being 'beyond' space and time.  Though these conceptions have 
merit, it fails to capture many of the common examples of supernatural phenomena 
we encounter.  More problematically, while the former offers us little reason to 
suppose that science cannot investigate the supernatural,  I will argue in chapter six 
that even the latter is questionable in its limiting effect on scientific investigation. 
 
In discussing the distinctions between the supernatural and the religious, we have 
seen that their domains are not coextensive.  We have further seen that while the 
goals and epistemologies of science and religion are different, they are capable of 
addressing some of the same topics, including those where supernatural phenomena 
are involved.  They may provide different answers, and these answers may be 
compatible or contradictory.  Moreover, where these answers conflict, one is not 
obliged to side with the scientist.  However, this does nothing to suggest that science 
must remain mute on topics addressed by religion.  The claims of creationism are, as 
we have seen, religious in nature.  As we have also seen, science is not mute on their 
veracity. 
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Chapter 4  
Science, the supernatural, and violations of a law of 
nature  
 
In previous chapters we have encountered the idea that the supernatural cannot be 
the subject of scientific enquiry because they 'violate' laws of nature.  As science is 
seen to deal in such laws, and exclusively so, supernatural hypotheses and 
phenomena are excluded on principle.  To remind ourselves of Ruse's early view on 
the matter, which has informed much legal and popular opinion since: 
 
Religion does not insist on unbroken law.  Indeed, religious beliefs frequently 
allow or suppose events outside law or else events that violate law (miracles).  
Jesus feeding the 5,000 with the loaves and fishes was one such event.  This is 
not to say that religion is false, but it does say that religion is not science.  
(Ruse, 1982a: 73) 
 
In this chapter we shall examine this claim in detail.  The subject of what exactly it is 
to be a law of nature is one of much philosophical dispute, constituting something of 
a core area of interest in the philosophy of science.  As with previous chapters it is 
not my intent to establish a definitive 'correct' understanding of what it is to be a law 
of nature, but I am instead interested in whether or not there is reason to think that 
any of the potential conceptions of such laws conflict with the possibility of scientific 
investigation of the supernatural. For this reason much of the chapter will be taken 
up by discussing a range of theories of natural law in turn, and addressing the 
question of whether or not any conception implies an incompatibility with the 
supernatural.  I will occasionally draw attention to various key arguments for and 
against such theories, but these observations are only intended for the sake of 
contextualisation and clarity, and should not be interpreted as critical to the overall 
discussion13. 
 
                                                 
13 That the validity of the accounts does not play a role in this discussion is a function of my conclusion 
that they do not have any bearing on supernatural investigation by science.  If it were found that any 
theory did have bearing on this issue, and was sufficiently prominent to justify a separationist position 
at large, then its validity would of course become highly relevant to the discussion. 
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In order to discuss the various theories regarding what it is that constitutes a law of 
nature, I will divide the discussion into what might be termed 'Humean' theories of 
natural law, and 'non-Humean' theories.  The key examples of the former to be 
discussed – a Naive Regularity view, a functionalist account, and a systems view – 
will all be deemed incompatible with the notion of a violation of natural law for the 
common reason that any observation of such a violation would constitute a 
candidate defeater for any putative law.  While one might argue that we can make 
sense of the notion of a violation on a systems account, this does not imply that 
science would not be able to investigate such a phenomenon or, at least, integrate it 
into the body of scientific knowledge. 
 
Regarding the latter category, we shall primarily discuss the notion that laws of 
nature reflect relations between universals, though some attention will also be given 
to tendency accounts proposed by Nancy Cartwright and E.J. Lowe.  As with systems 
accounts, it is possible to make sense of the notion of a violation of natural law on 
such an account, but not in a way which precludes scientific investigation.  Finally we 
shall briefly discuss the issue of anti-realist conceptions of natural law, to conclude 
that none of these accounts offer weight to the separationist position, even if we 
assume that they are valid. 
 
After arguing that none of the main theories offer significant reason to exclude the 
supernatural from scientific investigation I will then move on to discuss some 
theological and ideological issues that accompany the debate.  These issues revolve 
around philosophical, or at least habitual, commitments to determinism and 
'scientism' that can be witnessed on both sides of the theistic/non-theistic divide.  
Finally we will return to the argument forwarded by Plantinga in chapter one that 
suggests that no theory of natural law could even in principle allow for violation, 
even granting that supernatural intervention can and does occur. 
 
Although I will only cover a limited number of predominant theories of natural law, it 
must be noted that while there may exist unknown, or esoteric accounts which do 
exclude supernatural phenomena, this is of little help to the separationist.  It is 
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implausible to suggest that anyone involved in the debate is suggesting that science 
operates on the assumption that natural laws are best accounted for by hitherto 
unknown or else highly esoteric accounts, so it is unreasonable to exclude 
supernatural phenomena on the possibility that they might be.  If it is not coherent 
or reasonable to suggest that supernatural phenomena violate natural laws 
according to any widely held theory of what those laws are, then the claim that 
supernatural phenomena should be excluded from scientific investigation on such a 
basis is unsupportable.  At the very least, we should set aside the idea that the 
supernatural is that which violates laws of nature until we have a conception of what 
it is to be a law of nature within which this makes sense. 
 
 
Hume's 'Of Miracles': a historical starting point  
 
In Section X of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, entitled 'Of Miracles', 
Hume lays out a series of arguments that aim to show that we could never be 
epistemically justified in assenting to the notion that a miracle has occurred.  In 
doing so he provides an early and concrete example of the understanding that 
supernatural events, here specifically miracles, constitute violations of natural law: 
 
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable 
experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the 
very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can 
possibly be imagined.  ([1777] 2004: 73) 
 
Hume clarifies this definition even further: 
 
A miracle may accurately be defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a 
particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.  
([1777] 2004: 74, emphasis as original) 
 
It is important to note that Hume is specifically referring to "miracles" here, which 
does not seem obviously to extend to other supernatural phenomena or entities.  On 
this basic conception it does not seem prima facie to be the case that a transgression 
of a law of nature by a non-deity, or an action on the part of the Deity that did not 
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transgress a law of nature, would qualify as a miracle, although Hume seems to want 
to suggest otherwise: 
 
If a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be 
well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to 
blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow 
upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are 
really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature.  ([1777] 2004: 74) 
 
Hume's arguments have received much criticism, even on their founding premises.  
As Lowe observes: "Consider any simple well-established empirical law, such as 
Hooke's law; how many times must it not have been 'disconfirmed' by a bungling or 
careless schoolboy?  Of course we reject such contrary observations as mistaken, 
precisely because we believe the law to be true; but what we can't do is insist they 
never occur." (1987: 268).  The exact merits of Hume's argument against the 
possibility of epistemic warrant for believing a miracle story, while interesting, are 
secondary to the broader question of what it means to say that "a miracle is a 
violation of the laws of nature".  With that in mind, let us discuss what have come to 
be known as 'Humean' theories of natural law. 
 
Humean theories of natural law  
 
Whether or not Humean theories of law are actually the sort of theories of law that 
Hume endorsed is a matter of exegetical dispute which I shall not enter into here.  
We shall instead understand Humean theories of natural law to be those which seem 
closely related to Hume's account of causation outlined in both his Enquiry and in his 
A Treatise of Human Nature: 
There appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which 
is conceivable by us.  All events seem entirely loose and separate.  One event 
follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them.  They seem 
conjoined, but never connected.  And as we can have no idea of any thing which 
never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary 
conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and 
that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in 
philosophical reasonings or common life.  ([1777] 2004: 47) 
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Humean theories of natural law then are those which take laws not to be 
independently existing "powers" or "connexions" beyond human experience, but 
instead as descriptions of the way we observe the world to be.  They are those which 
understand laws to be observed and exceptionless regularities in nature. 
 
Naive Regularity Theory  
 
The most simplistic version of a Humean account of natural law interprets laws of 
nature to be generalised statements of the form "All Fs are Gs", or alternatively "If F, 
then G".  To take a prominent example, "to every action there is always opposed an 
equal reaction" (Newton, 1723: 20).  Here we would understand Newton's third law 
as reflecting nothing more than an observed regularity.  For every F-type event we 
encounter (an action), it is accompanied by a G-type event (an equal and opposite 
reaction).  Further examples offered by Hempel and Oppenheim include "All robins' 
eggs are greenish-blue", "All metals are conductors of electricity", and "At constant 
pressure, any gas expands with increasing temperature" (1948: 153). 
 
Even critical analyses of regularity theory have considered this an overly simplistic 
interpretation.  A common, and compelling criticism of the account derives from 
Nelson Goodman's discussion of counterfactuals: 
 
Suppose, for example, that all I had in my right pocket on VE day was a group of 
silver coins.  Now we would not under normal circumstances affirm of a given 
penny P 
 
If P had been in my pocket on VE day, P would have been silver, 
 
Even though from  
 
P was in my pocket on VE day 
 
we can infer the consequent by means of the general statement 
 
Everything in my pocket on VE day was silver. 
 
On the contrary, we would assert that if P had been in my pocket, then this 
general statement would not be true [...].  Though the supposed connecting 
principle is indeed general, true, and perhaps even fully confirmed by 
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observation of all cases, it is incapable of sustaining a counterfactual because it 
remains a description of accidental fact, not a law.  (1947: 122-123) 
 
Goodman's analysis shows that, at least intuitively, we do not want to call something 
a natural law purely on the basis of it being an exceptionless regularity.  Although the 
problem of supporting counterfactual statements is not entirely alleviated, one 
minor adjustment to regularity theory to avoid Goodman's objection is to insist that 
statements of law cannot be restricted to localities.  It seems at least far more 
plausible that "If P had been in Nelson Goodman's pocket on VE day, P would have 
been silver" if the suggested, non-localised statement of law were "Every coin is 
silver." 
 
George Molnar thus attempts to define a law of nature on regularity theory in the 
following way: 
 
Consider the following definition of a law of nature: 
 
D1: p is a statement of a law of nature if and only if: 
 
(i)  p is universally quantified; and 
(ii)  p is omnitemporally and omnispatially true; and 
(iii)  p is contingent; and 
(iv)  p contains only nonlocal empirical predicates, apart from logical 
connectives and quantifiers. 
  
This definition is plainly in the spirit of Hume, though not one offered by him.  
Whether anybody subscribes to it I do not know, but many modern 
philosophers accept definitions very similar to this one.  I shall refer to it as the 
Regularity Theory of Laws of Nature.  (1969: 78) 
 
David Armstrong, following on from Molnar, calls this theory the "Naive" Regularity 
theory of natural law: 
It is easy to see the aim of the definition: to pick out the unrestricted or cosmic 
uniformities from all other uniformities in nature.  I will call them Humean 
uniformities, for obvious reasons.  These Humean uniformities the Naive 
Regularity theory identifies with the laws of nature.  (1983: 12, emphasis as 
original) 
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Even this unrestricted understanding of natural law is not without its problems.  Van 
Fraassen, referencing Reichenbach and Hempel, discusses the following pair of 
unrestricted observed regularities: 
 
1. All solid spheres of enriched uranium (U235) have a diameter of less than one 
mile. 
2. All solid spheres of gold (Au) have a diameter of less than one mile.  (1989: 27) 
 
Van Fraassen grants that, while both of these statements might be true, only the first 
can be reasonably suggested as a law.  The second he argues is a matter of 
accidental fact.  The critical mass of uranium is such that it would prevent a one mile 
sphere of uranium-235 ever existing.  Conversely, while there is not enough gold on 
Earth, or possibly anywhere in the universe where that much gold is collected, it is 
not apparently impossible for such a sphere to exist. 
 
Fred Dretske suggests that a further problem with understanding laws in this 
simplistic manner is that it allows for coextensive terms to be substituted into 
lawlike statements and produce statements that are not lawlike.  He gives the 
example of the predicate expressions "is a diamond" and "is mined in kimberlite".  
Positing that these terms be taken as eternally and universally coextensive, he 
suggests that it should be possible to substitute the two terms without changing the 
nature of a statement.  However, "if diamonds have a refractive index of 2.419 (law) 
and 'is a diamond' is coextensive with 'is mined in kimberlite' [...] we cannot infer 
that it is a law that things mined in kimberlite have a refractive index of 2.419" 
(1977: 25). 
 
In other words, where F is "is a diamond", K is "is mined in kimberlite" and G is "has a 
refractive index of 2.419", then if (x)(Fx → Gx) and (x)(Fx ≡ Kx), we should be able to 
infer that (x)(Kx → Gx).  As we are unable to make this inference (regarding the 
lawhood of the expressions, not the truth value, which is unaffected), Dretske 
argues, there is something wrong with an account of laws that takes them merely as 
expressions of universal truths.  While it might be the case that "If diamonds have a 
refractive index of 2.419, then rocks mined in kimberlite have a refractive index of 
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2.419", it is not the case that "If it is a law that diamonds have a refractive index of 
2.419, then it is a law that rocks mined in kimberlite have a refractive index of 
2.419". 
 
Where then, does this discussion leave us regarding scientific investigation of the 
supernatural?  On a first reading, one might be inclined to think that a Naive 
Regularity view of natural law prohibits the investigation of the supernatural (or at 
least, of the miraculous, conceived of as violations of natural law) because a Naive 
Regularity view entails that the existence of such events is logically incoherent.  If 
there is some natural law, L, then any purported violation of L simply cannot have 
occurred by virtue of the fact that L is, by definition, exceptionless.  As Lowe argues: 
 
The reason why a miracle is logically impossible on the 'Humean' view of laws is 
that this view represents a statement of natural law as affirming that an 
exceptionless regularity of some sort obtains throughout the universe, without 
restriction of time or place – so that if L is a putative law and m a purported 
miracle 'violating' L, one may only judge either that m did occur, thereby 
constituting a counter-instance to L which accordingly cannot be regarded as a 
true law, or that L  is true and hence that m as a purported exception to L did 
not occur, or else that neither is L true nor did m occur.  What one cannot 
consistently judge is that both L is true and m occurred.  (1987: 269) 
 
If we understand the Regularity Theory in this way then Overton and Ruse's 
arguments against the scientific investigation of the supernatural seem to become 
untenable.  Let us take the loaves and fishes example, and posit some potential 
natural law such that: "It is impossible to feed 5,000 people with only a few loaves of 
bread and some fish".  There are only two possible ways in which the world could be: 
either the feeding of the 5,000 never occurred at any point in time or space, or the 
feeding of the 5,000 did occur at some point in time and space.  If the first option is 
true, then the law holds, but has never been violated.  If the second option is true, 
then it is not a law that it is impossible to feed 5,000 people with a few loaves of 
bread and some fish.  Whatever the state of the world, if this interpretation of 
Regularity Theory is accurate then there can be no violations of laws of nature. 
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As we see here, and as Lowe has observed, there are two possible options on Naive 
Regularity theory when we are faced with deciding between some putative law L, 
and some purported miracle m.  We can either deny the possibility of m, or we can 
take m to represent a potentially disconfirming instance of L.  Epistemically speaking, 
as Hume argued in 'Of Miracles', we might be tempted to favour L in virtue of the 
fact that it is taken to be affirmed by previously exceptionless experience.  However, 
it makes no sense, and is indeed self-fulfilling, for us to declare that miraculous 
instances are not within the domain of scientific investigation and then to arrive at 
the conclusion that it is a law that not-m on the basis of exceptionless observation of 
not-m.  If we do not allow for scientific investigation of m then, quite plainly, we will 
never scientifically observe m. 
 
This issue is compounded if we remember that a primary motivation, or at least 
justification, for the separationist position was the NOMA principle: the notion that 
the domain of science and the domain of religion occupy separate, non-overlapping 
spheres of thought.  However, on a Naive Regularity account, it is not the case that 
science is mute on the subject of religion.  By extending universally, in the ways 
outlined by Molnar and Armstrong, any scientific law which contradicts some 
religious claim is an explicit rejection of that claim.  Moreover, the exclusion of 
creationism from science on the grounds that it posits violations of natural law is, on 
a Naive Regularity account, a tacit assertion that creationism is logically incoherent.  
Clearly this is not in the spirit of the NOMA principle that separationists have 
advocated.  Thus separationism is not only untenable on Naive Regularity theory, but 
undesirable as well. 
 
Functionalism  
 
In light of the problems with the Naive Regularity view, particularly regarding the 
issue of counterfactuals, Goodman argues for a different type of regularity theory.  
He argues that we can follow the Humean principle that laws should be treated as 
observed regularities, without appeal to underlying "powers", deeming that 
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"reference to a notion of causative force can be dismissed at once as unscientific" 
(1947: 123).  He instead posits that we should understand natural laws in terms of 
their use in prediction: 
 
I want only to emphasize the idea that rather than a sentence being used for 
prediction because it is a law, it is called a law because it is used for prediction; 
and that rather than the law being used for prediction because it describes a 
causal connection, the meaning of the causal connection is to be interpreted in 
terms of predictively used laws.  (1947: 124) 
 
This focus on prediction distinguishes the functionalist account from the Naive 
Regularity view because it allows for lawlike statements to support counterfactual 
statements.  For example the general principle "Every match that is scratched, well 
made, dry enough, in enough oxygen, etc., lights" supports the counterfactual 
statement "If the match had been scratched, it would have lighted" (1947: 122). 
 
Goodman argues further that lawlike statements should not be dependent on 
particular instances.  Thus, while statements such as "All coins in Nelson Goodman's 
pocket are silver" can be true and also allow us to make a prediction about what we 
can expect to see if we were to remove coins from Nelson Goodman's pocket one by 
one, they cannot properly be called 'lawlike' because their acceptance is dependent 
upon examination of all of the contents of his pocket.  Conversely, Goodman 
tentatively argues, we might be inclined after a few positive instances to accept 
general statements like "All dimes are silver" or "All butter melts at 150oF" without 
needing to examine too many further instances in order to confirm them. 
 
Dretske generalises Goodman's analysis to the notion that laws differ from universal 
truths by virtue of an additional extrinsic feature(s) which determines its role in, for 
example, scientific prediction: "Laws are to universal truths what shims are to slivers 
of wood and metal; the latter become the former, by being used in a certain way [...].  
The basic formula is: law = universal truth + X" (1977: 251).  He goes on to argue that 
such an account is unsatisfactory because it implies that lawlike statements become 
laws when we come along and do something with them, but this suggests that prior 
to our using or confirming their lawlike status, they were not laws.  Thus, while it 
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might be true today that it is a law that "at constant pressure, any gas expands with 
increasing temperature", it was not true that it was a law a few thousand years ago.  
Dretske argues that this is unacceptable: 
 
The laws of nature are the same today as they were one thousand years ago (or 
so we believe); yet, some hypotheses are highly confirmed today that were not 
highly confirmed one thousand years ago.  It is certainly true that we only begin 
to call something a law when it becomes well established, that we only 
recognize something as a statement of law when it is confirmed to a certain 
degree, but that something is a law, that some statement does in fact express a 
law, does not similarly await our appreciation of this fact.  We discover laws, we 
do not invent them.  (1977: 254) 
 
We will discuss Dretske's solution to the problem by appeal to relations between 
universals later in the chapter, but for now we should turn our attention to how a 
functionalist account interacts with our understanding of miracles, or the 
supernatural, as violations of natural law. 
 
There are two separate, and important, issues here.  The first, as with the Naive 
Regularity account, concerns the idea that miraculous or supernatural events 
constitute violations of natural law.  While on the Naive Regularity view this idea 
seems at least intuitively (if not ultimately) plausible, the same is not true here.  The 
notion that universal truths do not admit of counter instances does not extend to 
the notion that predictions based upon universal truths do not allow for such 
instances.  It is a universal truth, let us accept, that objects fall to Earth at a constant 
acceleration of approximately 9.81 m/s2 so long as there is no air resistance.  This 
allows us to predict, via the equations of constant linear acceleration, that a stone 
dropped in a vacuum from a height of 10 metres will hit the ground after 
approximately 1.43 seconds.  However, if something intercepts the stone, preventing 
it from hitting the ground at all, then we would not be inclined to suggest that any 
law has been 'violated'.  The purported universal truth upon which we based our 
prediction is not undermined, but rather our prediction was based upon a lack of 
complete knowledge of the situation. 
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It should be clear then that miraculous events, so described by Hume as "a 
transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the 
interposition of some invisible agent" ([1777] 2004: 74), do not constitute obvious 
examples of violations on the functionalist account.  It being a law that "human 
beings do not return from them dead" is not obviously violated by the intervention 
of a being capable of resurrecting the dead, supernatural or otherwise.  The natural 
law, and our predictive success using it, is based upon the assumption that relevant 
qualifying factors are ignored.  Whether these considerations undermine a 
functionalist account is open to debate, but that these factors might do so is 
tangential to the supernaturality of the intervening entity.  The law of gravitation is 
no more or less violated if in our previous example it is a human being catching the 
stone, or a poltergeist. 
 
The second, and more important issue that arises for the functionalist account is that 
by virtue of being inherently unpredictable, supernatural hypotheses and 
phenomena fall outside of the realm of possible natural laws and, as such, are 
excluded from scientific discussion.  We have seen this sentiment earlier from 
Schafersman (1997) when he argued that because "miracles would allow unique, 
non-repeating, and non-controllable events to cause natural effects" that therefore 
they would be impossible to make sense of using empirical methods. 
 
But this account seems entirely implausible both from a perspective of 'normal' 
science and from a perspective of what we consider to be supernatural phenomena.  
The extinction of the dinosaurs via meteor collision reflects a "unique, non-
repeating, and non-controllable" event, but we would be pressed to find any 
philosopher or scientist who considers it to be outside of the realm of scientific 
enquiry.  Perhaps Schafersman instead intends to suggest that, unlike meteor 
impacts, supernatural phenomena cannot be discussed in terms of universal truths 
which can then be applied to specific instances.  We do not have knowledge of the 
underlying universal truths available to us in order to make the kind of predictions 
(or, in the case of the dinosaurs, explanations) we do in the realm of the purely 
natural. 
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That we do not have such knowledge may well be the case, but I would argue that 
this is a matter of accident rather than necessity, at least so far as we do not assume 
that supernatural phenomena are logically impossible.  There is nothing inherently 
unpredictable about many of the concepts that we consider to be 'supernatural'.  
Indeed, astrology, tarot reading, and even Biblical prophecy operate almost entirely 
on their ability to support predictions.  That we do not have empirical support for the 
universal truth of astrological statements, nor can we make reliable predictions 
based upon them, is a scientific argument against astrology, not an indication that 
there is something inherently unpredictable about supernatural phenomena.  It 
certainly is not a reason to declare that scientific methods cannot be applied to 
putatively supernatural phenomena. 
 
There are, I would concede, some supernatural phenomena that do not admit of the 
kind of predictability required by the functionalist account outlined here.  As we 
touched upon in our opening chapter, and shall return to in chapter seven, there 
may be other factors that prohibit scientific investigation of the supernatural.  Some 
interpretations of certain Biblical verses such as "Do not put the LORD your God to 
the test, as you tested him at Massah" (The Bible, Deuteronomy 6:16) suggest that 
applying the kind of predictive methods of science to appeals to God (such as by 
praying for rain and seeing what happens) go against the teachings of scripture.  
However, as we shall discuss later, these factors are additional to the supposed 
supernaturality of the hypothesis or phenomenon in question.  The relevant 
question regarding whether or not we can base predictive success upon some known 
universal truth is not "Is this supernatural?" but rather "Are there any factors or 
variables here that would impede predictive success?" 
 
A systems approach  
 
The final Humean approach that we shall consider relates laws to deductive systems.  
These deductive systems are based upon axioms which can logically lead to more 
generalised theorems.  Frank Ramsey and later David Lewis proposed that laws of 
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nature represent the axioms or theorems that exist in the true deductive systems 
that best balance simplicity and strength: 
 
We can restate Ramsey's 1928 theory of lawhood as follows: a contingent 
generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) 
in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination of 
simplicity and strength.  A generalization is a law at a world i, likewise, if and 
only if it appears as a theorem in each of the best deductive systems true at i.  
(Lewis, 1973: 73) 
 
It is trivially easy to maximise either strength or simplicity.  One can maximise 
strength by simply including all true propositions as axioms, or can maximise 
simplicity by including only one true axiom, say that 2 + 2 = 4 (Carroll, 2010).  The 
aim of Lewis' account is to find those systems which find the right balance between 
them.  Barry Loewer has suggested that, for example, quantum theory might be part 
of a such a system.  Returning to a slightly modified version of the gold/uranium 
spheres example: 
 
(U) There are no solid one ton spheres of uranium. 
(G) There are no solid one ton spheres of gold. 
 
Loewer argues that: 
 
It is plausible that quantum theory together with propositions describing the 
nature of uranium entail (U) but not (G).  So if quantum theory is part of the 
best theory of our world, then (U) will be a law.  In fact, the reason we think 
that (G) is not a law is that we think that the best theory of our world is 
compatible with (G)'s being false.  Adding (G) to fundamental physical theory 
would produce a stronger system but at a great cost in simplicity.  (1996: 111-
112) 
 
This arguably solves the earlier problem of the Naive Regularity view in that it is 
possible, under the systems view, that it can be universally true that P and still not 
be a law that P.  To return to the loaves and the fishes example offered by Ruse, it 
would not do for us to include an axiom such as "A few loaves and fishes are never 
enough to feed 5,000 people" in a best deductive system because such an axiom 
sacrifices a great deal of simplicity.  Thus even if we think that it is universally true 
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that a few loaves and fishes have never, and will never, be enough to feed a few 
thousand people, we are not obliged to consider this a law of nature. 
 
That said, the picture is not quite so simple.  While we might readily accept that "A 
few loaves and fishes are never enough to feed 5,000 people" is an acceptable 
sacrifice in formulating a system, there are further implications to such an event 
occurring.  Let us, for sake of argument, assume that the feeding of the 5,000 would 
represent a violation of the law of conservation of energy.  Given this, we would not 
only have to reject the specific law prohibiting the feeding of the 5,000, but also the 
more general law regarding energy conservation.  This is not quite so comfortable a 
proposition. 
 
There are a few responses that we can make here.  The initial response is simply to 
accept that, similar to earlier Humean approaches, any axiomatisation which admits 
of such a counter-instance will not feature in the best system.  Therefore, if there 
has ever been an instance in which a few loaves and fishes have been enough to 
feed 5,000 people, then the law of conservation of energy does not feature in the 
best system which maximises both simplicity and strength.  Thus there is no sense in 
speaking of the feeding of the 5,000 as a violation of this law. 
 
The second response is similar in approach to what Lakatos termed "monster-
barring" (1976: 15), whereby a generalisation is amended in order to accommodate 
counter example. We can simply restate Plantinga's argument that the laws of 
nature are only thought to hold in a closed system.  This is perhaps nowhere as clear 
as it is in the case of conservation of energy and thus, given that God's intervention 
represents a force which originates externally to the system, no violation actually 
occurs.  We shall return to this kind of response later in this chapter, but for now it 
allows us to hold that the best systems may well admit of counter-instance to 
otherwise universal laws.  We may axiomatise the law of conservation of energy 
such that it describes the operation of the natural world as a closed system, rather 
than an open one. 
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Finally, we might maintain the law of conservation of energy, but acknowledge that 
the system doesn't account for the loaves and fishes event.  To again borrow from 
Lakatos, the discovery of an inconsistency does not necessarily mean that we must 
put an end to a scientific research programme, but rather that "it may be rational to 
put the inconsistency into some temporary, ad hoc quarantine, and carry on with the 
positive heuristic of the programme" (1978: 58) . While this might be an unsatisfying 
resolution, it does once more allow us to avoid denying that the loaves and fishes 
event occurred, whilst also maintaining the law of conservation of energy. 
 
However, we might wish to argue that such responses are unsatisfactory.  We might 
say that omitting the law of conservation of energy on the basis of a single counter-
instance involves too great a sacrifice in strength to a system.  Similarly we might 
argue that Plantinga's response sacrifices too much simplicity, and that the nature of 
the loaves and fishes event makes it impossible to overlook.  Instead, we might insist 
that the law of conservation of energy does in fact feature in the best system, but 
that the feeding of the 5,000 represents a legitimate counterexample to it.  If this 
were the case, then perhaps we might speak coherently of a 'violation' having 
occurred.  Richard Swinburne has argued along similar lines to these.  He asks:  
 
But what are we to say if we have good reason to believe that an event E has 
occurred contrary to predictions of a formula L which otherwise we have good 
reason to believe to be a law of nature, and we have good reason to believe 
that events similar to E would not occur in circumstances as similar as we like in 
any respect to those of the occurrence of E?  (2000: 425) 
 
Swinburne argues that in such circumstances we have three options.  We can 
abandon L entirely, without replacement, which on the Ramsey-Lewis account would 
result in a massive loss in strength to the system.  We can attempt to replace L with 
some new law which accommodates E, which given the unrepeatability of E in similar 
circumstances Swinburne argues would lead us to make false predictions.  Or, we 
can accept that L is a law of nature, and that E represents a legitimate counter-
instance to it (2000: 425). 
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Does this then allow us to maintain a coherent separationist position?  I would argue 
not.  Swinburne's argument allows us to maintain that a law of nature has been 
violated given three criteria obtain: 
 
1) We have good reason to believe that L is a law of nature or, at least, holds 
most of the time. 
2) We have good reason to believe that E has occurred. 
3) We have good reason to believe that an event like E would not occur in 
circumstances similar to E. 
 
How then are we to establish the truth of (2) or (3) without scientifically investigating 
them?  We might, of course, appeal to theological reasons, as we presumably would 
in the case of the feeding of the 5,000.  In that instance, we might reasonably say 
that the theists have good (theological) reason to think that E occurred and also 
good (theological) reason to think that an event like E would not occur in similar 
circumstances. 
 
However, while we might grant this to be the case for the feeding of the 5,000, this 
does not seem to be generalisable to all supernatural, or even theological claims.  To 
return to the subject of Intelligent Design, the arguments forwarded in favour of 
believing that life was designed are not theological but empirical.  We might disagree 
with the notion that these arguments do in fact qualify as 'good reason' to believe 
that life was designed, but they do not seem obviously unscientific in principle.  Thus 
even if the claims of Intelligent Design reflect coherent violations of natural law, they 
do not seem obviously outside of the domain of science solely on that basis. 
 
More problematically for separationism, we can plausibly argue that there are 
examples of events which would constitute violations of laws of nature, but that we 
can scientifically investigate to determine that they did not occur.  Take, for example, 
the claim that God created the world six to ten thousand years ago ex nihilo.  Let us 
assume that this violates the law of conservation of energy, and also that in similar 
circumstances that this event, E, would not reoccur in similar circumstances.  We 
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would, therefore, be justified in accepting that this constitutes a genuine example of 
a violation of a law of nature if we can establish (2): that we have good reason to 
believe that E occurred.  However, while we might concede that there is theological 
reason to think that E did occur, we could surely not also concede that science has 
nothing to say on this issue. 
 
We thus return to the arguments from Plantinga and Laudan we saw in chapter one.  
The separationist position denies both the advocate and the detractor of the 
supernatural the ability to investigate their claims, and this is the case even for weak 
separationism.  While we might maintain that some theologically (or otherwise non-
scientifically) motivated beliefs concern events or facts which constitute legitimately 
uninvestigable violations of natural law, this covers only a fraction of the total set of 
supernaturalistic claims. 
 
It seems then that none of the major Humean accounts justify an acceptance of the 
separationist position.  Any account that is based on observation of exceptionless 
regularities cannot coherently accommodate a violation.  If we derive our laws from 
observation of the world, and some fact in the world contradicts that law, then it will 
always be our lawmaking attempts that have proved inadequate to describe reality, 
rather than some failure on reality's part to fit with our previous observations.  Even 
if we do manage to make sense of a violation on a Humean account, it gives us little 
reason to accept the separationist position.  Let us therefore turn our attention to 
non-Humean accounts. 
 
 
Non-Humean theories  
Relations between universals  
 
The first non-Humean theory we shall address attempts to distinguish between the 
notion that laws just are universal truths, and the notion that laws can imply 
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universal truths by virtue of an actual relation not between Fs and Gs, but rather F-
ness and G-ness.  As Armstrong outlines the theory: 
 
Suppose it to be a law that Fs are Gs.  F-ness and G-ness are taken to be 
universals.  A certain relation, a relation of non-logical or contingent 
necessitation, holds between F-ness and G-ness.  This state of affairs may be 
symbolized as 'N(F,G)'.  (1983: 85) 
 
Dretske argues that this approach solves the earlier difficulty in moving from 
"diamonds have a refractive index of 2.419 (law)" to "things mined in kimberlite have 
a refractive index of 2.419".  He argues that even if "is a diamond" and "is mined in 
kimberlite" are coextensive, there is no reason to think that relations between those 
properties and other properties should be maintained: 
 
If "F" and "K" are coextensive, we cannot substitute the one for the other in the 
law "All F's are G" and expect to preserve truth; for the law asserts a connection 
between F-ness and G-ness and there is no guarantee that a similar connection 
exists between the properties K-ness and G-ness just because all F's are K and 
vice versa.  (1977: 253) 
 
Moreover, this account appears to offer at least prima facie solutions to the 
problems of prediction and supporting of counterfactuals seen in a Humean account.  
If we know, or believe, that some relation holds between F-ness and G-ness, then we 
can predict, based on an observation of an F (a particular phenomenon or entity 
exemplifying the universal property of F-ness) that we can also expect to see a G.  
Moreover, we can reasonably suppose that we can make antecedent counterfactual 
claims ("if this were an F...") and then infer based on the law relating "F-ness" and 
"G-ness" that some consequent ("it would be G") (Dretske, 1977: 266). 
 
Van Fraassen has objected to the universals approach as outlined by Armstrong by 
asking us to identify what exactly the relation between F-ness and G-ness is, and also 
to show how we can infer that particulars F are accompanied by G based upon the 
fact that there is such a relation between F-ness and G-ness.  He argues that, 
although we might concede to Armstrong that the relation between universals 
simply is the causal relationship as we experience it, only now understood to relate 
types rather than tokens, we cannot extend this concession to the problem of 
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inference: "If a relation holds between two types, and is the sort of relation that can 
also hold between their tokens, it still does not follow that their tokens are indeed so 
related.  Romeo and Juliet's fathers hated each other but their children did not." 
(1993: 436). 
 
 Unlike the Humean account, the fact that the universals account describes an actual 
relation between types, rather than simply observed regularity, makes it a more 
complicated matter whether or not laws understood in this way admit of violation.  
Although it cannot be true both that "all Fs are Gs" and "some F is not a G", it can be 
true that "there is a relationship between "F-ness and G-ness" and also "some F is 
not a G".  This can be understood simplistically if we consider the relationship 
between heavy objects and falling.  We might accept that there is a relationship 
between some entity F having the property of being heavy, and with the subsequent 
event G involving its descent.  However, as can be observed with many objects 
having the property of heaviness (such as birds), there is no necessary connection 
between the token F (the bird) and a token event (it falling).  We shall discuss a 
conception of natural law which address this issue later in the chapter. 
 
We might, of course, want to argue that laws of nature are not to be understood so 
simplistically.  No one would suggest that it is in fact a law of nature that all heavy 
objects fall to the ground, or that the property of heaviness necessitates falling.  We 
would instead want to suggest that the relationship between heaviness and falling is 
to be considered in light of other factors, even though the relationship itself is 
maintained.  However, given such a concession, what reason could we then have to 
think that a miraculous event was a violation of such a relation, rather than simply an 
instance where say, the volition of a deity is one of the factors that must be 
considered? 
 
Conversely, we might be tempted to argue that it is not tokens failing to behave as 
would be expected due to the relationship between their types that reflect violations 
of laws of nature.  Rather we might wish to say that the lawlike relationships 
between properties cannot obtain if one of the properties of a particular token is 
117 
 
supernatural (let us call this property S-ness).  This could be understood in two 
alternative ways: 
 
1) If the property of S-ness is present in any particular token then no property 
which can exist in lawlike relations can also be present.  If X has the property 
of S-ness and it is a law that F-ness causes G-ness, then it is not the case that 
X has the property of F-ness. 
2) If the property of S-ness is present in any particular token then no lawlike 
relation involving its other properties can hold.  If it is a law that F-ness 
causes G-ness, and X  has the property of F-ness and also the property of S-
ness, then it is not the case that "If X then G". 
 
The first possibility here, though potentially functional, seems to contradict our 
understanding of what supernatural phenomena actually are.  Jesus, considered by 
many to be a supernatural being capable of many supernatural acts, shared many of 
the properties of non-supernatural entities, even whilst performing those acts.  It 
seems reasonable that we can suppose at least some lawlike relations hold between 
the type "is visible" and at least one other type.  However, even while walking on 
water, Jesus is quite obviously considered to have remained visible (though it is, of 
course, another question as to whether he remained heavy). 
 
The second possibility seems more plausible.  Moreover, If this account were correct 
then even if F-ness necessitated G-ness in a lawlike way, then the property of being 
supernatural would make it possible for this law not to obtain.  In other words, 
supernatural properties would allow for violations of natural laws.  We see here then 
a potential avenue for a defence of a separationist position.  Following on from our 
suggestion that "is visible" is a property which can stand in lawlike relations, then "is 
reflected in a mirror" seems a plausible candidate for a relevant related type.  
However, this relationship would not obtain when the first property type is 
instantiated by a supernatural entity such as a vampire.  This account finds some 
support in the fact that, were we to ask the question "Why don't vampires have a 
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reflection?", then we would not be surprised to hear the response "Because they are 
supernatural." 
 
The problem with this analysis however is that it does not seem to be any more 
problematic than the idea that "heavy things always fall" is not found to obtain in 
tokens which also possess a mechanism for flight.  If birds do not represent a 
violation of this relation, then why should vampires constitute a violation of "visible 
things cast a reflection"?  To single out the property of supernaturality as any more 
problematic than the property of having wings seems here to be arbitrary.  
Moreover, our understanding of supernatural entities indicates that there are 
relationships between properties which are only exemplified in entities with the 
property of supernaturality.  For example, the relationship between "is a vampire" 
and "is harmed by contact with a crucifix".  If vampires were actually taken to exist 
then certainly our understanding of natural laws would need to become more 
sophisticated in order to accommodate these relations, but this does not seem to 
pose any unique challenges.  Indeed, thanks to fantasy and horror literature, we 
already do have a reasonable understanding of how such relations behave14. 
 
Alternatively, rather than suggest that the presence of the property of 
supernaturality in a particular token interferes with other properties of the particular 
token, we might simply say that a phenomenon is supernatural iff the relations 
between universals are not consistently upheld in relation to it.  There is, say, a 
natural law relating "visible-ness" and "reflected-in-a-mirror-ness", and any visible 
entity for which this relation does not obtain is to be thought of as 'supernatural'. 
 
If this were the case, however, then it seems impossible that we could ever come to 
distinguish between a natural law failing to obtain in a supernatural entity and a 
defeater for a natural law hypothesis.  Even if Armstrong's account were correct, and 
this analysis of supernatural phenomena were also correct, then we still would not 
                                                 
14 As I shall argue more explicitly in chapter seven, I do not consider the term ' supernatural'  to have a 
useful function in this kind of discussion.  For now though it does not affect my argument to consider 
vampires as behaving according to a comprehensible set of supernatural laws rather a 
comprehensible set of non-actual natural laws. 
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be justified in adopting a separationist position.  Ontologically speaking, the 
separationists would be correct, but epistemically speaking their claims would be 
redundant.  If we cannot differentiate between instances where a natural law does 
not hold, and instances where a natural law does hold but its violation is an indicator 
of supernaturality, then how can the separationist position be applied?  We shall 
discuss this further in the following section. 
 
The most troubling part of all of these discussions regarding supernatural 
phenomena and natural laws as relations between universals however is the simple 
question of how we could possibly establish that such relations did or did not hold in 
any particular 'supernatural' phenomenon without being able to investigate it 
scientifically.  If supernatural phenomena do exist then on what grounds can we 
claim to know how the relations between their types behave a priori?  We might 
know that "in the absence of S-ness then a few loaves of bread and some fish will 
not feed 5,000 people", but this is just as true as it is to say "in the absence of having 
wings, then a bird will fall to the floor".  Similarly, if it were not for our scientific 
investigations of aerodynamic properties, and perhaps even wings themselves, then 
we would not be able to make claims about what kind of relations hold in their 
presence.  Without such investigation, then how are we to speak of what kind of 
lawlike relations do or do not hold in the presence of S-ness?  Indeed, how would we 
be able to identify the presence of such a property at all?  Thus, even if relations 
between the properties of supernatural phenomena are not lawlike, then we have 
no way to know this prior to scientific investigation of those phenomena and thus no 
reason to exclude them from such investigation. 
 
Moreover, while one might accept the above reasoning regarding observed 
phenomena, one cannot even defend the idea that one should avoid supernatural 
hypotheses.  If one were to argue that such hypotheses should not be entertained 
because, along the same lines as Hume, there is overwhelming support for their non-
occurrence, then this becomes viciously circular.  Supernatural hypotheses would be 
rejected on the grounds that such events are not seen to occur, thus they would 
never subjected to investigation, thus they would not be seen to occur. 
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Tendencies accounts  
 
An alternative group of non-Humean approaches to natural law suggest that natural 
laws do not apply universally, but rather describe the way that members of certain 
sets tend to behave.  Nancy Cartwright has argued that, rather than extending 
universally and eternally, the laws of nature describe a "patchwork" of behaviour 
patterns: "we live in a dappled world rich in different things, with different natures, 
behaving in different ways.  The laws that describe this world are a patchwork, not a 
pyramid" (1999: 1). 
 
Cartwright argues that things in nature possess "capacities" to behave in certain 
ways, but that these capacities are not lawlike regularities, and can manifest very 
differently in different circumstances.  She argues for example that redness carries 
the capacity to look a certain way under certain conditions, but then in a completely 
different way in others (1998: 25).  The lawlike regularities described by scientists 
may hold in the extremely restricted environment of the laboratory, but this does 
not reflect the actual world in which we live: 
 
We may think the natural behavior is for opposite charges to move towards 
each other and for similar charges, to separate from each other.  But it is 
important to keep in mind that this is not an effect in abstract.  That motion, 
like any other, depends on how the environment is structured.  (1998: 25) 
 
An alternative, though related account is described by Lowe.  He outlines what he 
calls the "normative" conception of natural law: 
 
According to the normative account of laws, a statement of natural law (a 
'nomological' statement) characteristically implies that normal or typical 
individuals or exemplars of some recognizable natural kind possess a certain 
dispositional property, that is, are disposed to behave or appear in a certain 
way (usually in certain specifiable conditions).  (1987: 273) 
 
These accounts contrast with the Humean conceptions in that they do not insist 
upon exceptionless regularities.  Lowe suggests that if, for example, we take it to be a 
natural law that "ravens are black" then this will remain true even when we 
encounter albino ravens so long as such creatures are "legitimately characterizable 
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as abnormal members of the species" (1987: 274).  He then contrasts this with the 
similar putative law that "swans are white", observing that this law is disconfirmed 
by the discovery of the Australian black swan. 
 
Although he argues for the normative theory on independent grounds, Lowe claims 
that the theory also does "justice to the intuition that miracles – conceived as 
violations of natural law – are at least logically possible" (1987: 273).  He argues that 
on the "normative" conception one could have both a true natural law and an 
exception to it that was deemed miraculous.  Using the example of a levitating table 
he suggests that: 
 
[I]f the levitation phenomenon turned out not to be repeatable, or only to occur 
at the command of one particular person and even then not reliably, or if no 
physical message between the person and table appeared to be involved [...] in 
addition, the abnormal phenomenon proved recalcitrant to any kind of 
naturalistic explanation (unlike albinism in ravens), it seems we would be faced 
with a prima facie case of a genuine miracle.  (1987: 277) 
 
Of course on the  normative account we do not understand miracles to be 
'violations' of natural law in the sense thought by the Humeans.  A miracle no more 
violates the law of nature in question than does an albino raven.  The difference 
being, as Lowe observed, that in the case of albino ravens we are able to identify a 
naturalistic explanation for their plumage.  Instead, miracles constitute violations in 
the sense of being "naturalistically inexplicable violations or suspensions of the 
natural order of things [...] without being destructive of that order" (1987: 277-278). 
 
Tendency accounts, if tenable, clearly allow for miraculous events to occur in a 
sense.  Moreover, Lowe's analysis offers us something of a solution to the problem 
posed in the previous section of distinguishing between an actual natural law failing 
to obtain, and a defeater to a purported natural law. 
 
However while Lowe's solution may offer us some epistemic grounds for identifying 
'miracles' in non-Humean theories of natural law, it remains implausible to suggest 
that such events would not be investigable by science.  This is certainly true in the 
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sense of investigating the events themselves.  A key feature of Lowe's description of 
the levitating table was that the event was investigable to the point that all 
naturalistic explanations were ruled out – including alternative potential natural 
laws.  This not only allows us to unknowingly investigate supernatural phenomena 
should some such event occur, but also at least tentatively allows us by process of 
elimination to posit a supernatural explanation as a result of scientific investigation.  
This methodology allows for at least a superficial scientific investigation of 
supernatural phenomena even if, though I do not think it is necessarily implied by 
the account, a deeper investigation proves intractable. 
 
That said, what reason is there to think that deeper investigation would prove 
intractable?  Supposing Lowe's levitating table actually existed, or beings who were 
visible but cast no reflection existed, then what is there to prevent us analysing the 
relations that obtain in these instances?  Certainly they would be rare occurrences, 
or else we would not have posited a natural law regarding their non-occurrence.  In 
Lowe's terms, they would not be in accord with "the natural order of things".  But 
simple rareness is not sufficient to warrant exclusion from scientific investigation.  
Especially in a situation, as described by Lowe, where the event occurred for 
sufficiently long enough, and in a way amenable enough to investigation such that all 
natural explanations could be eliminated.   
 
Indeed, we do not need to venture into the realm of the hypothetical in order to see 
this kind of approach to the miraculous being employed.  The Roman Catholic Church 
employs exactly this kind of process of elimination when assessing intercessory 
miracles in order to determine whether or not an individual should be beatified or 
canonised.  Most notably, a key feature of their approach involves determining 
"whether any alleged medical miracle (most all claimed miracles are of this sort) is 
inexplicable by current medical science" (Harvey, 2007: 1255).  For example, this was 
reportedly the case in 2014, when Pope Jean Paul II was granted sainthood on the 
basis of 'miraculously' healing the brain aneurism of Floribeth Mora Diaz: 
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Even her neurosurgeon seems to be convinced. "If I cannot explain it from a 
medical standpoint, something non-medical happened," said Alejandro Vargas 
Roman. "I can believe it was a miracle." 
 
She recounted the story on a website linked to the beatification of John Paul II. 
 
It was not long before the Vatican contacted her in what was the start of a long 
process in which the purported miracle was scrutinised by the experts of the 
Holy See, led by the Vatican “postulator” in charge of advancing John Paul II’s 
sainthood. 
 
Mrs Mora was flown to a Church-run hospital in Rome, where she was 
registered under a false name while doctors conducted tests which showed that 
she was completely healthy.  (The Telegraph, 2014) 
 
 
Although I do not wish to go so far as to declare the church's approach "scientific", it 
is at least worth noting that it bears significant resemblance to what we might 
understand the term to mean in a colloquial sense.  Miracle investigations involve 
the collection of x-rays, laboratory reports, and written testimonies, and are 
assessed by physicians who have been appointed as advisors on the church's 
'Medical Commission'.  "The physicians of the Medical Commission work only from 
written records.  They work in isolation and do not discuss their work with anyone, 
even each other, until panel meetings" (Harvey, 2007: 1257). 
 
There are reasons to question the legitimacy of calling this activity, rigorous as it 
might be, 'science'.  If we recall our discussion in chapter two regarding the social 
structure of science, we saw that one reason that we might not deem creationism 
scientific was because its practitioners operated independently from science, rather 
than as a proper 'subcommunity'.  Although it would perhaps be unfair to draw too 
heavy a parallel here, it is certainly plausible that a similar argument might be made 
in this case also.  However, as with our previous discussion, this is tangential to the 
issue of supernaturality.  If we can indeed identify a coherent understanding of a 
miracle in something like the senses outlined by Cartwright and Lowe, then the 
methods relating to beatification and canonisation represent a concrete example of 
at least a proto-scientific (as opposed to pseudoscientific) approach to the matter. 
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Thus, even if we grant that on certain non-Humean accounts that violations of 
natural law might occur, and be identified as such, we still find ourselves no closer to 
a justification of the separationist position.  Either such events cannot be 
investigated to the extent that they could be identified as violations of natural law, 
or they can be investigated to such a degree, but by doing so render the 
separationist position manifestly false. 
 
 
Anti-realism  
 
Some philosophers, motivated in part by considerations such as those above, have 
rejected both Humean and non-Humean accounts of natural laws.  As van Fraassen 
writes: 
 
We have now seen that any philosophical account of laws needs a good deal in 
the way of metaphysics to do justice to the concept at all.  We have also seen 
that, as a result, any such account founders on the two fundamental problems 
of identification and of inference.  The extant accounts come to grief 
additionally in their attempts even to meet the most basic criteria relating to 
science and explanation.  Their promises have all proved empty.  (1989: 130) 
 
Thus these philosophers are motivated to reject the notion that laws of nature 
reflect factual states at all.  This can be interpreted either in the broad sense that for 
any supposed law, x, where L is the property of being a law, then x L(x), or else in 
the narrower sense that "if it is a law that x, then it is not a fact that it is a law that 
x". 
 
On the broader understanding we can, without too much concern, conclude that if 
we define a miracle as a violation of a law of nature, then miracles simply cannot 
occur.  This is not to say that no event which we would habitually refer to as a 
'miracle' could not occur (say, the feeding of the 5,000), but rather that if such an 
event did occur, it would not be a miracle.  There can be no event that can be 
reasonably described as having violated a law of nature if there is no such thing as a 
law of nature. 
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However, the latter account is not quite so clear.  If we consider one such account, as 
outlined by Barry Ward (2002), we can see that we might simultaneously reject the 
notion that the laws of nature express facts, whilst also maintaining a coherent 
picture of miracles as 'violations' of those laws. 
 
Ward argues that motivations for accepting the Humean picture, despite its 
numerous and well-documented difficulties, roughly correspond to Lewis' remarks 
that: "The point of defending Humean Supervenience is not to support reactionary 
physics, but rather to resist philosophical arguments that there are more things in 
heaven and earth than physics has dreamt of" (1994: 474).  In other words, the 
Humean is motivated by the desire to avoid the ontological baggage of positing 
additional nomic states of affairs (such as relations between universals) on top of 
physical facts.  He then argues further that, due to the intuitive possibility that there 
could be multiple possible worlds with identical physical states but distinct sets of 
laws, that Humean Supervenience is (intuitively) false (2002: 194-195). 
 
Ward instead presents a projectivist account of what we mean when we speak of 
natural laws.  Specifically, he proposes an account whereby "law claims are 
understood as normative claims which express attitudes taken to rules for making 
predictions and explanations" (2002: 192).  Our discourse about natural laws existing 
in the world is in fact a projection of our attitudes regarding certain states of affairs 
onto the world.  He argues that lawlike statements such as Newton's Second Law, or 
that "all sodium salts burn yellow", should instead be understood as what he calls a 
"Model Generating Rule" (MGR).  These MGRs, when initial or boundary conditions 
of a system are specified, generate predictions regarding that system.  In the case of 
Newton's Second Law, if we know the initial position and velocity of some object in a 
system, as well as its mass and the forces acting in that system, then we can produce 
a model that predicts what will happen to the object.  He concludes that: 
 
To say of an MGR that it is a law is to express the following attitude: this MGR is 
one that ought to be used for predicting and explaining.  In saying 'it is a law 
that P' we are singling P out as one of the rules to use for those purposes.  It is 
important to note that it is not implicit in the commitment thus expressed that 
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there is some fact of the matter determining P as a rule that ought to be used.  
(2002: 197-198) 
 
It seems then that we could modify Hume's notion of a miracle as a "violation of a 
law of nature" as instead being an occurrence which does not conform to the 
predictive models generated by an MGR given specified initial and boundary 
conditions.  Thus if we agree that we ought to use Newton's Second Law as an MGR 
for predicting the motion of an object in a given system, and we know the initial 
conditions of that system, then any result that did not conform to our predictions 
regarding that object, so long as we have not made an error in calculation or initial 
measurement, could reasonably be considered a 'miracle' in the Humean sense, and 
more so if we add the additional qualifier that the failure to predict is the result of 
"particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent" 
([1777] 2004: 74). 
 
If this reasoning is correct, then it would appear that an anti-realist account could 
accommodate the notion of a miracle so long as we adjust our definition of 'miracle' 
in order to fit the revised schema.  However, even  if we accept that such an event 
could be considered a miracle, then we return to the same problems that faced the 
standard Humean accounts.  If we ought to use some MGRs for prediction and 
explanation, because it is the case that we have always observed that this MGR 
produces reliable predictive results then any failed prediction will either give us 
reason to question that the actual miracle occurred or else give us reason to doubt 
the predictive capabilities of the MGR.  Mirroring Lowe's discussion of the Naive 
Regularity account, it cannot be the case that (i) some MGR M has always been 
observed to produce successful predictions; and (ii) there exists some 'miraculous' 
event m which contradicts those predictions. 
 
Although Ward's suggestion is only one example of an anti-realist attempt to 
accommodate our intuitive and semantic dispositions towards laws of nature, I think 
we can reasonably take the above analysis as reason to be at least tentative 
regarding the status of miracles on a more general level.  We cannot simply dismiss 
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the idea that a violation of a law of nature has occurred on an anti-realist account 
unless we insist on adhering to the strictest of conceptions of what that means.  
However, even granting that an anti-realist understanding of laws of nature could in 
principle allow for coherent discussion of miraculous events, then that account can 
still be scrutinised in much the same way that realist accounts can.  This is not, of 
course, to suggest that no such account could allow for miraculous violation, but it 
certainly gives us reason to be hesitant before accepting the viability of the 
separationist approach. 
 
 
Theistic objections to violations of laws of nature  
 
It should be noted that opposition to the possibility of miracles has also been 
proposed on theological grounds.  As Wesley Wildman summarised the feelings of 
those involved in the Divine Action Project, a series of conferences and publications 
co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory and the Centre for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences in Berkeley:  
 
The idea of God sustaining nature and its law-like regularities with one hand 
while miraculously intervening, abrogating or ignoring those regularities with 
the other hand struck most members as dangerously close to outright 
contradiction.  Most participants felt that God would not create an orderly 
world in which it was impossible for the creator to act without violating the 
created structures of order.  (2004: 38) 
 
This argument raises an important issue concerning the way that God is conceived in 
the theistic worldview.  It is easy, when discussing the miraculous events attributed 
to God, to be lured into viewing Him as only acting in the world at such times.  One 
thinks of the laws of nature as operating of their own accord (once God has set the 
universe in motion), with God occasionally stepping in to keep everything running 
smoothly.  This kind of thinking is often associated with Newton's suggestion, having 
discovered the law of gravity, that God is still needed to adjust the orbits of the 
planets in order to prevent their decay (Ramati, 2001: 417).  This kind of thinking 
has, however, received much criticism.  As we saw in chapter two, Plantinga argued 
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that "god-of-the-gaps" theology was misguided because "God is constantly active in 
his creation" (1997: 150) and that natural laws should not be considered to be 
independent of God. 
 
If Plantinga is correct in this assessment, then God should not be viewed as playing a 
causal role only when the laws of nature are violated, but as actively maintaining 
them at all times.  But then, one may ask, is it incoherent or inconsistent to speak of 
God maintaining the laws of nature while at the same time violating them?  
According to Plantinga, not in any obvious way:  
 
There would be arbitrariness and inconsistency only if God had no special 
reason for acting contrary to the usual regularities; but of course he might very 
well have such reasons.  This is obvious for the case of raising Jesus from the 
dead: God intends to mark the special status accruing to Jesus by this mighty 
act of raising him from the dead.  (2011: 106) 
 
The notion that God does not act in an interventionist sense is not, however, limited 
to arguments regarding consistency.  As theologian, philosopher and Anglican Priest 
John Macquarrie has been oft quoted: "The way of understanding miracle that 
appeals to breaks in the natural order and to supernatural intervention belongs to 
the mythological outlook and cannot commend itself in a post-mythological climate 
of thought" (1977: 248).  This position should not be taken as denying that God is 
causally responsible for what we see in the world.  God is still taken to act in a role of 
'sustaining' or 'preserving' the natural order, but not 'interfering' with it.  As Langdon 
Gilkey outlines a liberal theological position:  
 
In understanding God's acts and speech literally and univocally, the orthodox  
belief in special revelation denied the reign of causal law in the phenomenal 
realm of space and time, or at least denied that reign of law had obtained in 
biblical days.  To the liberals, therefore, this orthodox view of revelation 
represented a primitive, prescientific form of religion and should be modernized 
[...].  God's act's ceased to be special, particular, and concerned with 
phenomenal reality [...].  Rather, the divine activity became continual, creative, 
immanent activity of God.  (1961: 194-195) 
 
Thus we see that one can accept God as having a causal role in the events within the 
universe and yet also reject the notion that God miraculously intervenes in the 
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natural order.  What is interesting to our discussion however is the description of 
this view as "prescientific".  This account seems to adopt the position that science is 
not only capable of investigating supernatural phenomena understood as violations 
of the laws of nature, but that it has actively disconfirmed their occurrence.  
Astonishingly we find here an example of the anti-supernaturalist anti-separationist 
position, outlined in chapter one as being paradigmatically represented by Richard 
Dawkins, being advocated as a viable theistic position.  Thus once again we see 
reason to reject the notion that the separationist outlook represents any plausible 
sense ofa 'middle ground'. 
 
Plantinga (2011) argues that such liberal theological attitudes are the result of 
commitment to the idea that modern science implies "hands-off theology" and 
further, that science is tied to a deterministic outlook which leaves no room for 
divine intervention.  He suggests that such notions are the result of equating science 
with what he calls a "Laplacean" conception of the way the world is.  By this he 
refers to a classical Newtonian understanding of the universe as a "vast machine 
evolving or operating according to fixed laws" (2011: 74-75) combined with the 
notion that the universe is causally closed.  By combining these two notions we 
arrive at the idea that violations of the laws of nature cannot and do not happen 
because the conception does not allow for such events.  He argues however, as we 
have seen already, that even granting the Newtonian picture, we have no reason 
from science to suppose that the universe is causally closed: 
 
These principles, therefore, apply to isolated or closed systems.  If so, however, 
there is nothing in them to prevent God from changing the velocity or direction 
of a particle.  If he did so, obviously, energy would not be conserved in the 
system in question; but equally obviously, that system would not be closed, in 
which case the principle of conservation of energy would not apply to it.  
Indeed, there is nothing here to prevent God from miraculously parting the Red 
Sea, or changing water into wine, or bringing someone back to life, or, for that 
matter, creating ex nihilo a full-grown horse in the middle of Times Square.  It is 
entirely possible for God to create a full-grown horse in the middle of Times 
Square without violating the principle of conservation of energy.  (2011: 78-79) 
 
If Plantinga is correct then no matter what conception of a law of nature we adopt, 
there would be no necessary contradiction in saying that it is a law, L, that not-m, 
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and also, m.  The scope of L is limited to situations in which the universe is causally 
closed, but even the definition of a miracle suggested by Hume was appended by the 
important caveat "by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of 
some invisible agent" ([1777] 2004: 74).  In the case of Christian theism, if the Deity 
in question is specially acting to bring about m then the universe is not causally 
closed and thus L is not applicable in that situation.  God cannot violate the laws of 
nature because the laws of nature do not apply in situations where He is intervening. 
 
There are a number of objections that may be raised against Plantinga's argument.  
Firstly, that this is a case of special pleading, or else a misconception of the 
universality of natural laws.  To say that the laws of nature only apply to the limited, 
closed, system of the universe is simply to extend Nelson Goodman's pocket to the 
size of the universe.  This criticism does not, however, seem entirely fair.  The issue 
with Goodman's pocket was a question of limiting the scope of a law to a specific 
spatiotemporal location.  Plantinga however is limiting the scope of a law to space 
and time itself.  God, being transcendent, exists 'outside' of such boundaries, thus it 
is entirely coherent (so long as one accepts the coherence of transcendent existence) 
to say that the laws of nature are not spatiotemporally limited and yet still limited. 
 
A second objection might echo the earlier concerns of the DAP conference.  In what 
sense if, in Plantinga's words, "God is constantly active in his creation, that natural 
laws, if there are any, are not independent of God" (1997: 150), does it make sense 
to refer to the laws of nature as operating in a closed system?  If God is constantly 
maintaining the laws of nature (or, on the more dramatic Occasionalist outlook, 
directly intervenes in every instance of causation), then how can one talk of a 
causally closed universe?  In what situations could L ever be thought to apply if God 
is active in every situation? 
 
Regarding the separationist debate, Plantinga's argument seems double-edged.  On 
the one hand, by placing God outside of the closed system governed by natural laws, 
it gives us explicit reason to think that science cannot investigate acts of God, which 
as we have seen is the driving motivation behind much of the discussion surrounding 
131 
 
the issue.  On the other hand, Plantinga has given us explicit reason to reject the 
notion that supernatural events violate laws of nature, which is one of the most 
explicit and consistent expressions of justification for the separationist position.  If 
we accept Plantinga's argument then, while we might want to accept the 
separationist position, he has provided a devastating blow to a central tenet of it. 
 
Even more problematic for the separationist position is the fact that neither natural 
laws nor violations of them are couched specifically in terms of Christian theism15.  
Even Hume's caveat was rendered religiously neutral by being framed as a 
disjunction ("or by the interposition of some invisible agent").  If we grant that the 
God of Christian theism (or transcendent deities in general) might be taken as 
legitimately operating outside of the scope of natural law, then this does not justify 
us extending the separationist principle to supernatural phenomena in general.  
Unless we define supernatural phenomena as specifically that which exists or 
originates beyond the boundaries of space and time (an idea discussed in chapter 
six), then there seems to be no obvious reason that we can extend Plantinga's 
reasoning to anything other than God Himself.  Indeed, the majority of those 
phenomena which we would commonly refer to as supernatural (such as ghosts, ESP 
and astrology) seem entirely distinct from such a definition. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
It seems then, that the notion of the supernatural as a violation of natural law is, if 
even coherent, an extremely poor motivation for a separationist position.  Humean 
conceptions of natural law simply render the concept untenable, even on more 
sophisticated accounts.  It cannot be the case both that there is some universal 
regularity which might constitute a law of nature, and also a truth which contradicts 
it.  Where it is plausible to speak of a violation on a Humean account, this offers us 
                                                 
15 Unless one defines natural laws in explicit terms as deriving directly from God in some way, as in 
the form of a literal divine decree.  However, if one adopts such an approach then the notion that 
science can not investigate supernatural phenomenon collapses even more swiftly into incoherence. 
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no reason to suppose that science cannot investigate and, more pressingly, we could 
not in many cases affirm that a violation has occurred without conducting such an 
investigation first. 
 
The non-Humean accounts we have discussed, though perhaps more promising, fare 
little better.  Though they offer potential avenues for us to make true claims 
regarding both the existence of natural laws and violating instances of them, they do 
so in a way that makes it plain that such violations are entirely within the remit of 
scientific investigation.  Indeed, establishing what these laws are, and when they 
have been violated, requires science to investigate. 
 
We have not discussed every conception of natural law in the philosophy of science, 
nor is it impossible to rule out any future conceptions that might allow us to make 
sense of the notion.  However, the failure of primary modern accounts is sufficient to 
render the separationist position highly suspect if defended on such grounds.  On 
any account of natural law that might be deemed widely accepted enough to inform, 
for instance,  legal decisions regarding what constitutes science, we cannot make any 
sense of the notion that the supernatural is that which violates it in a way that 
implies exclusion from scientific investigation.  On any account that fails to garner 
such acceptance, there is little justification for appealing to it in order to defend 
maintaining the separationist position in the spheres of scientific or legal 
communities.  While this kind of approach offers interesting scope for philosophical 
research then, it cannot be accepted at present. 
 
Pursuantly, as we have seen in our brief insight into religious approaches to the 
topic, the notion that supernatural phenomena involve violations of the laws of 
nature seems at best controversial.  Even if we were successful in constructing a 
concept of natural law which could meaningfully be considered violable in a way not 
amenable to scientific investigation, many in the religious community would not 
consider God to act in a way that violated it.  If we find ourselves in a position where 
not only is our understanding of natural law esoteric, but our conception of the 
supernatural does not apply to the God of Christian theism, then it seems that we 
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have strayed far beyond the point where such terminology can be employed in the 
kind of cultural discussions raised in chapter one.  
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Chapter 5  
Scientific methodology and the supernatural  
 
The notion of a 'scientific method' is common in both the philosophical literature 
and the popular zeitgeist.  As in previous chapters, I shall spend little time here 
discussing whether or not any such method actually exists, or whether it unites the 
sciences.  Rather, as with the approach to natural law in chapter four we shall 
address major potential conceptions of scientific methodology in turn, and examine 
them in relation to the supernatural.  Before engaging in the discussion proper 
however, I shall return to the issue raised earlier of defining the supernatural in 
terms of that which science cannot investigate.  As this is one of the most promising 
conceptions of the notion we have addressed, it is worth taking note of again, even 
though as before, it is simply untenable in the context of separationism. 
 
This chapter is broadly structured historically, and the first major discussion point we 
shall turn to is Popperian falsifiability.  This is a natural starting point due to its 
prevalence and historical location in the demarcation debate, as well as the natural 
relationship between science and 'testing'.  This will entail a brief outline of the 
concept, followed by relating it more explicitly to supernaturalism via commentary 
from Pennock.  Following on from this we shall address two issues raised by Kuhn: 
the notion that science operates in periods of "normal science" and "revolutionary 
science"; and the idea that science can be demarcated from pseudoscience due to its 
ability to "problem solve".  In each case, it is determined that no impediment to 
investigation of the supernatural seems to arise. 
 
After discussing the work of Kuhn we shall move on to the idea of "sophisticated 
falsification", forwarded by Imre Lakatos, with a particular emphasis on novel 
prediction.  Although again no conflict is identified between Lakatos' views on 
scientific method and investigation of the supernatural, we do see here a potentially 
interesting reason why creationism in its current state may be deemed unscientific. 
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The final two approaches to scientific method present a more sceptical approach to 
the notion of science possessing some necessary or sufficient criteria which set it 
apart.  The first, forwarded by Paul Feyerabend, is the more opposed to the notion 
of a defined scientific method, although he does present an idea of how we might 
meaningfully distinguish true scientists from "cranks" (1981: 199) in a way that has 
useful bearing on our discussion.  The second, offered by Paul Hoyningen-Huene, 
offers a more optimistic approach to demarcation, though not one which offers any 
weight to the separationist position. 
 
 
A preliminary aside  
 
Before discussing the various methodological criteria that have been proposed over 
the course of the demarcation debate, it is worth reemphasising a point made in 
chapter three about a specific issue regarding the supernatural and our 
understanding of scientific method.  One can, of course, define the 'supernatural' as 
that which is untestable or unfalsifiable.  Indeed, Pennock, in defending the 
Kitzmiller result, seems to imply such a definition: 
 
The [...] misunderstanding arises [...] with ID proponents and even some 
opponents (typically supporters of metaphysical naturalism), claiming that 
science can indeed test the supernatural.  This confusion often seems to turn on 
an inadvertent naturalizing of the supernatural, such as treating creationist 
hypotheses as though they were meant in the ordinary way.  For instance, both 
Laudan and Quinn cite the young-earth creationist view that God created the 
earth 6,000 to 10,000 years ago as a hypothesis that is testable and found to be 
false.  But this and other examples that are offered to show the possibility of 
tests of the supernatural invariably build in naturalistic assumptions that 
creationists do not share.  (2009: 550) 
 
Such an understanding does provide a potentially valid reason to exclude the 
supernatural from scientific investigation.  If the supernatural is simply understood 
as that which is untestable or unfalsifiable, then this offers a prima facie justification 
for arguing that science cannot investigate it.  However, this is simply a more specific 
form of our earlier problem regarding defining the supernatural as "that which 
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cannot be investigated by science".  While testability or falsifiability may feature in 
some plausible definition of supernaturality, such a definition is fatally circular when 
forwarding a prescriptive separationist position. 
 
We can coherently, and perhaps even sensibly, accept such a definition for the 
supernatural.  By defining the supernatural as that which lies beyond scientific 
investigation we would not only arrive at a coherent picture of exactly what 
differentiates natural and supernatural phenomena, but we would also do justice to 
the prevalent intuition that science and religion operate in accordance with 
something like Gould's conception of non-overlapping magisteria16.  A phenomenon 
would be supernatural if it is determined to be untestable and/or unfalsifiable.  Not 
only does such a criterion align with Gould's intuitions, but it also seems to be one of 
the few – if not the only – unifying and exclusive traits that can be plausibly 
attributed to so diverse a set as astrological phenomena, goblins and the God of 
Western theism. 
 
In this form however, the criterion is far too weak to adequately capture our 
intuitions regarding what it means for something to be 'supernatural'.  If taken at 
face value, then this account would imply that Russell's teapot, the disappearance of 
Amelia Earhart, and potentially the entirety of the unobservable universe are 
'supernatural'.  We must, therefore, be careful to strengthen our criterion such that 
a phenomenon is supernatural only if there is no nomically possible world in which it 
is testable or falsifiable.  Russell's teapot could, given a sufficiently powerful and 
well-located telescope, be so tested.  The fate of Amelia Earhart could be 
ascertained if the wreckage of her plane were discovered.  The 'unobservable' parts 
of the universe could be rendered observable by means of a suitably located 
observer. 
 
                                                 
16 Though it should be noted that this would conflict with Gould's suggestion that there were other 
magisteria, such as Art, unless further steps are taken to differentiate the artistic and the religious 
spheres. 
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I do not wish to overly endorse this conception of the supernatural, partly because it 
would exclude too many intuitively supernatural phenomena (in its stronger form, 
both astrology and goblins would be rendered non-supernatural), and partly because 
it seems to reduce the supernatural to an overly relative conception, to use Clarke's 
terminology.  Even the theistic God, taken to exist transcendent to the universe, is 
only supernatural by virtue of the fact that we as observers are not.  If we were 
capable of observing beyond the spatiotemporal manifold in which we exist and 
"gaze upon the face of God", then He would no longer constitute a supernatural 
entity. 
 
These considerations aside, the most fundamental problem with this conception of 
the supernatural as it pertains to our discussion is that it offers no independent 
reason for endorsing a separationist position regarding science and the supernatural.  
If some phenomenon is untestable or unfalsifiable, and either of these criteria is 
necessary for scientific investigation, then that phenomenon is not scientific.  
However, it is of no consequence, nor is it informative, to say that this phenomenon 
is also supernatural.  By noting that the phenomenon is untestable or unfalsifiable 
we already have all of the information that we need in order to determine its status 
as unscientific, and that this also renders that phenomenon supernatural is irrelevant 
to the discussion.  Most troublingly, to assert that some phenomenon is outside of 
the domain of science because it is supernatural is to construe the relationship 
entirely in reverse.  The phenomenon, on this account, is not unscientific because it 
is supernatural, it is supernatural because it is unscientific. 
 
We should note that Pennock argues that methodological naturalism does not 
operate in science in such a seemingly arbitrary and confused manner.  We do not 
simply declare that supernatural phenomena and hypotheses are outside of the 
scope of scientific enquiry, but rather through reasoned argument (such as by 
arguing that supernatural phenomena are untestable or unfalsifiable), and thus 
while they are excluded by virtue of being supernatural, he potentially avoids the 
charge of circularity that I am levelling here:  
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Does science put forward the methodological principle not to appeal to 
supernatural powers or divine agency simply on authority?  Is it just an 
extravagant, arbitrary, speculative assumption?  Certainly not.  There is a simple 
and sound rationale for the principle based upon the requirements of scientific 
evidence.  (Pennock, 1996: 552) 
 
While these considerations may seem obvious, it is important to bear them in mind.  
We might be confident that we should never simply assert that supernatural 
phenomena should be excluded from science, nor fall into the circularity outlined 
here, but we must take pains not to be lured into such a position through habit or 
carelessness.  If the supernatural truly does not belong within the sphere of science, 
then we must be clear about both what it is we mean by supernatural, and for what 
reason such phenomena are beyond scientific investigation.  Let us now turn our 
attention towards some notable examples of attempts to outline such reasons. 
 
 
Testability, confirmation and Popperian falsifiability  
 
We have encountered the notion of testability and falsification several times over 
the course of this discussion.  This should come as no surprise given how deeply the 
concept of 'science' is entwined with the notion of 'testing' and 'experiment'.  Of the 
five explicit criteria for science that Ruse and Overton outlined during the McLean 
case, two of them directly referenced this point.  Pennock also defended such a 
position in his testimony at the Kitzmiller trial (2006: 457).  Indeed, the role of 
testability has had much attention throughout the 20th and 21st centuries following 
the claims of the Logical Positivists that the only meaningful statements were those 
which were analytic or which could be verified empirically (Ayer, [1936] 1952: 9).  In 
this section we shall briefly discuss the concept once more in a general sense, this 
time with a deeper focus on Popper and Pennock, before discussing the concept in 
terms of our established potential conceptions of the 'supernatural'.  
 
The work of Karl Popper on falsification has received a great deal of attention in the 
demarcation debate.  On a general level, Popper emphasised the notion that 
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scientific theories need to be open to revision (reflected in Ruse's "tentativeness" 
criterion discussed in chapter two): "Popper alleges that advocates of supposed 
sciences such as Freudian and Adlerian psychology and Marxism, are defensive or 
evasive when it comes to dealing with difficulties for their theories; they shun 
openness to revision and adopt an uncritical approach to their subject" (Nola and 
Sankey, 2007: 253).  This emphasis on revision and tentativeness places a high 
degree of importance on a theory's ability to be disconfirmed by evidence. 
 
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper introduced the concept of a "basic 
statement".  A basic statement, he says, "is a statement which can serve as a 
premise in an empirical falsification; in brief, a statement of singular fact" ([1935] 
2002: 7).  Popper goes further here and distinguishes basic statements into two 
categories, those which are compatible with a theory, and those which are not: 
 
A theory is to be called 'empirical' or 'falsifiable' if it divides the class of all 
possible basic statements unambiguously into the following two non-empty 
sub-classes.  First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is 
inconsistent (or which it rules out, or prohibits): we call this the class of 
potential falsifiers of the theory; and secondly, the class of those basic 
statements which it does not contradict (or which it 'permits').  We can put this 
more briefly by saying: a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers 
is not empty.  ([1935] 2002: 65-66) 
 
It is worth noting here that there is an asymmetry between confirmation and 
falsification.  The problem with confirmation is that an instance of apparently 
supporting evidence for a theory, even a surprising one (which we shall discuss 
shortly), does not confirm a theory as true.  This problem is exacerbated by other 
famous concerns such as Hume's problem of induction ([1739] 2003: 247) and 
Hempel's raven paradox (1945: 11), though we do not have space to discuss such 
issues satisfactorily here.  For now we should merely note that if we express some 
law of the form "If P, then Q", then any instance of both P and Q will not confirm 
that theory, whereas any instance of P and not-Q will disconfirm it.  Hence the 
emphasis on falsification, rather than confirmation, in Popper's demarcation. 
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It is also relevant that for Popper a theory must contain potentially observable 
content in order to be classed as scientific.  There must be some potentially 
observable basic fact in the class of statements inconsistent with the theory17.  That 
a theory does not contain such facts is not, at least superficially, a criticism of the 
theory, but it does determine that the theory is not scientific.  This applies not only 
to purported 'pseudosciences', but to many respected areas of thought:  
 
In this category will be found propositions that are mathematical, definitional, 
analytic or metaphysical including influential metaphysical theories that are 
proto-scientific in that there is at the time no known way of bringing them into 
relation with anything we could observe (such as ancient Greek atomism or 
aspects of Freudian psychology).  (Nola and Sankey, 2007: 257) 
 
Falsification and the supernatural  
 
What then, can be said of the claim that supernatural phenomena and hypotheses 
are untestable in the sense described by Popper?  Pennock argues that claims 
regarding the existence of such phenomena, specifically those made by creationists, 
are untestable due to the nature of God: "A god that is all-powerful and whose will is 
inscrutable can be called upon to 'explain' any event in any situation [...].  Leaving 
the designer unnamed and undescribed has the same effect." (2006: 472). 
 
This is, at least prima facie, a reasonable criticism of creationism.  There is arguably 
no basic statement that is inconsistent with the existence of an omnipotent being, by 
virtue of that being's omnipotence.  However, as we have seen in previous chapters, 
Laudan has argued against the idea that we can reasonably treat such an issue in 
isolation;  if we are seeking a basic statement that is inconsistent with the premise 
"there exists an omnipotent being", then we will be left empty-handed.  As Pennock 
argues the general case: 
 
                                                 
17 It is worth observing that Popper's account allows for not only falsifiable but falsified theories to be 
considered within the domain of science.  Pennock's argument discussed in chapter two that 
creationism, like geocentrism, has been rendered unscientific by disconfirmation, does not necessarily 
hold here. 
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Supernatural theories [...] can give no guidance about what follows or does not 
follow from their supernatural components.  For instance, nothing definite can 
be said about the processes that would connect a given effect with the will of 
the supernatural agent – God may simply say the word and zap anything into or 
out of existence.  Furthermore, in any situation, any pattern (or lack of pattern) 
of data is compatible with the general hypothesis of a supernatural agent 
unconstrained by natural law.  (1996: 553) 
 
However, as Pennock immediately acknowledges, this is not the whole story.  Even 
creationists do not simply argue that "an omnipotent being exists", but rather make 
a whole host of claims, some of which seem to be inconsistent with possible basic 
statements: 
 
Creation-Science does include supernatural views at its core that are not 
testable and it was rightly dismissed as not being scientific because of these in 
the Arkansas court case, but it at least was candid about a few specific non-
supernatural claims that are open to disconfirmation (and indeed that have 
been disconfirmed), such as that the earth is less than 10,000 years old and that 
many geological and paleontological features were caused by a universal flood 
(the Noahian Deluge).  (1996: 553) 
 
Pennock's distinction between supernatural and non-supernatural views here is 
interesting.  Remember that in chapter two we saw that for Pennock the "first and 
most basic characteristic of supernatural agents and powers is that they are above 
and beyond the natural world and its agents and powers.  Indeed, this is the very 
definition of the term.  They are not constrained by natural laws or chance 
processes" (2006: 471).  It seems then that the distinguishing factor for Pennock here 
is that a phenomenon is supernatural iff it exists "above and beyond" the natural 
world not in a loose sense, but in an absolute one.  God, existing above and beyond 
the natural world is supernatural, but events such as the Noahian flood, even if this 
were an event that was the result of direct intervention by God, are not.  Thus, 
whilst the occurrence of the Noahian flood falls within the remit of scientific 
investigation, God Himself does not.  Thus one might understand Pennock as arguing 
for the weak form of separation outlined previously. 
 
Whilst this distinction may be a valid one, the application here suffers from two 
major problems.  Firstly, it at least requires further elaboration as to why indirect 
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inferences to God from observable phenomena are prohibited in scientific 
methodology, whereas indirect inferences to countless other unobservable 
phenomena are not18.  This is no small issue given that Pennock's conception of the 
'supernatural' hinges on the already questionable notion of 'natural law' discussed in 
the previous chapter.  Pennock hints at an answer: 
 
Empirical testing relies fundamentally upon use of the lawful regularities of 
nature that science has been able to discover and sometimes codify in natural 
laws.  For example, telescopic observations implicitly depend upon the laws 
governing optical phenomena.  If we could not rely upon these laws – if, for 
example, even when under the same conditions, telescopes occasionally 
magnified properly and at other occasions produced various distortions 
dependent, say, upon the whims of some supernatural entity – we could not 
trust telescopic observations as evidence.  (1996: 552) 
 
The argument here seems to be that supernatural phenomena behave entirely (or at 
least often enough to prevent reliable prediction) erratically and unpredictably.  
Unlike say, electrons, which cannot be observed directly, but fall within the domain 
of scientific investigation via indirect observation, supernatural phenomena do not 
adhere to predictable natural laws.  But then, as I have argued in previous chapters, 
if we are not able to investigate any supposedly supernatural phenomena 
scientifically, by what means have we arrived at the conclusion that they are 
unpredictable in this way?  Even more problematically, if we define the supernatural 
in terms of natural law, how can we non-circularly differentiate between which 
phenomena or hypotheses are investigable by science (those which operate 
according to predictable natural laws), and those which are not (those which do not 
operate according to the same laws) prior to scientific investigation? 
 
Additionally, in order to meaningfully apply this distinction we need to restrict 
ourselves to an unreasonably limiting understanding of what it is for a claim to be 
supernatural.  While it might well be the case that there is no basic statement which 
is inconsistent with the proposition "an omnipotent being exists", there are many 
such statements which are inconsistent with the proposition "an omnipotent being 
                                                 
18 As discussed in chapter two, even on an anti-realist account, scientific theories still make reference 
to unobservables. 
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created the universe 10,000 years ago"19.  Pennock differentiates between two 
extremes: statements which contain only references to 'supernatural' (on his 
terminology) phenomena; and statements which contain no references to 
'supernatural' phenomena, but such a binary approach reflects neither the possible 
range of hypotheses available to the supernaturalist, nor the actual range of 
hypotheses that have been forwarded.  As Pennock himself acknowledged, 
creationists claim that the Earth was created six to ten thousand years ago by an 
omnipotent deity.  While he may be correct that testing this requires us to "build in 
naturalistic assumptions that creationists do not share" (2009: 550), this is simply 
irrelevant to the question of whether or not scientists are able to investigate it. 
 
In Pennock's defence, his intended target here is creationism as presented by the 
Intelligent Design movement and the associated legalistic and rhetorical tactics they 
have employed.  Even if there are possible and actual propositions that contain both 
supernatural elements and are also incompatible with at least one basic statement, 
these statements have been largely avoided by the ID community.  This is in fact a 
large part of Pennock's criticism, and seems to inform much of his argument: 
"Confronted with evidence for an ancient earth, creation scientists dismiss the 
relevance of any such observations on the ground that God simply made the earth 
appear to be old" (2009: 550). 
 
While this is a fair assessment of much of the state of the debate, this analysis simply 
reinforces the dichotomy of extremes Pennock wants to set up: a hypothesis that is 
not open to falsification in the way described here is not a scientific hypothesis 
because there are no basic statements which could possibly be incompatible with it.  
But this is not an issue with supernaturality, but rather an issue with explaining the 
discovery of falsifying evidence with an appeal to merely 'appearing' to be falsified.  
Certainly if we allow for the possibility that the truth value of any proposition is 
utterly unrelated to any empirical evidence we might find regarding it, then no 
                                                 
19 This is even granting Pennock's conception of the supernatural as existing "above and beyond" the 
natural world.  If we grant that creatures such as goblins, vampires and unicorns can rightly be 
considered supernatural, then the list of falsifiable statements regarding them grows exponentially. 
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scientific activity could occur.  However, the assumption that we should not allow for 
such severe scepticism seems far more fundamental than anything regarding the 
supernatural.  As Evan Fales argues: "If that sort of skepticism is in play, then why 
worry about the occasional machinations of a god?  The skeptic, in any case, will 
demand an answer to the much more fundamental question by what right we 
assume the operation, ever, of lawful natural regularities." (2013: 253). 
 
At a more superficial level, even if we grant that certain theistic outlooks cannot be 
falsified due to the possibility that God can make any true fact appear to be false, 
this does not give us reason to exclude theistic hypotheses in general, let alone 
supernatural ones.  Popper's demarcation criterion for a theory to be scientific 
demanded that there be some basic statement that was inconsistent with that 
theory.  If there is no such basic statement regarding the notion that "an omnipotent 
being created the universe 10,000 years ago" since it is always possible that God 
made the universe appear as if it was not 10,000 years old, then we simply need to 
posit a stronger hypothesis in order to avoid this problem: "an omnipotent being 
created the universe 10,000 years ago and did not make it appear otherwise".  This 
revised hypothesis, despite containing identical supernatural features, is now 
falsifiable in a way that the former is not, and therefore scientific on Popper's 
account in a way that the former is not.  That creationists have hitherto avoided such 
commitments in formulating their theories does not diminish the fact that, once 
again, we see that supernaturality is irrelevant to the question of demarcation. 
 
Alternative conceptions of the supernatural  
 
While Pennock's objections to the falsifiability of creationism may not hold, perhaps 
some of our other conceptions of supernaturality do present difficulties.  We saw in 
chapter three that numerous potential definitions were available, including "that 
which violates natural law", "disembodied minds", and "that which lies beyond space 
and time".  It seems however that our analysis of Pennock's argument provides us 
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with ample solutions regarding these criteria as well.  Let us briefly examine these 
notions in turn. 
 
We have seen that attempting to cash out supernaturality in terms of natural law is a 
task beset with problems, but even if we grant that it is possible to make sense of 
such a notion, this does not seem obviously to prohibit the construction of 
falsification criteria.  If we assume that whatever interactions occur in the workings 
of astrology are not, in any meaningful sense, in accordance with natural law, then 
this does not prevent us from applying the laws of logic to them in constructing 
criteria.  If it were claimed, for example, that "Capricorns are hard workers", then 
this offers us an entirely testable piece of information.  Whatever relations are at 
play underneath this correlation, natural or otherwise, have no bearing on our ability 
to make testable predictions.  Indeed, suggesting that we need to understand such 
relations, or that they even exist, commits us to a very specific and controversial set 
of conceptions of natural law that is by no means an accepted prerequisite for 
science. 
 
The notion that the supernatural involves disembodied minds does not fare any 
better.  Indeed, all of our discussion of an omnipotent being, in the context of 
creationism, implicitly assumes such an entity is being discussed.  In other areas, the 
disembodiment of the mind seems an almost extraneous issue in constructing a 
hypothesis.  If one posits agency, as one might in the case of investigating a 
mysterious death, or upon discovering some archaeological artefact, then the 
question of whether or not said agency is embodied does not come into discussion.  
Of course, we will generally assume that said agency was embodied, and that 
embodiment might even factor into a more complete explanation (say in explaining 
the method of committing a murder, or in the crafting of a piece of pottery), but we 
have no more need to know 'how' some agent-orchestrated act occurred in order to 
posit agency than we need to know 'how' gravity works in order to posit attraction 
between massive bodies. 
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One might be tempted here to appeal to a classic response to design arguments 
(Hume [1779] 1993: 46) that the reason we can infer a murderer, or a potter, or a 
painter, or a house builder, is that we have experience of murderers, potters, 
painters and house builders.  Thus the analogy regarding other scientific appeals to 
agency fails because we have experience of natural agents, but not supernatural 
ones.  However this is where we can make an important distinction between 
genuinely scientific appeals to the supernatural, and unscientific appeals (or 
otherwise non-scientific references) to the same.  As we have acknowledged, the 
claim that "an omnipotent being exists" is not scientific on a Popperian outlook.  
However, by adding relevantly testable criteria to the claim, we are able to render it 
properly scientific. 
 
This distinction is perhaps best exemplified by observing the discussion surrounding 
the various problems of evil.  The classic formulation by Epicurus20 lays the 
foundation for an entirely Popperian research program.  The hypothesis is that there 
exists some entity who is capable of preventing evil, and willing to do so.  This 
presents us with the possible and inconsistent basic statement that "evil exists" as a 
testable prediction.  However, as has been seen over centuries of theodicies there 
has been much in the way of objection to the idea that the absence of evil is a logical 
consequence of the existence of an omni-attributed being.  Pennock's description of 
the behaviour of young earth creationists can, to a degree, be mapped onto such 
discussions.  As Pigliucci argues: 
 
When a young-earth creationist is faced with geological evidence of an old 
earth, he has several retorts that seem completely logical to him, even though 
they actually represent the very reasons why creationism is a pseudoscience: 
the methods used to date rocks are flawed (for reasons that remain 
unexplained); the laws of physics have changed over time (without any 
evidence to support the suggestion); or God simply created a world that looks 
like it is old so that He could test our faith (called "last Thursday" defense, which 
deserves no additional commentary).  (2013: 16) 
 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Noddings: "[I]f God could have prevented evil and did not, he is malevolent; if 
God would have prevented evil but could not, he is impotent; if God could not and would not, why 
call him God?" (2003: 438). 
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However, and this is a crucial point regarding the overarching thesis of our 
discussion, there is a key difference between the behaviour of creationists and those 
defending their beliefs against the problem of evil.  Proponents of theodicies are not 
forwarding, nor claiming to forward, any kind of scientific hypothesis.  The claim that 
"God exists" is not being treated as a scientific claim as understood on a Popperian 
schema.  It is not falsifiable, as Pennock has argued, because it is taken to be 
compatible with all possible basic statements.  However, while "an omnipotent being 
exists" is not necessarily a scientific claim, this does not mean that it cannot be 
incorporated into a scientific claim.  The idea that there exists an omnipotent being 
may not be falsifiable, but the notion that "there exists an omnipotent being whose 
existence is incompatible with both evil and the appearance of evil" (at least 
defensibly) is falsifiable 21. 
 
Again, we see that the supernaturality of a claim is irrelevant to its scientific 
investigability.  Certainly a proposition with no apparent falsification criteria 
("somewhere in space, there is a lump of gold that weighs exactly one ounce") will 
be, at least for practical purposes, unfalsifiable.  That creationists, or even theists in 
general, have not provided hypotheses which fit the Popperian scientific model, is of 
no consequence.  As we noted in chapter one, and will discuss again in chapter 
seven, there are many theists (for example the pro-supernatural, pro-separationists) 
who have no desire whatsoever to do so.  Moreover, that thus far the most 
prominent anti-separationist theists in the science/religion controversies have 
declined to provide any such hypothesis is similarly unimportant. 
 
We can, to further this line of thought, modify the falsification criteria so that it 
demands active attempts at falsification in order for a program to be deemed 
scientific.  As Boudry argues: "To give the Popperian demarcation criterion some 
teeth, we need only require that, in addition to being falsifiable, a theory must have 
survived repeated attempts at falsification (the Popperian notion of 'corroboration').  
The fact that young-earth creationism is technically 'scientific' for a strict Popperian, 
                                                 
21 So long as a suitably rigid definition of evil is provided.  This is, admittedly, a proposition whose 
meaning is much more philosophically controversial than "the Earth is 10,000 years old". 
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in the sense that it is at least open to falsification, even though having been 
conclusively falsified, is a semantic nonissue." (2013: 83).  If we accept this 
reasoning, then we can avoid concerns over both the scientific status of creationism 
due to its potential falsifiability, and also accommodate theists with no interest in 
appearing scientific.  Creationism, or any other attempt at scientific theory, would 
only qualify upon sincere attempt at falsification.  That creationism has thus far 
failed to meet this requirement, and that many theists have no interest in meeting it 
at all, is at least in principle irrelevant to the supernatural content of the proposals 
involved. 
 
The final conception of the supernatural, that which exists beyond space and time, 
shall be addressed in more detail in chapter six along with further discussion of both 
design inferences and the problem of evil, though for now it provides a useful 
opportunity to note an important general issue with supernatural hypotheses.  One 
might be inclined to argue that supernatural phenomena, being beyond the scope of 
empirical testing, are clearly beyond the realm of empirical science.  Indeed, this 
final conception of the supernatural renders this intuition almost tautologous.  If the 
supernatural is defined as that which is beyond the boundaries of space and time 
then it seems self-evident that we cannot investigate it.  This objection however is 
subject to two distinct problems. 
 
The first, and most obvious, problem with this argument is that not all intuitively 
supernatural phenomena are thought to exist beyond space and time.  Ghosts, 
goblins, psychics, and all manner of other phenomena exist, at least in part, within 
the boundaries of the space-time manifold.  Even God, especially within Christian 
tradition, is often thought to exist partially in this manner.  Thus it seems absurd, at 
best, to discount the supernatural from science on such a basis. 
 
The second, and more complicated, problem is that even if supernatural phenomena 
do exist beyond space and time, their effects do not.  We might, in order to defend 
weak separationism, argue that there are some issues with inferring information 
about a transcendent being from purely non-transcendent empirical information.  
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However, when we consider actual theistic claims, no such inferences are required.  
We are not dealing with the Humean problem of inferring a designer of a particular 
type, whilst having no previous experience of that same type.  Theists are not in 
general starting from a blank philosophical slate and attempting to reason 
information about God blind, but instead bring much in the way of doctrinal, 
traditional and revelatory information to the table.  The theist is not forced to infer a 
designer solely from the evidence, but can instead posit a designer (with various 
attributes) and test predictions based on that hypothesis. 
 
Even though there is no need to rely on purely non-transcendent empirical 
information in constructing testable hypotheses, many such attempts have been 
proposed.  Arguments from design have often at least ostensibly operated in this 
manner, though the history of creationism outlined in chapter one illustrates the 
blurriness of this claim.  Leaving such complications aside however, it is conceivable 
that in the absence of pre-existing theistic belief that a design inference from 
observation of the complexity or beauty of the natural world might be made.  
Moreover, it is also conceivable that falsifiable predictions could be constructed 
from a suitably fleshed out hypothesis of that nature.  We will discuss these kinds of 
natural theological arguments in the following chapter.  
 
 
Kuhn – Paradigm shifts and problem solving  
 
Kuhn argued that Popperian falsification was something that only described scientific 
method in very rare circumstances.  He argued that Popper had "characterized the 
entire scientific enterprise in terms that only apply to its occasional revolutionary 
parts" (1974: 803).  Though Kuhn articulated several characteristics which he 
thought described good scientific theory22, there are two distinct, though related, 
aspects of Kuhn's work which are relevant to our discussion.  The first is his famous 
discussion in The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1962), on the idea that the 
                                                 
22 See Kuhn 1977: 320-339. 
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dominant scientific theories and methodologies of a period of science represent 
"paradigms" which can be replaced in a periods of great upheaval.  The second, is his 
more specific commentary on science as a "puzzle solving" activity. 
 
Under Kuhn's analysis, scientific theories are not, in periods of "normal science", 
subject to heavy scrutiny or criticism in the sense of attempting to falsify them.  
Evidences which appear to be incompatible with any particular theory, rather than 
taken as a potential falsifier of that theory, are taken as "problems" to be solved.  It 
is only when such problems become too overwhelming that a "crisis" period 
emerges, and alternative theories are proposed and actively considered as viable 
alternatives. 
 
We briefly considered in chapter two the possibility that one might adopt a Kuhnian 
analysis in discussing methodological naturalism, with the naturalistic position taken 
to be part of the current paradigm, and supernatural hypotheses thus falling outside 
of current scientific discussion.  We might, less controversially, also understand the 
evolution versus creationism division in this way.  If one takes evolutionary theory to 
represent the dominant theory of the current paradigm (as one undoubtedly 
should), then creationism, interpreted in a way that contradicts evolutionary theory, 
might be considered 'unscientific' in the sense of falling outside of that paradigm.  
This echoes, to an extent, Pennock's suggestion that creationism is 'unscientific' in 
the same way that geocentrism is unscientific, albeit in a much more particular 
manner.  Additionally, it would highlight the reason that much of the 'evidence' for 
Intelligent Design, largely comprising apparent flaws with evolutionary theory, has 
failed to take purchase within the scientific community.  Even if evidence for 
something like Behe's "irreducible complexity" is presented, it is at this stage far 
more likely to be taken as a problem to be solved than as evidence that the entire 
theoretical framework should be overturned. 
 
There are, however, two major obstacles to utilizing such an approach in defending a 
separationist position regarding the supernatural.  Firstly, it adopts such a stringent 
definition of 'scientific' as to rule out not only creationism and geocentrism, but also 
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any historical theories which have been subsequently replaced by more modern 
viewpoints such as Newtonian mechanics, as well as any modern hypothesis which 
falls outside of the accepted paradigm.  While this may be a reasonable move from a 
position of philosophical abstraction, and creationism certainly falls outside of the 
current scientific paradigm, it fails to capture the sentiments of a separationist 
position presented in chapter one.  To say that creationism is incompatible with the 
prevailing scientific paradigm is not to say that science and religion occupy distinct 
non-overlapping spheres of thought, but rather to say that scientific consensus has 
determined this particular religious claim to be false. 
 
The second problem for such an approach is that while we might accept evolutionary 
theory as intrinsic to the current paradigm, it is not so clear that this is also true for 
either metaphysical or methodological naturalism.  Although, as we continue to 
touch on throughout our discussion, there have been several suggested reasons as 
to why one might take methodological naturalism to constitute an important aspect 
of current scientific methodology, and thus reasonably interpret it as part of the 
current paradigm, this is not something that can be derived purely from the 
accepted truth of evolutionary theory, and therefore the accepted falsehood of 
creationism.  It does not follow from a rejection of creationism that we can reject all 
supernatural phenomena, even if one could construct an argument to exclude the 
former. 
 
More problematically, even if we could conclude that naturalism was a tenet of the 
current scientific paradigm from a rejection of creationism (or from any other 
scientific theory), then this would construe the reasoning exemplified by 
separationist opposition to creationism backwards.  We cannot reject creationism 
from the scientific world because it contains supernatural elements, and then non-
circularly reason that supernaturalism is not part of science from any argument 
containing the premise that "creationism is not scientific".  This applies not only to 
the simplistic argument considered here, but also to cumulative cases built upon 
observation of general rejection of supernatural phenomena in scientific theory.  For 
example, as Pennock claims: 
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Put simply, the argument was that as a point of method science does not 
countenance appeals to the supernatural.  Again, we did not claim only science 
requires this ground rule [...].  Suffice to say that no judge would take seriously 
a plaintiff who sought damages against someone for laying a curse upon his car 
or a defendant who pleaded innocent on the grounds that the crime had 
actually been committed by a ghost.  A lawyer would be laughed out of court 
who argued that judges and juries should consider "alternative theories" that a 
crime was committed by a supernatural intelligence.  The IDC's call for a 
"theistic science" is similarly unworkable.  (2009: 546) 
 
While I am inclined to agree with Pennock that both inside and outside of the 
scientific community there is a hostility and dismissiveness towards supernatural 
hypotheses, we cannot non-circularly use this reasoning as a basis for separationism.  
It is of no philosophical consequence that scientists do not accept supernatural 
hypotheses if it turns out that their reason for doing so is based upon the 
observation that scientists do not accept supernatural hypotheses. 
 
The second important aspect of Kuhn's work that is relevant to our discussion is his 
emphasis on "puzzle solving".  Kuhn argued that it is this puzzle solving aspect of 
science which allows us to demarcate the pseudosciences.  He uses the example of 
astrology in particular and contrasts it with astronomy, which he considers genuine 
science.  He argues that only the astronomer is able to adjust their theory in light of 
new evidence, or to do further research in order to accommodate a problem.  
Conversely, a problem encountered in astrology could not be treated as a puzzle to 
be solved because "no man, however skilled, could make use of them in a 
constructive attempt to revise the astrological tradition" (1974: 804). 
 
I am not convinced that the puzzle solving criterion is sufficient to exclude astrology 
from the domain of science, but even if it did, it does not seem that it could be 
successfully extended to all supernatural claims.  If creationist ideas were correct, 
then the fact that we do not find an evenly distributed fossil record across all strata 
should provide a perfectly soluble puzzle.  Why, if all life was created simultaneously 
within the last 10,000 years, do we find fossils to be distributed according to the 
geological layers, as if they had been laid down at different points in time?  Further 
research might provide geological or theological reasons for the apparently stratified 
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history of life, and indeed, creationists have attempted to answer this question via 
appeal to the Noahian flood: 
 
The ‘fountains of the great deep’ (Gen. 7:11) would logically have buried small 
seafloor creatures first.  Water plants would generally be buried before coastal 
and mountain plants.  Land creatures would be buried last, especially the 
mammals and birds that could escape to higher ground.  The more intelligent 
creatures would find a way to escape until the very end, leaving their bodies 
nearer the surface, where post-Flood erosion would destroy most evidence of 
their existence.  Humans would have been most resilient of all, clinging to 
debris and rafts, before they died of exposure; their floating bodies would have 
made easy meals for scavenging fish, so would not have fossilized as readily.  
Most mammal and human fossils are post-Flood.  (Sarfati 2002: 129). 
 
Of course we are free to disagree with this specific creationist argument, but we can 
only assume that no creationist could solve the problem of fossil distribution if we 
assume that creationism is false.  If we wish to avoid presenting this as assumption 
then we would be forced to counter this claim with evidence.  However, whilst 
demonstrating that creationism is not evidentially supported would certainly 
disqualify it from becoming accepted scientific theory, we could only show it to be so 
unsupported if it had been scientifically investigated.  Once again, creationism is 
perfectly within the realm of scientific investigation, it just so happens that such 
investigation has led the scientific community to reject it.  Thus the separationist 
appealing to Kuhn finds themselves with an impossible task, either we must assume 
that creationism is false in order to assert that it is not scientifically investigable, or 
else we must investigate it in order to demonstrate that it is false.  Either way, they 
are not advocating a scenario in which science is taken to be mute on the subject. 
 
 
Lakatos and scientific research programs  
 
Lakatos argued that the Popperian approach was naive on the grounds that the 
distinction between a scientific theory and a pseudoscientific theory cannot be that 
the former is open to refutation because, to some extent, all theories are falsified.  
"Contrary to Popper, the difference cannot be that some are still unrefuted while 
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others are already refuted.  When Newton published his Principia, it was common 
knowledge that it could not properly explain even the motion of the moon; in fact, 
lunar motion refuted Newton." (Lakatos, 1973: 24).  In light of this, he offered a 
revised system of "sophisticated falsification". 
 
Lakatos suggested that science be viewed in terms of "research programmes" (1969: 
167).  Echoing Kuhn's notion of competing paradigms, a scientific research program 
consists of a "hard core" of fundamental postulates which are taken to be true, a set 
of heuristics for developing the programme, and any auxiliary assumptions which 
follow from these, but can be altered upon refutation (Nola and Sankey, 2007: 274-
275).  These programmes are reconstructed historically, rather than being actively 
recognised by those within them.  Even the hard core of beliefs need not be held by 
their practitioners: "Prout never articulated the 'Proutian programme': the Proutian 
programme is not Prout's programme" (Lakatos, 1978: 119). 
 
Relevant to our discussion, theoretical stages within scientific research programmes 
can be differentiated in terms of the novel consequences of a theory.  If we consider 
two theoretical stages, T1 and T2, then T2 can be identified as subsequent and distinct 
to T1 if it contains some novel consequences that T1 does not.  Most simply, but not 
exhaustively, this can be understood in terms of novel predictions.  If there is some 
logical consequence of the laws and empirical content of T2 that is not found in T1, 
then T2 represents a new theoretical stage with novel content.  If these 
consequences turn out upon investigation to be true, then T2 has predicted a novel 
fact.  In Lakatos' terms, such a series is "theoretically progressive" (1978: 33). 
 
It is not necessarily the case that a novel fact need be unknown prior to being 
posited in order to function as a confirming piece of evidence.  Though this is a 
matter for discussion which shall not be elaborated upon here, one can arguably 
consider a piece of known information to be confirming evidence for a theory if that 
information was not included in the construction of that theory, or was not 
something which the theory was intended to explain, for example: "the missing 43 
arc-seconds per century in the precession of the perihelion of Mercury.  This fact, 
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well known from the middle of the nineteenth century, remained unexplained for 
some time until it received its first generally acceptable explanation in late 1915 
when Einstein introduced his general theory of relativity." (Nola and Sankey, 2007: 
278).  Whether or not this counts as confirmatory of Einstein's theory depends on 
whether one takes the historical context of the theory into account, rather than 
consider the theory's logical relation to facts in isolation. 
 
From a demarcation perspective, there are a number of issues to unpack here.  
Firstly, Lakatos' demarcation criterion applies to series of theories, not theories 
themselves.  As he articulates the point: 
 
Sophisticated falsificationism thus shifts the problem of how to appraise 
theories to the problem of how to appraise series of theories.  Not an isolated 
theory, but only a series of theories can be said to be scientific or unscientific: to 
apply the term 'scientific' to one single theory is a category mistake.  (1978: 34) 
 
Looking at the issue in a diachronic manner, rather than focusing on a single theory, 
we can deem a research programme scientific only when it contains at least one 
theoretical stage that has some novel and testable consequence not contained in a 
previous stage, and that consequence passes testing. 
 
If we put forward a theory to resolve a contradiction between a previous theory 
and a counterexample in such a way that the new theory, instead of offering a 
content-increasing (scientific) explanation, only offers a content-decreasing 
(linguistic) reinterpretation, the contradiction is resolved in a merely semantical, 
unscientific way.  A given fact is explained scientifically only if a new fact is also 
explained with it.  (1978: 34, emphasis as original) 
 
This seems like it should provide a perfectly reasonable criterion for the rejection of 
the supernatural (and specifically creationism) from science, at least as far as current 
scientific opinion is concerned.  Unlike Popper's falsification criteria, Lakatos' account 
is not troubled by the fact that creationism or any other supernatural doctrine is 
capable of making testable claims.  What is significant is not that the claims are 
testable, but that the claims have not produced novel, confirmed results.  
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Creationism is unscientific because it only offers a reinterpretation of currently 
known content, rather than offer predictive success of its own. 
 
While it might be the case that no supernatural research programme has met 
Lakatos' criteria, it is not clear that this lack of confirmed novel predictions should 
tell us anything about whether or not supernatural claims are investigable in 
principle.  If we understand the supernatural solely as the kind of non-repeatable 
instances described by Schafersman, or accept Pennock's scepticism that anything 
can logically follow from a supernatural hypothesis, then of course no novel 
predictive success is possible.  In The God Delusion, Dawkins somewhat derisively 
describes a double-blind experiment in which one group of hospital patients were 
prayed for and another group were not (2006a: 61-64).  The experiment 
demonstrated no difference between the two groups, a fact which neither Dawkins 
nor theologians found to be particularly compelling evidence for anything. 
 
What is interesting about the hospital patient example though, is that it raises the 
question: 'What if the results had shown that patients who were prayed for did get 
better faster?'  It would seem that if this were the case, then Lakatos' sophisticated 
falsification criterion would have been fulfilled, and thus a supernatural 
phenomenon would seem to be entirely acceptable as part of a scientific research 
programme.  As I have tried to make clear however, we cannot deem a phenomenon 
uninvestigable solely on the presupposition that it will be found to be false.  That 
nobody was surprised that the patients were unaffected by prayer speaks only to the 
attitudes of those involved, and has no bearing on the content of the hypothesis 
itself.  Similarly, while the unrepeatable nature of "A miraculous healing occurred" 
might render it impossible to accommodate within a scientific research programme, 
the claim that "Prayers result in faster healing" suffers from no such difficulty.  That 
the latter is no less obviously a supernatural a claim that the former illustrates that 
the separationist position misses the mark. 
 
The current lack of evidential support for supernatural claims makes them 
unscientific in the sense that they are not part of established theory, but this lack of 
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support does not however exclude them from being, in principle, investigated by 
science.  Lakatos' account thus offers us an interesting, and valuable, approach to 
the demarcation debate, whilst at the same time giving us no reason to accept the 
separationist position.  We do not need to accept creationism as scientific, because it 
has not offered any novel predictive success, but this does not give us reason to 
blind ourselves and science to the possibility of investigating an entire ontological 
category. 
 
 
Feyerabend and proliferation  
 
Feyerabend famously said of science that  "there is only one principle that can be 
defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development.  It is the 
principle: anything goes" (1975: 28).  However, while he is often taken to be 
defending this principle, he does not actually endorse it.  Rather, he argues that if 
one is to adopt the notion that there is some general and fixed principle that is true 
of all scientific method, then this is the only one that survives critique.  Feyerabend is 
in fact criticising such an approach, arguing that the only thing that survives 
evaluation "will be empty, useless and pretty ridiculous – but it will be a 'principle'.  
It will be the 'principle', 'anything goes'." (1978: 188). 
 
With that in mind, Feyerabend does offer some insights into ways that we might 
speak meaningfully about scientific method.  Firstly, he places an emphasis on the 
values of certain goals or principles within science, and suggests that it can be 
meaningfully asked how best we might realise those goals.  Of note, he endorsed the 
"principle of proliferation", which he suggests aims to achieve "maximum testability 
of our knowledge" (Nola and Sankey, 2007: 301).  The methodological rule which he 
suggests follows from this goal is to: "Invent, and elaborate theories which are 
inconsistent with the accepted point of view, even if the latter should happen to be 
highly confirmed and generally accepted." (Feyerabend, 1981: 105).  Pursuant to 
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this, and more pertinent to the discussion of demarcation, Feyerabend argues that it 
is possible to differentiate between "the crank" and "the respectable thinker": 
 
The crank usually is content with defending the point of view in its original, 
undeveloped and metaphysical form, and he is not at all prepared to test its 
usefulness in all those cases which seem to favor the opponent, or even admit 
that there exists a problem.  It is this further investigation [...] which 
distinguishes the "respectable thinker" from the crank.  The original content of 
his theory does not.  (Feyerabend, 1981: 199) 
 
Pennock argues that here Feyerabend offers a scathing criticism of creationism: 
 
It is almost as though he meant to apply this criterion to rule out creationism as 
crank science.  Creationists of all stripes are well known as beginning with 
beliefs, both metaphysical and empirical, that they hold immune from empirical 
test.  Feyerabend only fails to see that this problem is not just a matter of 
attitude – metaphysical immunity to test can indeed be built into the original 
content of the theory.  (Pennock, 2009: 560) 
 
Contrary to this I would argue that, when taken cumulatively, Feyerabend's analysis 
represents a stringent defence of creationism as science, or rather, a stringent 
defence of creationism in principle as science, and an even more stringent rejection 
of the separationist position.  Firstly, by rejecting the notion that any general and 
fixed principle applies to all scientific methodology at all times, Feyerabend implicitly 
rules out the possibility of a fixed and general principle that "science cannot 
investigate supernatural phenomena".  Secondly, by endorsing proliferation of 
theories, even those which are inconsistent with those which are "highly confirmed 
and generally accepted", Feyerabend offers an almost specific defence of any theory 
which opposes evolution.  These two principles combined give us good reason to 
think that creationism is not only possibly a scientific endeavour, but an outright 
endorsable one. 
 
Of course, I would not disagree with Pennock's analysis of creationism to date as 
displaying much of what Feyerabend condemns to "crank" methodology.  However, 
this returns us to our discussion in chapter two regarding tentativeness and integrity 
in science.  It is not a criticism of creationism that it has been practiced by crank 
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methods, but rather a criticism23 of creationists.  It is arguable, and indeed 
defensible, that being so closely linked to religious dogma does render creationism 
with "metaphysical immunity to test [...] built into the original content of the 
theory", as evidenced by the complete lack of reaction to the experiment referenced 
by Dawkins in the previous section.  However there seems little, even on a theistic 
outlook, to suggest that one can only approach the theory with such immunity in 
place.  That certain religious positions are held 'on faith', not just in the absence of 
evidence but in spite of it, does not entail that all supernaturalist claims must be 
approached in such a manner.  Extricating the 'religiosity' from the theory however is 
a discussion we will need to return to in chapter seven. 
 
 
Hoyningen-Huene and systematicity  
 
Hoyningen-Huene rejects Feyerabend's scepticism regarding a distinguishing 
characteristic of science, as well as the earlier implications that all scientific 
endeavours feature some necessary or sufficient criteria of method which unites 
them.  He instead identifies four historical "phases" of thought regarding the nature 
of science (2008: 167-168).  The first, extending between the time of Plato and 
Aristotle and the 17th century, defined by attributing certainty to that which is 
scientific.  The second, extending between the 17th and 19th centuries, which 
continued the focus on certainty but with the addition of what we would in 
modernity refer to as something like 'the scientific method'.  The third, covering 
most of the 20th century, and characterised by our earlier discussion of Popper, 
Lakatos and Kuhn, acknowledges the fallibility of science, but also suggests that it 
can still be ascribed special status "due to its distinctive mode of production" (2008: 
168). 
 
                                                 
23 I use the term 'criticism' here to denote a criticism in the context of the creationist pretension to 
science.  In other contexts, as we shall discuss in chapter seven, the adherence to religious belief in 
the face of contradicting evidence is not something which is universally considered a negative 
behaviour. 
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The fourth, and present, stage is represented by Feyerabend, and a scepticism of the 
existence of any defining scientific method or criteria for science: "At present, we are 
in the fourth phase, which started around the last third of the 20th century.  In this 
phase, belief in the existence of scientific methods of the said kind has eroded.  
Historical and philosophical studies have made it highly plausible that scientific 
methods with the characteristics as posited in the second and third phase do not 
exist." (2007: 168).  This is also the approach to science which I have tentatively 
endorsed throughout this discussion.  It is fitting then, to conclude our analysis of 
scientific method with an approach which hopes to move forward. 
 
Hoyningen-Huene suggests that rather than identify some unifying characteristic of 
scientific theory or method, we might instead argue that what unites scientific 
knowledge is that they share a family resemblance in increasing what he calls 
"systematicity": "Scientific knowledge differs from other kinds of knowledge, 
especially from everyday knowledge, by its higher degree of systematicity" (2007: 
169).  Hoyningen-Huene acknowledges that the term is vague and, rather than 
attempt to lay out a concrete definition, he offers examples for each of the eight 
"dimensions" in which he claims science to be more systematic than other 
enterprises.  Though there is not room here to attempt a similar explication, some of 
the examples he offers include the use of systems of axioms, taxonomy, increased 
unification and predictive power, and attempts to eliminate errors (2008: 171-178). 
 
What is striking about Hoyningen-Huene's approach is that it offers far more scope 
for nuance and accommodation than earlier approaches.  Note that in his initial 
definition he describes science as having a "higher degree of systematicity", rather 
than as featuring systematicity simpliciter.  He acknowledges that other activities, 
including many day to day activities, involve some degree of systematicity, and even 
that some exhibit more systematicity when approaching topics not covered by what 
we would commonly consider 'the sciences': "knowledge gained by police forces in 
suspected serial criminal cases is much more systematic than knowledge in loosely 
structured scientific fields" (2008: 169).  Moreover, because he does not require an 
enterprise to increase systematicity in all of the eight dimensions he identifies, there 
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is no issue of unduly eliminating an activity as science that we have encountered in 
conceptions relying on strict necessary and sufficient criteria.  For example, for 
Hoyningen-Huene not all sciences make predictions, let alone novel ones, or ones 
that are open to falsification. 
 
Despite the inclusivity of the approach, Hoyningen-Huene does argue that there is 
scope to discuss demarcation meaningfully: "the dynamics of a scientific field can, in 
the most abstract way, plausibly be characterized by the tendency to increase its 
degree of systematicity, in whatever dimension it is possible […].  The dynamics of 
typical pseudo-scientific areas, however, looks very different." (2008: 179).  His 
approach is interesting for us because it not only allows us to see why creationism 
has not historically been considered science, but also see a way forward that it could 
become one.  As Hoyningen-Huene outlines one distinction: 
 
[T]here is typically no autonomous development of self-critical tests of the basic 
assumptions of the field.  For instance, in many fields that are predominantly 
seen as pseudo-scientific, statistical approaches could be developed in order to 
test basic assumptions.  But usually this is not done; if it happens at all, then it is 
typically done by outside scientists who try to challenge the respective field.  
(2008: 180) 
 
This criticism echoes much of that from both Ruse and Pennock towards the 
Intelligent Design movement, but makes no reference whatsoever to the content of 
that being tested.  Indeed, the implication of Hoyningen-Huene's final sentence here 
is that 'legitimate' scientists have been able to perform scientific approaches to such 
content.  If creationism, creation science, or Intelligent Design are unscientific, then 
it is because the researchers in question have not approached the topics in question 
with a tendency to increasing systematicity, not because they happen to contain 
elements that might be considered 'supernatural'. 
 
One might, as we have seen throughout our discussion, suggest that there is 
something special about the supernatural that renders it immune to increased 
systemisation.  One of Hoyningen-Huene's other observations about pseudosciences 
is that they tend not to expand the knowledge applications, accuracy, or predictive 
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capacities of the field of study.  If supernatural phenomena do lie outside of natural 
law, or outside of space and time altogether, then perhaps this is true. 
 
As we have seen however, such conceptions of the supernatural seem untenable. 
 While there may well be certain supernatural phenomena that are not amenable to 
such systematicity, as we shall discuss in the following chapters, this does not seem 
plausibly the case in general.  Indeed, again, the only way that we could establish 
that all supernatural phenomena were immune to such investigation would be to 
actually investigate them in the first place.  This poses no problem for Hoyningen-
Huene's account, as a systematic investigation into that which is not open to testing 
seems both entirely scientific, and even perhaps achievable.  However, for the 
separationist who wants to rule some phenomenon outside of the scope of scientific 
investigation a priori, without first attempting a scientific approach to it, then 
circularity emerges once more. 
 
I do not wish to endorse systematicity fully as a way to understand the nature of 
science, though I do find the account appealing.  However, this approach helps to 
show that we do not need to embrace full blown scepticism of scientific method, or 
demarcation, in order to reject the separationist account.  I have argued throughout 
this thesis that there is no criterion for either science or the supernatural that is both 
uncontroversial enough to be taken for granted in a scientific or even legal defence 
of separationism, and also indicates any degree of mutual incompatibility between 
the two domains.  However, Hoyningen-Huene's account suggests a progressive 
approach to thinking about both science and demarcation that allows us to accept 
that we can meaningfully discuss "the nature of science" whilst at the same time see 
no reason to accept a separationist account. 
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Conclusion  
 
As ever, this analysis cannot be thought to exhaustively reflect the sheer breadth of 
discussion of demarcation with regard to scientific method.  I have outlined a loose 
historical overview of the key points forwarded regarding the topic over the last 
century, which can be taken as informative of the broad state of the debate.  
However, once more, that there may exist some more esoteric account of scientific 
method which succeeds in furthering the separationist position is something which is 
worth considering, but not something which can be reasonably taken as justification 
for the adoption of that position in present scientific, legal or cultural circles. 
 
We have seen that none of the primary approaches to scientific method, including 
even those which reject the concept, support the notion that scientific method in 
some way prohibits investigation of the supernatural.  That said, we have also seen 
that many such approaches do suggest that creationism in its current form is not 
legitimate science.  This result is not surprising, and should serve as reasonable 
comfort to those who would hope to exclude creationism from science classrooms.  
Importantly however, it is not something that hinges on the notion that creationism 
is either supernaturalistic or on the presumption that it is false.  That creationism has 
not been presented in falsifiable terms, that it is not part of the current scientific 
paradigm, that it has not produced novel predictions, or that it has not been 
approached in a way that increases systematicity does nothing to suggest that the 
claims of creationists are not true, and certainly nothing to suggest that 
supernaturalist positions at large should be excluded from the domain of science.  
Rather these considerations illustrate that creationism is, according to commonly 
presented demarcation criteria, unscientific in its current form. 
 
If there is a scientific method, then while we can plausibly state that thus far 
creationism has not been successfully defended in accordance with it, we have no 
need to adopt a principle of separationism regarding science and the supernatural in 
order to determine that this is the case.  The separationist position is not only 
untenable, but it is also unnecessary in defending the commonly held belief that 
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enterprises such as creationism are not science.  Creationism has failed every 
criterion for demarcation presented throughout our discussion, and would have 
done so equally were the posited designer natural in origin.  The separationist 
position then is not simply an excessive and unjustified approach to deeming 
creationism unscientific, but it is also one that is completely unnecessary. 
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Chapter 6  
The supernatural as that which is outside of space and 
time  
 
The final potential understanding of the supernatural that we shall address in detail 
is the notion that it is that which is 'outside' of the natural world.  Though there are 
numerous ways in which we might interpret this, the simplest locus for discussion on 
this point rests with theism.  Not only does the theistic God represent a widely 
acknowledged example of this conception, but it is also the area in which the most 
contentious debates around this subject occur, as is illustrated in our discussions of 
the creationist movement. 
 
While the theistic arguments for creationism are perhaps the ones most commonly 
discussed in relation to science, this is largely due to the cultural factors surrounding 
the movement that we saw in chapter one.  Recalling Hansson (2008), an enterprise 
is often only regarded as pseudoscientific if its "major proponents try to create the 
impression that it is scientific".  However creationism, and design arguments in 
general, are merely one facet of the diverse landscape of natural theology.  That 
proponents of other such positions have not been engaged in the same battle to be 
recognised as scientific should not exclude them from consideration.  In this chapter 
then we shall examine not only arguments from design, but several other lines of 
reasoning which attempt to link empirical observation to the conclusion that God 
does (or does not) exist.   
 
Before addressing any specific argument we will take some time to address loosely 
what it means for an entity to exist 'outside' of space and time or, as this issue is 
blurry, for it to exist non-physically and atemporally.  It will be impossible to address 
this issue in any kind of depth, as a discussion on the exact nature and boundaries of 
space, time, and the natural world is a subject far beyond the scope of this thesis.  I 
contend, however, that a broad understanding will suffice in the context of this 
debate.  As ever, if the separationist position hinges on any particular esoteric 
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ontology or metaphysics, then the separationist has a great deal of work to do prior 
to advocating exclusion of the supernatural from the mainstream scientific 
enterprise. 
 
Moving on to the arguments themselves, we shall begin by examining the kalam 
cosmological argument.  This serves as one of the clearest examples of an attempt to 
infer from empirical observation of the world around us to a conclusion that 
concerns things which are of necessity not within it.  I argue that regardless of its 
soundness, or even validity, the kalam offers an insight into the ways that we might 
well begin to make such inferences.  Following on from this, I return to the ever-
present issue of design.  This time, we shall take our discussion back beyond the 
creationist movement as we have thus far encountered it, and discuss the 
interactions of William Paley and David Hume to show that both proponents and 
detractors of such inferences can appeal to an at least tentatively scientific 
methodology. 
 
In order to reinforce the claim that we might consider design inferences to be 
scientific, or at least to undermine the idea that such a consideration does not rest 
on traditional conceptions of 'supernaturality', I shall then draw a comparison 
between traditional design inferences and modern multiverse theories.  This is not to 
assume that design inferences are on the same footing as multiverse hypotheses in 
terms of scientific credibility, but instead to show that the principles involved in 
determining whether or not something is scientifically investigable are not obviously 
drawn along the lines argued by the separationist.  In relation to this, I will then 
discuss the arguments from the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the universe, and the 
potential for abductive reasoning as a scientific step from empirical observation to 
either a theistic or a multiverse hypothesis. 
 
Turning away from arguments in favour of the existence of God, we shall turn 
instead to arguments against the existence of such an entity, in particular via the 
problem of evil.  This serves three useful purposes in our discussion.  Firstly, it offers 
a further example of inferences regarding that which is beyond the limits of space 
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and time which are based on empirical observation.  Secondly, it further legitimises 
the theoretical scientific nature of the preceding arguments by offering them 
potential falsification criteria.  Finally, it reinforces the normative claim made in 
chapter one that separationism is of benefit to neither the supernaturalist nor the 
anti-supernaturalist. 
 
Finally, I shall introduce two arguments which point towards the idea that, far from 
methodological naturalism being a useful tool within science, instead science must 
assume supernaturalism in order to function.  Roughly speaking, this is the 
suggestion that in order to accept that the laws of nature operate in a predictable 
fashion, and that our cognitive faculties are reliable enough to apprehend them, we 
must assume a supernatural basis for both.  Although I do not defend these 
arguments, I suggest that the separationist position is of necessity non-neutral in 
regards to them.  Thus, the purported motivating principles behind separationism 
have no purchase when it comes to defending methodological naturalism. 
 
 
'Outside' of space and time  
 
As we have seen, attempts to delineate between the natural and the supernatural 
have a tendency to appear circular, which will necessitate the use of a broad brush in 
discussing this topic.  Draper outlines the distinction in the following terms: 
 
"[N]aturalism" is the hypothesis that the natural world is a closed system, which 
means that nothing that is not a part of the natural world affects it.  Naturalism 
is logically incompatible with theism because theism implies that the natural 
world was created (and so affected) by a supernatural entity (namely, God), 
while naturalism implies that there are no supernatural entities, or at least none 
that actually exercises its power to affect the natural world.  By the "natural 
world," I mean the collection of all existing physical entities (past, present, and 
future) together with any entities whose existence depends (either causally or 
ontologically) on the existence of those entities.  "Natural" entities are entities 
that are part of the natural world so defined, and a "supernatural" entity, if 
there is such a thing, is simply an entity that can affect the natural world despite 
not being a part of it.  (2007) 
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Avoiding circularity then, we can unpack several details as to what it is that Draper 
means when he refers to something not being part of the natural world.  Namely, 
anything that is not a physical entity that exists in the past, present or future, nor 
that is a non-physical entity that is dependent upon such things for its existence.  
Additionally, he references God as an entity that he explicitly considers to be 
supernatural.   
 
These criteria allow us to think loosely of the supernatural in similar terms to those 
outlined in Plantinga's discussion of the universe as a "closed system" (2011: 78).  
Whatever the exact boundary between the supernatural and the natural, we can 
consider the boundaries of space (where any physical entity must exist) and time 
(past, present and future) to serve as an imperfect guide.  This thinking is also 
reflected in Armstrong's approach: "Naturalism I define as the doctrine that reality 
consists of nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system" (1978: 261). 
 
It should be noted that this delineation is not obviously in keeping with common 
usage of the terms, rendering vampires, unicorns and goblins squarely within the 
natural realm, and perhaps even extending this appellation to ghosts, extra-sensory 
perception and astrological effects.  However, as Clarke argues: 
 
We may be unsure whether ghosts and goblins are best understood as 
supernatural entities or as unusual natural entities.  However, on any 
understanding of the natural-supernatural distinction that shows at least some 
respect for ordinary usage, God – an all-powerful agent whose existence is 
unconstrained by either space or time – will be understood as a supernatural 
agent and ordinary worldly entities – tables, chairs, and the like – will be 
understood as natural entities.  (2009: 130) 
 
Although I consider this somewhat fuzzy approach to the natural/supernatural 
distinction deeply problematic, and will return to this issue in the following chapter, 
it will serve us well enough to accept it for the present purposes.  It also allows us to 
dedicate our attention in this chapter specifically to the weaker form of 
separationism, as well as to focus on supernatural hypotheses as opposed to 
observed supernatural phenomena.  That sensible employment of the term 
supernatural might render ghosts and goblins "unusual natural entities" seems at 
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least problematic enough to draw into question exactly what the separationist is 
claiming should be excluded from science, and certainly problematic enough for us 
to be wary of employing the term in scientific or legal policy.  However, in the 
interest of examining as many possible interpretations of the separationist claim as 
we can, we shall grant this limited usage here.  If even this level of separationism is 
ultimately unviable, then the separationist has no further concession available to 
make. 
 
 
The kalam cosmological argument  
 
In order to examine the concept of the supernatural as that which exists beyond 
space and time we shall begin by addressing the kalam cosmological argument.  This 
argument is especially relevant here for several reasons:  firstly, it has a unique focus 
on this particular boundary; secondly, unlike other arguments from natural theology 
which we shall discuss later, the argument does not obviously invoke 'violations' of 
the laws of nature in a way that might otherwise render it unscientific by Ruse's 
criteria24; and finally, the kalam's most prolific recent defender, William Lane Craig, 
has frequently appealed to scientific evidence in order to support its second 
premise. 
 
In its simplest form, the kalam argument is as follows: 
 
 Everything that begins to exist has a cause. 
 The universe began to exist. 
 Therefore, the universe has a cause.  (Craig and Sinclair, 2009: 102) 
 
Interestingly, in light of the definition of the supernatural we are currently 
considering, then if this argument is sound, it need not take us to God in order for it 
to establish the existence of the supernatural.  So long as the universe is not self-
                                                 
24 Though the argument does infer the creation of matter and energy ex nihilo which would violate 
the first law of thermodynamics, discussions of violations of the laws of nature can plausibly only be 
deemed sensible upon the actual existence of nature itself. 
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caused, or else caused by one of its physical components or anything dependent 
upon them for its existence, then whatever the cause of the universe is, that cause 
will be supernatural.  Although I would not be quick to dismiss either of these 
options given the assumption that the universe has a cause, for the sake of analysing 
the relationship between the kalam and science, let us ignore these possibilities, and 
therefore grant that it leads to a necessarily supernatural conclusion. 
 
How then, does the kalam relate to science?  Well, Craig argues that the second 
premise of the argument is supported, in part25, scientifically.  He argues that:  
 
According to current cosmological theory, time and space came into existence 
with the Big Bang [...].  On such an understanding, the universe did not spring 
into being at a point in a previously existing empty space.  Rather space and 
time themselves come into being along with the universe, which implies 
creation out of absolutely nothing.  (2001: 256) 
 
Additionally, after examining various scientific theories as to the nature of the Big 
Bang, Craig concludes that: 
 
Our survey shows that contemporary cosmology is quite supportive of the 
second premise of the kalam cosmological argument.  Further, this conclusion is 
not reached through ferreting out elaborate and unique failure conditions for 
scores of individual models [...].  It seems that the field of cosmology, therefore, 
yields good evidence that the universe began to exist.  (Craig and Sinclair, 2009: 
181-182) 
 
Although Craig goes on to argue that the cause of the universe must possess the 
attributes commonly ascribed to the Christian God, this is, as we have said, an 
unnecessary extension for our purposes.  So long as the cause of the universe is not 
the universe itself, one of its physical components, nor anything dependent on one 
of its physical components, then by our current definition the kalam argument, if 
successful, establishes the existence of a supernatural entity. 
 
                                                 
25 Although Craig argues that there are philosophical reasons to accept this premise, primarily the 
impossibility of an actual infinite (see Craig and Sinclair, 2009: 103-125) this does not affect our 
discussion.  We can assume, for sake of argument, that no such philosophical support exists. 
171 
 
One might object that Craig here has not offered scientific support for the conclusion 
of his argument, but rather for one of the premises.  It is thus not the case that 
science has investigated supernatural phenomena, but rather natural phenomena, 
whilst philosophy has done the legwork required to arrive at a supernatural 
conclusion.  As no one is objecting to the notion that the supernatural fall within the 
remit of philosophy, this seems to present no apparent problem for the 
separationist. 
 
This objection, while technically plausible, does somewhat miss the point however.  
While the argument itself is philosophical in nature, it is not difficult to imagine a 
situation whereby premise two ("The universe began to exist") were presented not 
as a stepping stone in an argument, but rather as a testable prediction of a 
supernatural hypothesis.  Say that, prior to the origin of the Big Bang theory, 
someone had posited that the universe had a cause, and that as a result of this they 
predicted that it had a beginning.  This would have constituted a testable scientific 
hypothesis (to whatever degree it is accepted that the Big Bang constitutes both a 
beginning for the universe and a testable scientific hypothesis).  Indeed, given the 
kalam's origins in early Christian and Islamic scholarship, one might even reconstruct 
such a notion historically as a "novel consequence" of such a hypothesis. 
 
Alternatively, one might argue that while the second premise of the kalam is 
testable, the conclusion it draws is not.  However, as well as facing the difficulties 
already outlined regarding falsification, this criticism cannot actually follow.  The 
argument is, at least in principle26, a logically valid, deductive argument.  Given this, 
if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true by the rules of 
deductive logic.  So long as one accepts the truth of the first premise then any efforts 
to investigate the second premise scientifically are, by extension, efforts to 
investigate the conclusion scientifically.  If we grant scientific investigability to the 
second premise, then we grant implicit scientific investigability to the conclusion. 
 
                                                 
26 Draper, for example, has argued that the Kalam equivocates over the term "begins to exist", and 
would thus be invalid (1997: 172-177). 
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This response does, of course, open the discussion up to a further response: that 
scientists are not obliged to think that the first premise is true.  Thus, again, whilst 
one may test the second premise, this potential disconnect between its truth and 
that of the conclusion renders the conclusion squarely in the realm of philosophy, 
rather than science.  This analysis is compounded by the fact that, as Craig himself 
describes it, the first premise is "rooted in the metaphysical intuition that something 
cannot come into being from nothing" (Craig and Sinclair, 2009: 182).  It is surely 
reasonable to argue that if anything moves a claim out of the domain of science, 
then depending on a metaphysical intuition stands as a reasonable candidate. 
 
Without getting drawn into a discussion on the dividing line between philosophy and 
science, we can however note several responses to such a critique.  Firstly, although 
Craig acknowledges the foundation of the first premise as metaphysical, he also 
argues that it "is constantly confirmed in our experience.  Scientific naturalists thus 
have the strongest of motivations to accept it." (2009: 187). While I make no 
commentary on the validity of this claim, it is at least hypothetically possible that the 
first premise of the kalam enjoys the same kind of scientific investigability as the 
second, thus eliminating any necessary metaphysical leap towards its conclusion. 
 
Secondly, it is at least plausible that science operates under such metaphysical 
assumptions.  We have seen that separationists will gladly accept the notion that 
science operates under the assumption that metaphysical naturalism is true, even if 
only for methodological purposes.  The first premise of the kalam, related as it is to 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason and ex nihilo nihil fit, is arguably as defensible an 
inclusion into scientific methodology.  Let us look at how Draper argues in defence of 
a modest methodological naturalism: 
 
A strong presumption of naturalism based on everyday experience and the 
success of naturalistic science justifies a modest methodological naturalism: the 
reason scientists should not look for supernatural causes is that natural causes 
are much more likely to be found.  A methodological naturalism justified in this 
way is "modest" because it implies that scientists should look first for 
naturalistic explanations, and (depending on how strong the presumption of 
naturalism is) maybe second, third, and fourth too, but it does not absolutely 
rule out appeals to the supernatural.  (2005: 297)  
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This argument makes two important claims with relation to our examination.  By 
arguing that as a methodological principle science should first look for natural 
causes, then supernatural ones, it makes the implicit assumption that it is part of the 
methodology of science to look for causes at all.  Indeed, it suggests that 
supernatural causes should be considered before assuming that no cause exists.  
Even allowing for the metaphysical possibility of acausal events or entities, it seems 
sensible to suppose that science operates on the methodological assumption that 
any given phenomenon does have a cause or explanation.  Either way, at least on 
Draper's summary, methodological naturalism is to be abandoned as an assumption 
before abandoning a methodological commitment to the first premise of the kalam. 
 
More compellingly, given our current understanding of the supernatural as that 
which exists beyond space and time, we are forced to bypass the first, second, third, 
and fourth attempts to find a naturalistic cause of the universe.  Whatever the cause 
of the universe is, assuming that it has one or that one should be searched for, that 
cause must be supernatural according to Draper's own definition (or else caused by 
itself or one of its own constituent parts).  Thus, even accepting a modest form of 
methodological naturalism, we are justified in positing a supernatural hypothesis in 
this specific case if the kalam is sound. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most pressingly to our discussion, none of these considerations 
regarding the premises of the kalam rely on the supernaturality of the thing being 
investigated.  Even granting that "Everything that begins to exist has a cause" is a 
metaphysical principle, the kalam would be equally valid if one replaced "the 
universe" in each of its instances with "this table" or "the current President of the 
United States".  Whether or not it is a matter of scientific enquiry is not determined 
by the nature of the cause being posited, but rather by the nature of the argument 
and one's particular views on the relationship between science and philosophy. 
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The nature of the cause and a return to design  
 
One could argue that while the kalam might point us towards some cause that is 
external to the natural world, it cannot tell us anything about that cause which is 
scientifically testable.  Thus, to return again to weak separationism, while the second 
premise of the argument is open to scientific investigation, the content of the 
conclusion is not.  Rather than allowing us to investigate the supernatural 
scientifically, all the kalam does is to point to the idea that were it within the scope 
of scientific investigation, then scientific methodology would compel us to search for 
a cause of the universe. 
 
Here then we return, as ever, to the subject of Intelligent Design.  While the kalam 
argument, even in its extended versions, may not give us scope to scientifically 
investigate the cause itself, arguments from design do claim to make such 
inferences.  Where the kalam only 'predicts' a beginning to the universe, which gives 
us little to go on with regard to the nature of the cause that led to it27, design 
arguments rely on the notion that the cause of certain elements of the universe is, at 
minimum, intelligent, creative, and has purpose. 
 
Like the kalam, design arguments long predate contemporary discussions of 
demarcation and Intelligent Design.  Writing in the New York Times, Behe explicitly 
draws a link between the modern Intelligent Design movement, and the classic 
"watchmaker" argument forwarded by Paley: 
 
[T]he physical marks of design are visible in aspects of biology.  This is 
uncontroversial, too.  The 18th-century clergyman William Paley likened living 
things to a watch, arguing that the workings of both point to intelligent design.  
Modern Darwinists disagree with Paley that the perceived design is real, but 
they do agree that life overwhelms us with the appearance of design.  (2005) 
 
                                                 
27 Craig has argued that we can infer several details regarding the nature of the cause of the universe, 
including that it is uncaused,  beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, enormously 
powerful, and personal (Craig and Sinclair, 2009: 191-194).  However, though one might pursue a 
defence of the scientific nature of these inferences, they wander further into the realm of philosophy 
than is prudent to address here. 
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Paley's argument is perhaps the best known and most oft quoted formulation of a 
design argument.  As he outlines it in the opening chapters of his Natural Theology: 
 
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked 
how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for anything I 
knew to the contrary, it has lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very 
easy to show the absurdity of this answer.  But suppose I had found a watch 
upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in 
that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, 
for anything I knew, the watch might always have been there.  (1802: 5) 
 
He argues that the reason for this discrepancy is that the several parts of the watch 
are organised with a clear purpose.  That were they arranged differently, or were 
they a different shape or size, they would not result in the function that they are 
seen to produce.  This, he claims, is clear evidence of an artificer (or artificers) who 
has created the watch for this end.  He continues: 
 
This is atheism: for every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of 
design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the 
difference, on the side of nature, of being greater and more, and that in a 
degree which exceeds all computation.  (1802: 13) 
 
The spirit of Paley's argument is clearly seen in the modern Intelligent Design 
movement.  Paley's appeal to the fact that rearranging or changing the individual 
parts of the watch would negate its function are strongly echoed in Behe's own 
arguments regarding "irreducible complexity". 
 
Although the responses we have focused on in this discussion have centred on the 
notion that arguments such as Paley's and Behe's are unscientific, there have been 
many responses from the realm of philosophy to the effect that they are simply 
invalid.  Most famously, those presented by Hume's character Philo in his Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion which, though published twenty-three years before 
Paley's work, discusses many of the points it raises. 
 
There is not space here to go into a great amount of detail, nor list every argument 
that Hume forwards.  Some prominent examples focus on either the inconsistency 
between the attributes of the designer that would be inferred and that described in 
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Christian theology ([1779] 1993: 51), or else on the need for an explanation for the 
designer, and the regress that would follow ([1779] 1993: 62), none of which is of 
concern to our discussion.  Whether the extra-universal entity we can infer is similar 
to the Christian God, or if it requires an explanation, does not affect that such an 
entity can be inferred, and we can say things about it that might contradict any 
picture at all. 
 
Of more interest to us are Hume's arguments concerning the strength of the 
analogy.  So Philo claims, the analogy to the watch is too weak, that the dissimilarity 
between the universe and the products of human artifice "is so striking, that the 
utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a 
similar cause" (1779: 46).  Moreover, that: 
 
 All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and 
magnificence of the works of nature, are so many arguments for a Deity, 
according to the true system of theism: But according to [...] experimental 
theism, they become so many objections, by removing the effect still further 
from all resemblance to the effects of human art and contrivance.  (1779: 67) 
 
What is noteworthy here, regardless of the success of Paley's argument, or Hume's 
critique, is that both can be adapted to fit the criteria set out by Ruse and Overton.  
Assuming that at least some concrete design criteria are set out, perhaps some 
extension of Paley's claim that "we deduce design from relation, aptitude, and 
correspondence of parts" (1802: 213), then Paley affords us with a claim that is 
testable.  Namely, it suggests that the universe possesses certain qualities which, 
upon investigation, we will discover.  As we discussed earlier, that some proponents 
of Intelligent Design have been reluctant to present such criteria, or that the 
universality of the claim renders it unfalsifiable, does not render the claim itself 
untestable in principle.  Moreover, by restricting the claim, perhaps by limiting the 
prediction to a specific feature of the universe (as we shall discuss below regarding 
fine-tuning arguments) we can render it, if not falsifiable in a strict sense, at least 
open to failed prediction. 
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Similarly, Hume's claim that the universe possesses no, or at least very few, 
attributes with which we associate design, is equally testable.  Hume does not reject 
the design inference on the grounds that the inference is beyond scientific enquiry 
(indeed, Hume refers to the endeavour as "experimental theism"), but rather 
because the evidence does not support the proposed conclusion. 
 
We see then that of Ruse and Overton's criteria for science, the third ("It is testable 
against the empirical world") and fifth ("It is falsifiable") can be accommodated even 
by traditional design inferences.  As discussed in previous chapters, tentativeness of 
conclusion is not something which need concern us.  Regardless of the disposition of 
Paley, Hume, Intelligent Design theorists, or anyone else, it is possible for someone 
to investigate the design hypothesis tentatively.  The argument itself, let alone any 
supernaturality it entails, is irrelevant to this.  Thus we can discount the fourth 
criterion ("Its conclusions are tentative")  as problematic as well. 
 
This leaves us with the two most problematic criteria: "It is guided by natural law" 
and "It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law".  The latter of these is, 
surprisingly, largely in tune with Paley's argument, and with design inferences in 
general.  While we might be hesitant to attribute the term "natural law" to such a 
situation, the notion that all instances of a specific kind of relation, aptitude, and 
correspondence of parts are the product of design fits exactly the kind of schema for 
natural laws that we have examined.  Paley is not suggesting the kind of 
unpredictable or violating event against which this criterion is intended to ward, but 
rather works towards establishing the kind of regularity it is intended to emphasise.  
This is not of course to say that Paley is describing something which we could 
comfortably describe as a "natural law", but rather that the underlying motivations 
for insisting that science adheres to such laws (for example for the purposes of 
falsifiability and prediction) are not contravened by this approach. 
 
A more difficult issue is that of being guided by natural law.  Given the definition of 
supernatural on which we are currently focusing, then even allowing for Plantinga's 
solution to the idea that interactions by a deity would 'violate' natural law by 
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distinguishing between closed and open systems, we are still left with the issue that 
even if they are not in violation of such laws, acts by an entity external to the 
universe seem difficult to consider guided by them. 
 
There are several ways that we might attempt to deal with this issue.  Most 
obviously, we can reject the criterion.  In a discussion regarding the legitimacy of 
supernatural investigation within science, such a criterion is overtly question 
begging, though of course so would be a rejection of it.  Alternatively, we could refer 
to our earlier discussion of the difficulty in coherently outlining a 'violation' of a 
natural law, and extend this reasoning to say that we cannot confidently understand 
what it would mean for something not to be "guided by natural law" either.  
Unfortunately, in this current context, we have a very clear (at least, in principle) 
idea of what it means to have violated, or at least interfered with, natural law.  An 
entity that is by definition outside of the natural world and is acting upon it is, even if 
this is unproblematic in all other respects, at least superficially in opposition to this 
criterion.  That being said, I would suggest that there are at least two lines of 
argument that we can employ to show that this criterion is inappropriate even in this 
context. 
 
The first argument I would present is that whilst the dividing line between the 
spatiotemporal world and the supernatural is seemingly sensible, being located at 
the 'edge' of the universe itself, it is arbitrary in terms of scientific investigation.  
Suppose, for a moment, that Paley's criteria may be formulated into a truly testable 
hypothesis.  Now, pursuant to this, suppose that some feature of what we consider 
the natural world was in fact designed by an intelligent race of aliens.  For the sake 
of familiarity, let us say the human eye.  Paley, suspecting this, points to that feature 
and argues that, if it is designed, then it will exhibit features X, Y and Z.  Then, upon 
investigation, we discover that it does indeed exhibit such features.  This hypothesis 
would, due to the fact that the intelligent alien race is not extra-universal, seem to 
satisfy the criteria outlined as necessary for being science.  Assuming, of course, that 
investigations into the acts of intelligent beings such as those pursued by forensic 
and social scientists qualify as 'science'. 
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Of course, one can argue that such a hypothesis is not really tenable.  For one, 
because the theory of evolution offers a more parsimonious explanation for the 
perceived data, and for two because any potential designer for such a feature would 
have to possess features X, Y and Z as well, and thus the inference simply leads us to 
infinite regress.  However, for our purposes this does not actually matter.  The 
viability of the hypothesis is not what is in question, but rather whether or not 
supernaturality factors into whether or not it is investigable by science.   
 
It seems to me that supernaturality does not factor in such a way.  If such an 
inference could work for an alien race, then there seems to be no obstacle posed by 
locating that race outside of the universe in terms of investigability.  This is especially 
true if we also, perhaps by noting the infinite regress it would lead to, deduced that 
whatever the designer is, it must be located outside of the universe.  Conversely, if 
we cannot make such an inference for an alien race, then externality to the universe 
is not the relevant factor in eliminating such a hypothesis. 
 
We thus see no reason to think that the criteria of being guided by natural law, even 
in this extreme context of extra-universal deities, has any bearing on scientific 
investigability.  In addition to this hypothetically framed defence, we can also put 
forward a second more grounded argument, though one that is perhaps more 
controversial, in the fact that many scientists are perfectly willing to discuss extra-
universal phenomena.  Specifically, they are willing to posit, and even test, the 
notion of a 'multiverse'. 
 
 
Multiverse theory and testability  
 
Discussion of a single multiverse theory, or even a single type of multiverse theory is 
misguided.  Though not all distinctions will be relevant here, it is important to note 
that not all theories described as relating to a multiverse actually posit anything we 
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might consider 'extra-universal' in the currently intended sense of being outside of 
space and time. 
 
The universes generated by eternal inflation have a common causal origin and 
share the same space-time, for which reason they do not form a completely 
disconnected multiverse.  Nor is this the case for cyclic models of the 
Steinhardt-Turok type.  The other universes are not accessible to observers 
located in our universe but are nonetheless connected, which distinguishes this 
kind of multiverse from ideas of a genuine multiverse made up of strictly 
disjoint universes such as proposed by Tegmark and others.  (Kragh, 2009: 539) 
 
There is a definite philosophical distinction to be drawn between theories which 
posit entities or processes that share space-time and those which do not, though the 
practical basis for this discussion does not necessarily hinge upon it.  The universes in 
the former category may be just as causally disconnected from our own as those in 
the latter and, moreover, may feature just as distinct a set of 'physical' laws.  This 
means that it is unclear not just whether or not multiverse theories in general may 
be considered scientific, but also which specific multiverse theories qualify and 
which do not. 
 
With that in mind, conversations regarding the multiverse are quite illuminating.  On 
the one hand many who have opposed the multiverse as scientific have done so on 
the grounds of testability.  As Paul Davies neatly summarises the concern, whilst 
himself linking it to our point of current interest: 
 
[H]ow is the existence of the other universes to be tested?  To be sure, all 
cosmologists accept that there are some regions of the universe that lie beyond 
the reach of our telescopes, but somewhere on the slippery slope between that 
and the idea that there are an infinite number of universes, credibility reaches a 
limit.  As one slips down that slope, more and more must be accepted on faith, 
and less and less is open to scientific verification.  Extreme multiverse 
explanations are therefore reminiscent of theological discussions.  Indeed, 
invoking an infinity of unseen universes to explain the unusual features of the 
one we do see is just as ad hoc as invoking an unseen Creator.  The multiverse 
theory may be dressed up in scientific language, but in essence it requires the 
same leap of faith.  (2003) 
 
Conversely, Leonard Susskind has argued in defence of the scientific status of String 
Theory, and has been particularly vocally opposed to the kind of falsifiability criteria 
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laid out by philosophers.  He argues: "As for rigid philosophical rules, it would be the 
height of stupidity to dismiss a possibility just because it breaks some philosopher's 
dictum about falsifiability.  What if it happens to be the right answer?" (2006: 196).  
This point of view echoes the sentiments of Plantinga we discussed in chapter one 
regarding the exclusion of supernatural investigation, and much of the driving 
considerations of our discussion as a whole.  It also captures the sentiment of others 
in cosmology: 
 
Several of the proponents of the multiverse and anthropic reasoning suggest 
that physics is at a crossroads, on its way to shift from one paradigm to another 
– Kuhnian phrases occur abundantly in the literature.  Perhaps 'we are facing a 
deep change of paradigm that revolutionizes our understanding of nature and 
opens new fields of possible scientific thought'.  The Nobel laureate Steven 
Weinberg and others are ready to accept multiverse theories based on the 
anthropic principle as a new style of physics which in some areas replaces the 
computational-experimental style based on first principles.  (Kragh, 2009: 543-
544) 
 
Such an abandonment of testability as a cornerstone of scientific method has not 
been without objection.  Although much of this opposition has been on the grounds 
of commitment to falsifiability in science as a fundamental principle, in a somewhat 
telling argument from mathematician George Ellis, he draws the link directly to more 
traditional talk of excluding 'pseudosciences': 
 
The very nature of the scientific enterprise is at stake in the multiverse debate.  
Its advocates propose weakening the nature of scientific proof in order to claim 
that the multiverse hypothesis provides a scientific explanation [...].  The 
Popperazi (a derogatory term used by Susskind for those who believe testing 
scientific theories is an indispensible aspect of science) will no longer be able to 
deny astrology its place as a proper scientific theory.  Is that what we really 
want?  (2008: 2.33-2.35) 
 
Though I have by no means done justice to the complexities nor extent of the 
multiverse debate here, there are numerous interesting observations that we can 
take away from these brief insights.  Firstly, that scientists are not universally 
committed to the kind of falsifiability that has been presented in opposition to 
Intelligent Design.  Secondly, that being beyond the borders of our universe does not 
automatically constitute exclusion from the scientific enterprise.  Thirdly, that the 
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spectre of pseudoscience looms over at least some of the reluctance to accept 
multiverse theory, and a revised approach to science.   
 
Given these considerations, it seems that even the exclusion of arguments such as 
the kalam from science may require closer attention.  As cosmology takes us further 
and further beyond the realm of empirical observation, attachments to simple 
notions of testability and falsification may need to fall by the wayside, or at least be 
adopted less stringently.  Alex Orenstein notes: 
 
The more sophisticated twentieth-century methodology places relatively less 
stress on the force of direct evidence than it does on that of indirect evidence.  
Science is not just a collection of sentences [...].  Rather, science is a web of 
logically inter-connected sentences [...].  [E]vidence, especially for the more 
theoretical parts of science, for example, 'E=mc2' or molecular theory is not 
direct.  Such evidence draws consequences from those theories.  These 
consequences in turn eventually yield other more observable consequences 
that provide indirect tests for those theories.  (2002: 86) 
 
As ever, even if one objects to such an interpretation of scientific method, we once 
again see that supernaturality is of little importance to the debate.  If the kalam or 
Intelligent Design arguments do fail the criteria for science, then they do not do so 
on the basis of the supernatural nature of their conclusions, unless we wish to say 
the same thing of multiverse hypotheses, or perhaps any number of theories 
founded on indirect evidence. 
 
One final point of interest which we can derive from these discussions is to note 
Helge Kragh's allusion to the link between multiverse theories and "anthropic 
reasoning" (2009: 543).  Although I would avoid drawing a strong link between the 
two, this does neatly lead us to the third breed of natural theological argument that 
we shall consider: arguments from the fine-tuning of the universe. 
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Fine-tuning arguments  
 
Speaking loosely, the anthropic principle dictates that the nature of the physical 
universe must, for it to be observed, be compatible with the existence of those 
which might observe it.  The constants and laws which we discover in nature need to 
be such as to allow for intelligent life capable of discovering them, otherwise it 
would be impossible for us to have discovered them.  Theoretical physicist Lee 
Smolin, calculating the probability that stars might exist given random parameters 
for the initial conditions of the universe, estimates a likelihood of such constants 
obtaining as being somewhere in the region of one in 10229.  As he states the case: 
"In my opinion, a probability this tiny is not something we can let go unexplained.  
Luck will certainly not do here; we need some rational explanation of how something 
this unlikely turned out to be the case." (1997: 45). 
 
Supposing that Smolin is correct that such an occurrence does demand explanation, 
then there are a few avenues that we might pursue.  Either, the parameters that we 
see are in some way necessary.  As Smolin outlines the possibility, this "approach to 
explaining the parameters is the hypothesis that there is only a single unique 
mathematically consistent theory of the whole universe.  If that theory were found, 
we would simply have no choice but to accept it as the explanation." (1999: 45).  Of 
course, while this may be the case, it does not undermine the idea that the necessity 
of such constants does seem remarkably fortuitous. 
 
The main alternatives we have already seen.  If some form of multiverse theory is 
correct, and a sufficiently large number of universes either has, does or will exist (or 
exists in non-temporal relation to us), then the occurrence of a universe even with 
an unlikelihood exceeding Smolin's calculation will turn out to be unsurprising.  
Moreover, as the anthropic principle suggests, it is also unsurprising that this is the 
type of universe we in fact observe.  It is worth noting however that we would 
misconstrue multiverse theory by presenting it as an exclusively ad hoc explanation 
for these coincidences: 
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A few of the multiverse theories proposed in the 1980s were motivated by 
attempts to explain various anthropic coincidences, but this was not generally 
the case.  Not only are the two approaches, the one based on multiverse 
scenarios and the other on the anthropic principle, logically distinct from one 
another, they were rarely seen as connected until the last decade of the 
century.  Indeed, inflation cosmology was often seen as an alternative to 
anthropic reasoning because it might seem to make anthropic explanations 
redundant.  Only later did it become common to conceive inflation as a 
justification of the anthropic principle and at the same time a modification of it.  
(Kragh, 2009: 537) 
 
Conversely, we might posit the idea that the apparent 'fine-tuning' of the universe is 
indicative of an intelligent designer who has arranged the parameters in such a way 
as to allow for intelligent life.  As Plantinga reviews the argument, albeit hesitantly: 
"The basic idea is that such fine-tuning is not at all surprising or improbable on 
theism: God presumably would want there to be life, and indeed intelligent life with 
which (whom) to communicate and share love." (2011: 199). 
 
The important question for us is not whether or not a design hypothesis might be 
successful, but rather whether it is sufficiently different from these other hypotheses 
in relevant ways so as to render it unscientific.  There are two main ways that we 
might argue that this is the case, other than simply forbidding supernatural 
phenomena outright.  Firstly, on the grounds that it is untestable and makes no 
predictions.  Secondly, because it is too weak an argument. 
 
While the first of these objections is indeed troubling, it is no more so than in the 
case of multiverse theory.  We have seen a glimpse into the arguments surrounding 
that hypothesis, and they are certainly not something that can be easily dismissed.  If 
one weighs against multiverse theories as a scientific enterprise, then one might be 
justified in also weighing against design inferences from fine-tuning.  However, if one 
does not weigh against multiverses in such a way, and grants that the kind of 
abductive reasoning that anthropically motivated multiverse theories are indeed 
scientific, then one does not seem justified in excluding design hypotheses on such a 
basis. 
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On the other hand, we might simply argue that the design hypothesis is unscientific 
simply because it is too poorly supported by evidence.  There are too numerous 
alternative, and arguably more parsimonious, explanations to warrant positing an 
entirely new ontological category of being as the best explanation.  Moreover, even 
the weak methodological naturalism suggested by Draper would demand that we 
favoured multiverse hypotheses before considering something 'supernatural' as an 
explanation.  Of course, given the definition we are currently examining, many 
flavours of multiverse theory are supernatural in nature, so the strength of such an 
argument is debatable. 
 
While I think these considerations are reasonable, it is unfair to treat fine-tuning 
design hypotheses as isolated arguments.  Even limiting ourselves to arguments from 
natural theology, and ignoring less controversially unscientific reasons to believe in 
divine creation such as divine revelation, then we have seen at least three separate 
lines of argument towards such a conclusion in this chapter alone.  The God 
hypothesis need not be treated as the answer to a single question, but rather as the 
result of a cumulative set of inferences (What caused the universe?  Why is there the 
appearance of design?  Why does the universe seem fine-tuned to permit life?).  
Seen in this light, it stands defensibly in better stead than at least the anthropically 
motivated brands of multiverse theory, at least in this isolated context.  If we do not 
limit ourselves in such a way, and allow for revelatory evidences to be considered so 
long as, say, they allow us to make novel predictions, then this strengthens the case 
even further. 
 
Of course, while the discussion here I think grants us reason to question the 
unscientific nature of a God hypothesis in principle, I have spent no time evaluating 
the strength of these arguments.  I make no case that natural theology is good 
science, only that it is not obviously not science.  One of the key reasons to think that 
multiverse theory might be regarded as scientific is the fact that so many scientists 
take it seriously.  It would require far more support and examination within the 
scientific community itself before design hypotheses might be thought of as anything 
more than potentially scientific.  I do not reject the arguments seen in chapter two 
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that science is an inherently communal activity.  What I argue here is that any 
inclusion or exclusion should be consistently organic rather than, as Susskind 
objected to as regards falsifiability, dictated by the whims of armchair philosophy. 
 
Before moving on, it is worth noting that arguments such as those outlined above do 
not solely arise from the pro-supernaturalist camp.  There have been many 
atheological arguments derived from observation of the world around us,  most 
famously, and most prominently, of which are the various 'problems of evil'. 
 
 
Natural atheology  
 
 It is worth mentioning that, to whatever degree the above arguments from natural 
theology are testable, they are also to some degree open to negation.  This is not to 
say that they are falsifiable outright, but that research into their predictions can 
return negative results.  While we cannot, for example, conclusively rule out the 
possibility that there exist features of design somewhere in the natural world we can, 
for any given investigation, fail to find such features.  Pursuantly, it is at least 
conceivable that on investigating the so called 'fine-tuning' of the universe, we might 
have discovered that in actuality there were many ways in which the universe could 
be configured such that life was possible. 
 
Alternatively, we might discover that there are very few configurations which 
support intelligent life, in line with the argument from fine-tuning.  Of course, given 
the kind of abductive reasoning that is involved in fine-tuning arguments, we would 
not consider this to be a novel prediction.  We cannot reason from the observation 
of fine-tuning to the hypothesis of design, and then subsequently consider fine-
tuning to be a novel prediction of a design hypothesis.  However, if someone had 
argued prior to the advent of modern cosmology that such fine-tuning would be 
found to exist because the universe had been intelligently designed, then this would 
have presented a loosely falsifiable result.  Admittedly, there would be nothing to 
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prevent the theist from maintaining their theism in the face of such a result – there 
is no apparent contradiction between the claims that "God exists" and "life can exist 
in a great multitude of universes" – but as we have discussed, the degree of 
tentativeness of the proponent is not relevant to the scientific nature of the 
hypothesis. 
 
These considerations aside, we saw in chapter one that those in the anti-
supernatural, anti-separationist camp felt that there might be empirical avenues of 
investigation which would justify rejecting the existence of God.  It is interesting to 
note that while they obviously disagree on the answer to such questions, there are 
theists who agree with such claims.  As Craig offers a slightly different example to 
Dawkins' "Jesus' DNA" argument: 
 
[I]f the bones of Jesus were to be discovered, then Christianity would be 
falsified.  This is because the resurrection of Jesus is essential to the truth of 
Christianity.  So if Jesus did not rise from the dead, Christianity would be false.  
So if the bones of Jesus were discovered, that would entail that he did not rise 
from the dead and so Christianity would be falsified.  (2011) 
 
What exactly would be involved in confirming such a discovery, I do not know, but 
this does offer an in principle way of falsifying the existence of the God of 
Christianity.  As before, tentativeness of the proponent has no bearing on the 
scientific nature of the hypothesis, Craig and Dawkins alike have outlined a 
theoretically testable hypothesis by which we might scientifically refute the claims of 
Christianity, a candidate for even the most stringent of definitions of 'supernatural'.  
As ever, while one might object to the investigability of the claim that Jesus was 
resurrected on practical terms, the supernaturality of the claim is entirely irrelevant.  
Were Jesus claimed to have died and been resurrected in modern times, then we 
would potentially have ample ability to compare any discovered bones to his 
recorded DNA. 
 
Importantly, and as we shall discuss in the next chapter, these arguments only apply 
to specific kinds of theistic claim.  Writing somewhat derisively in Skeptic magazine, 
Pigliucci distinguishes between different brands of theism and the claims that they 
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make.  In particular, he distinguishes between a "metaphysical god", which has no 
relationship with the physical world, and an "anthropomorphic god", who is more 
concerned and interactive with the world around us: 
 
If he is not literally running it, he certainly originated and designed it (at least by 
"picking" the right physical laws.  So, god interacts, to a more or less limited 
extent, with the physical world.  Which means that god is somewhat a part of 
the physical universe.  By this definition, the existence of god is a question 
within the realm of scientific investigation.  (1998: 69) 
 
Pigliucci goes on to list several ways in which he thinks that science and religion are 
in conflict, from areas discussed in biology and design, to astronomy, geology and 
anthropology.  Whether he is correct in his assessments is, as with the arguments in 
favour of the existence of God, beyond the scope of our discussion.  However, it is 
important to note that his examples at least hypothetically allow for scientific 
disconfirmation of specific theistic beliefs.  For example, in discussing astronomy he 
writes: 
 
Biblically-derived cosmologies put the Earth at the center of the universe, and 
imply that the Sun rotates around our planet.  Copernicus (1543) and Galileo 
(1632) took care of that hypothesis and of any possibility that the Sun ever 
"stopped."  (1998: 70) 
 
I do not think it needs to be defended that most contemporary theists would reject 
the notion that the absence of a geocentric universe has any great bearing on the 
existence of God.  However, this returns us once more to the tentativeness criteria.  I 
would not by any means suggest that we could or should force the theist to accept 
any specific proposition as part of their own theism.  If modern Christians do not 
believe that the existence of God necessitates the existence of such a universe, then 
it is not the place of scientists to tell them otherwise. 
 
While scientists might not be able to tell theists what they believe, however, this 
does not preclude them from investigating the claims that theists themselves say 
they believe.  While deciding whether or not a young Earth is important to the truth 
of Christianity is the duty of the theologian or the philosopher, not the scientist, the 
job of deciding whether or not the Earth is young falls squarely in the domain of the 
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latter.  A scientist is, so far as we trust the claims of science, entirely within their 
jurisdiction in declaring that any belief that the Earth is 10,000 years old, whether 
religious or otherwise, is false. 
 
At this point I should draw attention a slight subtlety that may be overlooked.  While 
we can make an easy distinction between "what supernaturalists believe" and "what 
supernaturalists do not believe", or rather "what supernaturalist X believes" and 
"what supernaturalist X does not believe", this is not quite the same as the 
distinction between "what supernaturalist X believes" and "what follows logically or 
empirically from the premises set out by supernaturalist X".  I am not advocating 
handing the reigns of designating the limits of scientific investigation of the 
supernatural exclusively over to supernaturalists.  If the astrologist claims that those 
born under a certain sign of the zodiac will be more likely to possess certain 
tendencies then, unless there is some additional qualification of that claim from 
within astrology itself, the testable implications of that claim are open to be deduced 
by the astrologist and non-astrologist alike. 
 
This distinction between that which supernaturalists believe and what follows from a 
particular supernaturalist belief has been given extensive and divisive attention in 
the many discussions of the problem of evil or suffering.  It is not controversial 
among theists or atheists that some degree of suffering28 exists in the world.  What is 
controversial is whether or not the non-existence of such suffering follows from the 
existence of an omni-attributed deity.  This is a broad and complex area of 
philosophy of religion, much of which shall not be relevant to us now.  Notably, we 
shall not concern ourselves with discussion of logical versions of these problems.  
This is due to their focus on a priori rather than empirical considerations, which are 
already too distanced from our current conception of science to be usefully 
discussed here.  Rather, we shall focus our attention on the appropriately labelled 
'evidential' formulations of the argument.  One famous example of such an 
argument, offered by William Rowe, is as follows: 
                                                 
28 The existence of "evil" is somewhat debatable, though this is perhaps more of a semantic issue than 
a theological one. 
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1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
 
[Therefore] 
 
3) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.  (Rowe, 
1979: 336) 
 
What makes Rowe's version of the argument particularly relevant is that the first 
premise may be submitted to actual investigation.  Though he uses the hypothetical 
example of a fawn dying slowly in a forest fire as an example of such an evil, we 
could reasonably conceive of many actual examples of such suffering. 
 
It is important to note an objection here that although the notion of "suffering", 
particularly as an example of "evil", is perhaps too contentious or ethereal to be 
scientific, this is not actually necessary for the argument to undermine 
separationism.  While I would certainly agree that a question such as "What is evil?" 
is a question better suited to the realms of philosophy and theology, once that 
question has an answer, then the question "Is there evil?" is a clearly empirical one.  
If, as with design, we suppose that some criteria for suffering be established, either 
by philosophical argument, or theological interpretation, then we are rendered free 
to investigate the physical world for examples of it.  In this particular case, Rowe has 
taken suffering to be an example of such a criterion. 
 
Of course, a second, and more compelling objection to applying scientific 
methodology in Rowe's argument is that the premise requires not just suffering, but 
suffering which is not necessary for the existence of some greater good, or the 
avoidance of some worse outcome.  Indeed, much of the philosophical work 
surrounding the problem of suffering and the problem of evil has been the 
establishment of theodicies designed to explain exactly why the evil seen in the 
world is necessary for the existence of some greater good, or the avoidance of some 
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greater evil.  Perhaps most notably John Hick's "soul-making theodicy" ([1966] 2010: 
253-261) and Plantinga's "free will defence" (1974: 165-167). 
 
What makes the evidential problem of evil particularly interesting to our discussion 
is that two prominent ways of defending it map extremely closely to the kind of 
scientific reasoning we commonly accept in other areas of investigation.  The first, as 
Rowe himself defended, is that we can use inductive reasoning to justify our belief 
that no overriding good exists which would accompany particular instances of gross 
evil.  He argues that, where E1 refers to the case of the fawn, and E2 refers to the 
situation of a 5-year-old girl who is raped and beaten by her mother's boyfriend that: 
"No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's 
obtaining it would morally justify that being's permitting E1 or E2" (1991: 72).  Thus 
the argument is supported by an explicit appeal to empirical observation. 
 
Rowe argues that, as with other similar inferences, we are justified in believing that 
no such state of affairs exists by way of induction.  Since all of the states of affairs we 
know of fail to justify permitting either E1 or E2, we can reasonably infer that no 
such state of affairs exists.  Strange as it may seem, given sufficiently fleshed out 
criteria, then this reasoning is entirely in line with that which we accept as scientific 
when applied to questions about physics or biology.  The only difficulty involved in 
rendering this scientific is the initial philosophical or theological step in actually 
establishing what those criteria are, but this poses us no problem.  If the theologian 
makes the claim that "evil can be understood as X, and moral justification can be 
understood as Y", then the scientist can (in principle) investigate whether or not X 
exists in the absence of Y.   
 
Of course one may disagree that suffering, even to an excessive degree, is an 
example of evil.  However, this provides no difficulty to the opponent of 
separationism here.  We can defer to the theist to outline their position on what it is 
that constitutes evil, and allow the scientist to work from there.  Although not all 
conceptions of either suffering or evil will be amenable to such investigation, the fact 
that some in principle could be means that it is not the case even in so classically a 
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philosophical and supernatural area as the problem of evil that science must remain 
entirely mute.  It is not the burden of the anti-separationist to argue that all 
supernatural phenomena do fall within the domain of science, but rather only that 
some supernatural phenomena could fall within the domain of science. 
 
The second type of reasoning with which we might move from the existence of 
suffering to the conclusion that God does not exist is once again by appeal to 
abductive reasoning.  This is, as we have seen with the discussion of multiverse 
theory, somewhat more controversial.  However, as science finds itself at something 
of a crossroads regarding what does and does not constitute scientific reasoning in 
regards to the multiverse, it is worth raising this point here.   
 
One way of approaching this idea is through what Draper offers as an alternative to 
the theistic position, which he calls "the Hypothesis of Indifference": "neither the 
nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or 
malevolent actions performed by non-human persons" (1989: 332).  Draper goes on 
to argue that, given our observations of the pain and pleasure experienced by 
humans and animals (though we could reasonably substitute other observed criteria 
here), then the Hypothesis of Indifference explains these observations much better 
than theism does. 
 
As with previous arguments, I make no claim here as to whether or not Draper is 
correct in his evaluation.  What is important to our discussion, rather, is that if we 
agree with some defenders of the scientific status of multiverse theory that this kind 
of reasoning is viably scientific, and moreover that this kind of reasoning can be 
extended beyond the borders of our universe, then we once again find ourselves 
with no obstacle to the scientific investigability of a supernatural claim by virtue of it 
being supernatural.  While one might object to abductive reasoning in principle, or 
disagree with the idea that the Hypothesis of Indifference is a better explanation for 
the data than is theism, or even disagree that we have the ability to verify whether 
or not our observations of pain and pleasure are accurate, none of these objections 
hinge upon the supernaturality of any of the claims involved.  If the evidential 
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problem of evil could, in theory, be rendered scientific in all other aspects, then it 
would not be justifiable to exclude it from science simply on the grounds that it 
referred to supernatural phenomena unless, as before, one also rejected multiverse 
theory on the same grounds. 
 
 
Theism underpinning science  
 
Before we conclude this chapter, there is a further issue that arises when we adopt 
this conception of the supernatural.  That is, a conception whereby the supernatural 
is defined in such a way as to render the set of supernatural things, and the set of 
God-like things roughly coextensive.  As Plantinga suggests along similar lines, that 
naturalism can be understood as: "the idea there is no such person as God or 
anything like God" (2010: 247). 
 
We have discussed the concept of methodological naturalism several times 
throughout the course of our investigation as the suggestion that science operates 
by methodologically assuming metaphysical naturalism.  That is, that although 
scientists are not philosophically committed to metaphysical naturalism, this 
principle serves as a methodological tool for investigation.  As Draper argues when 
he suggests his weaker conception of methodological naturalism, we should assume 
metaphysical naturalism for the purposes of investigation, until we have reason not 
to do so. 
 
We might be inclined to assume that, since science investigates the 'natural' world, 
that taking naturalism to be the assumed default position for science is somewhat 
reasonable.  Science operates, we have seen suggested, according to the workings of 
natural law.  If we allowed for the possibility of scientific investigation of the 
supernatural, if conceived of as violations of such laws, then the whole system would 
fail to operate. 
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However, while this kind of argument is not without merit, there is an alternative 
way of perceiving the situation by which naturalism is not only unjustified as a 
default assumption for science, but outright contradictory to it.  I shall outline briefly 
two such views, the first an adaption of an argument from John Foster, and the 
second, a more explicit argument for the position from Plantinga.  Beginning then 
with Foster: 
 
The basic regularities of nature cannot be explained in terms of other natural 
regularities.  So how are they to be explained?  Well, it might be suggested that 
any explanation will have to be in supernatural terms – that the basic 
regularities form the terminus of explanation within the framework of the 
natural realm, and that the only way of accounting for them would be to 
suppose that there is something outside that realm which is responsible for 
their obtaining.  (2001: 148-149) 
 
He goes on to argue that a law of nature cannot be construed as a mere observed 
regularity, but rather as "the causal necessitation of the regularity as such" (2001: 
158), arguing that only by viewing the law of nature in this way are we able to 
support counterfactuals and the like: 
 
It is only when the regularity is imposed as a regularity that it comes to embody 
a restriction on what could have happened and what is capable of happening, as 
well as forming a common factor in what does happen.  (2001: 159) 
 
Again, we are not here assessing the validity of this argument.  Though we have seen 
that it is far from alone as an objection to Humean accounts of natural law. 
 
While Foster uses this reasoning in order to argue for the existence of God on the 
basis of the existence of the regularities we observe in nature (and thus this could be 
considered a further example of natural theological argument, albeit more complex 
in its relationship to science) I would suggest that we could reverse his reasoning in 
order to apply a direct criticism to methodological naturalism.  If Foster's reasoning 
is sound, then the only justification we have for assuming that the laws of nature will 
continue to operate in a scientifically predictable manner is through appeal to 
supernatural explanation.  If this is the case however, and we accept the idea that 
science requires an assumption of predictability, then we must actually assume 
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methodological supernaturalism to be true in order to conduct scientific research.  
The arguments we have encountered regarding the unpredictability of the 
supernatural as an argument in favour of separationism would actually wind up as an 
argument against it. 
 
I shall leave this conclusion unexamined for a moment, and turn to the argument 
from Plantinga.  Known as the "evolutionary argument against naturalism" this 
second argument has been defended in slightly varying forms by Plantinga since his 
first formulation in Warrant and Proper Function in 1993.  He argues that, if both 
naturalism is true (N), and our cognitive faculties have developed in the way 
proposed by contemporary evolutionary theory (E), then the likelihood that our 
cognitive faculties are reliable (R) is low.  
 
Supporting this position, he posits "Paul", a prehistoric hominid faced with surviving 
an attack from a tiger.  Plantinga argues that there are numerous behaviours that 
would be beneficial to Paul's survival, notably fleeing, and that these behaviours will 
be acted upon by natural selection.  If Paul's behaviour is such that he does not get 
eaten, then he will survive to pass on that behaviour-inducing mechanism. 
 
The problem, however, is that we need not ascribe any specific belief to Paul in 
order to bring about such behaviour.  While we might be tempted to say that Paul 
flees from the tiger because he does not want to be eaten, any number of beliefs 
could cause similar actions (assuming that belief plays a causal role in action at all): 
 
Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but whenever he sees a 
tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely 
that the tiger he sees will eat him.  This will get his body parts in the right place 
so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief.  
(Of course we must postulate other changes in Paul's ways of reasoning, 
including how he changes belief in response to experience, to maintain 
coherence).  Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat 
and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run 
away from it.  (1993: 225) 
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Continuing the argument, Plantinga notes that if N and E are true, then the likelihood 
of R is low.  If the likelihood of R is low given N and E, then this provides a defeater 
for R given N and E.  But if we have a defeater for R given N and E, then this defeater 
also applies to any beliefs we hold, including N and E.  Therefore, "one who accepts 
N&E thereby acquires a defeater for N&E, N&E is self-defeating and can't rationally 
be accepted" (2011: 345).  Put more simply, the belief that naturalism is true and 
that our cognitive faculties have developed along evolutionary lines is self-
undermining because it leads to the conclusion that our beliefs are unreliable. 
 
What bearing then, does either of Plantinga's or Foster's arguments have on the 
question of methodological naturalism?  Well, if either argument is sound, then this 
would illustrate that science cannot operate on the assumption that naturalism is 
true29.  In the latter case, because the 'fundamental' assumption that the world 
operates according to predictable natural laws could not be justified, and in the 
former case because no assumption at all could be justified whilst also accepting one 
of the most prominent theories in contemporary science. 
 
I do not, by any means, wish to argue that I think that either of these arguments, or 
any that lead to a similar conclusion, are sound.  However, what I do wish to argue is 
that it is at least a requirement of the separationist position to work on the 
assumption they are not.  Thus the separationist is not advocating a neutral or 
impartial philosophical position at all.  In order to take naturalism to be the neutral 
methodological position for science, then we need to assume that science can 
function in the circumstance that either metaphysical naturalism is true, or that 
metaphysical non-naturalism has no bearing on the ability of science to function. 
 
It might, were it necessary, be reasonable to adopt either of these assumptions given 
that science has an admirable track record of success.  However, as I have tried to 
argue over the course of this discussion, the difficulties in understanding the term 
                                                 
29 Assuming, as we are, that science is in some sense involved with seeking truth.  Science could, much 
like Paul, theoretically operate entirely successfully independently of this assumption, but then any 
discussion of conflict or concord between science and religion would be redundant. 
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'supernatural' render methodological naturalism barely coherent, let alone 
necessary for scientific investigation.  What renders a hypothesis scientifically 
investigable may involve a number of factors, but so far supernaturality has not 
beenrelevant on any interpretation of either science or the supernatural.  Thus, 
making philosophical assumptions regarding the role of the supernatural in science, 
especially under the banner of rejecting such assumptions, is both an unnecessary 
and unjustified restriction on what it is that science is, and what it is that science 
could be.  The neutral methodological position for science is therefore one that 
needs make no reference to either naturalism or supernaturalism. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
I must be clear that I am not here advocating explicitly that arguments from natural 
theology are legitimately scientific.  Though I do not consider this wholly implausible,  
determining that issue is part of a larger demarcation project which is wider than the 
aim of this thesis.  What I am instead arguing is that the considerations that would 
exclude such arguments from science have no relation to the supernaturality of their 
subject matter.  Even if there is a blunt distinction between philosophical argument 
and scientific method, we are not bound to assume that arguments surrounding 
theism, or the supernatural at large, belong in the former. 
 
Although I have discussed each argument individually, the idea that the arguments in 
natural theology might be scientific is best seen if they are viewed as a cumulative 
series of inferences.  The kalam argument, if sound, gives us reason to think that 
there exists a cause that lies outside the bounds of space and time.  Regardless of 
whether we consider this cause to be God, on the current conception of 
supernaturality, this cause would be supernatural by definition.  Design arguments 
seek to tell us something about that cause, as well as to offer further evidence for its 
existence.  If these arguments are at least potentially sound, then this would allow us 
in principle to make inferences regarding a supernatural entity from empirical 
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observations, thus undermining even the weak separationist position.  Fine-tuning 
arguments work similarly to those from design, allowing us to once again make 
inferences regarding an extra-universal entity from empirical observation of the 
world around us.  Interestingly, there are striking similarities between this latter class 
of arguments and some inferences to a multiverse.  Importantly, the objections to 
the scientific status of each of these sets of inferences have little to do with 
supernaturality. 
 
On the other side of the debate, arguments from natural atheology offer us not only 
further insight into the investigability of supernatural hypotheses, but further 
establish the potential for earlier arguments to be falsifiable.  While these arguments 
may not comprise, even potentially, anything close to scientific theory, to say that 
science is mute on such matters seems wholly implausible.  The magisterium of 
science simply is not non-overlapping with these issues. 
 
Finally, though again I make no comment as to the soundness of the arguments in 
question, the considerations forwarded by Foster and Plantinga give us reason to 
question the assumption that methodological naturalism can be taken as in any way 
a 'neutral' position with respect to supernaturalism.  We can no more grant that 
metaphysical naturalism is a working assumption of science than we can grant the 
same status to metaphysical supernaturalism without a great deal of philosophical 
legwork.  The burden of proof once again, at least in the domains outside of abstract 
philosophy, rests with the separationist.  As metaphysical naturalism carries with it 
the assumption that no supernatural basis is necessary for either the regularities 
seen in nature, or our capacity to understand them, then to say that this is an 
assumption with nothing to say on the validity of theism seems contentious at best.  
If methodological naturalism is to be defended, it cannot be done so at present by 
appeal to the kind of "respectful discourse" Gould appealed to in presenting his 
NOMA principle (1997: 62). 
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Chapter 7  
Outcomes, limitations, and the relationship to 
demarcation  
 
In this final chapter we shall take stock of the discussion and clarify exactly what it is 
that is being argued from the considerations given thus far.  This will be divided into 
three distinct, but overlapping sections.  Firstly, I shall summarise the main lines of 
argument that I am forwarding: primarily, that the separationist position is 
unjustified, and should not be held as a principle of scientific practice; and as a 
secondary point, that although the term 'supernatural' may be used in a colloquial 
sense, it is too unclear in its present state to help us understand the issues discussed 
in this thesis. 
 
With these two arguments made explicit, we shall then address some limitations to 
the primary argument.  While I am suggesting that pre-emptive rejection of 
supernatural claims from scientific investigations is unjustified, I am not arguing that 
all supernatural claims are scientifically investigable.  I will discuss for example 
potentially unfalsifiable religious claims, as well as the important role of faith in 
much religious thought.  It should be noted however that these specific religious 
claims by no means represent the totality of claims which might lie beyond the reach 
of science.  For example, as we saw in chapter one, Gould also suggested that 
questions of art and beauty might be considered distinct from science, and I do not 
intend to disagree. 
 
Finally, we shall look to the broader aspects of the discussion.  This will involve 
acknowledgement of the relationship between the separationist debate at hand, and 
the larger demarcation debate between science and pseudoscience.  We shall also 
briefly consider the potential effects on scientific discourse should the separationist 
position be abandoned.  I argue that given the issues discussed thus far, and 
considering the limitations to be outlined in this chapter, a measured approach to 
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separation would have little practical impact on the scientific endeavour, though this 
should be regarded as a strength of the approach rather than a criticism. 
 
 
Outcomes  
 
I have argued throughout this thesis against a position of separationism between 
science and the supernatural.  Although there is a distinction to be drawn between 
the 'supernatural' and the 'religious', there is significant overlap in discussions 
regarding the exclusion of either from the scientific domain.  For this reason this 
conclusion is inseparably linked to an objection to the related idea that science and 
religion occupy different "spheres" or "non-overlapping magisteria".  Neither of 
these points are made without qualification, and we shall discuss some limitations 
shortly.  Before doing so however it will be useful to make more explicit exactly what 
is being argued, and what position I am forwarding. 
 
Primary outcome: The supernatural should not be excluded from 
science  
 
The primary outcome, that we should not exclude the investigation of supernatural 
phenomena or supernatural hypotheses from scientific investigation, is argued along 
four major lines.  These arguments are threaded throughout the discussion, so do 
not correspond to distinct chapters, though some have received significantly more 
attention than others.  Let us then break these down into more explicit claims: 
 
(i) The separationist position does not provide a middle ground between science 
and the supernatural, nor science and religion.   
 
Rather than encouraging "respectful discourse" (Gould, 1997: 62), the separationist 
limits the abilities of both proponents and opponents of the existence of the 
supernatural to defend their positions by appeal to scientific evidence.  Moreover, 
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the position fails to find a cultural middle ground between supernaturalists and anti-
supernaturalists, being opposed both by the ardent supernaturalists of the 
Intelligent Design movement, and also ardent anti-supernaturalists such as Dawkins.   
 
While one might be tempted to argue that the separationist position reflects a more 
'moderate' view than these two camps, it does not reflect moderation at all, but 
rather another extreme point of view on an orthogonal issue.  The view that science 
cannot investigate supernatural claims does not lie somewhere in the gulf between 
"strong supernaturalist" and "strong anti-supernaturalist", but rather lies at one end 
of the spectrum between "separationist" and "anti-separationist".  More 
problematically, by actively eliminating a point of common ground – the ability to 
discuss matters scientifically – the separationist position erects a wall, rather than a 
bridge, between the two former positions.  The defender of supernaturalists claims 
is denied the chance to offer scientific evidence in support of their claims, and the 
detractor is similarly stifled.  If there is scientific evidence available for either 
position, then the separationist denies both parties the opportunity to present and 
discuss it. 
 
(ii) The terms 'science' and 'supernatural' are too ill-defined for any consistent 
justification for exclusion to arise.   
 
Although we will discuss the relationship to the broader demarcation debate 
towards the end of this chapter, it is worth noting here the sheer breadth of 
interpretations of what it is to be 'scientific' touched upon in this (non-exhaustive) 
overview of the topic.  What is more troubling, even for those who might consider 
the demarcation debate somewhat settled, is the additional dimension of defining 
the supernatural.  The suggestions that have been forwarded here, such as "that 
which violates the laws of nature", or "that which is external to space and time but 
can affect that within space and time", are tentative at best.  We have seen the 
difficulty in coherently understanding such notions, especially without circular 
appeal to the 'natural'.  Even if such terms could be accepted, they bear little relation 
to common usage, and suggest little reason to accept a separationist account.  This is 
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not simply to say that the definitions given so far are vague, but that it seems 
plausible that there are no legitimate ways to make them more precise.  This is 
particularly true of supernaturalism, which we shall discuss in the secondary 
outcome. 
 
In any case, it seems at least prudent to be cautious regarding the state of the 
debate regarding what it is to be either scientific or supernatural.  Given such 
caution, sweeping declarations about how the two might interact seem somewhat 
premature, especially in the legal domain.  This remains the case even if we grant 
that philosophy has any business speaking about what it is that scientists can and 
cannot do. 
 
(iii) Even if we grant that both terms can be well-defined, still no justification for 
separation arises on the most common understandings of either science or 
the supernatural.   
 
We have looked at a number of the most prevalent conceptions of science and the 
supernatural, and seen that in no circumstance could a reason for separation be 
located in the supernaturality of a claim, rather than in some other unrelated issue.  
Often, this will involve practical (and contingent) impediment to testing, or else 
appeal to qualities of the supernatural phenomenon in question which cannot be 
established prior to investigation.  While it is not useful to repeat these discussions 
here, even in the most tenuously scientific area of natural theology, the most 
compelling argument for exclusion is in the philosophical nature of the discussion, 
rather than the content itself.  In this area especially, it can be seen that these 
problems undermine even a weak form of separationism. 
 
(iv) Even if some reason for exclusion could be shown to arise for a specific 
understanding of science and the supernatural, these understandings would 
be so esoteric as to render their application unjustified.   
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We have discussed a selection of the most well-known criteria for science and the 
supernatural and found no conflict, but it is always possible that some unconsidered 
criteria might be identified where conflict does in fact arise.  However, even in this 
scenario, such understandings would be so esoteric as to require significant 
philosophical work on the part of the separationist to demonstrate that the 
conclusion could, or should, be universalised.  While this is certainly an area for 
interesting further research, I maintain that the burden of proof rests with the 
separationist when it comes to advocating the separation between science and the 
supernatural in anything more than an abstract sense.  The history of separationism 
in the domains of science, law and politics is simply not justifiable according to the 
current state of the philosophical debate. 
 
In summary, the separationist position is neither helpful, nor justified.  Moreover, as 
this is not simply an issue of philosophical curiosity, but a matter with practical 
implications for policy in both the sciences and the legal system, the premature 
application of this position is something that should be avoided.  Whilst it is easy to 
sympathise with those who have worked to keep Intelligent Design out of science 
classrooms in favour of accepted and rigorously tested theory, the measures taken 
to achieve this goal have stepped well over the bounds required to achieve the task.  
An enormous amount of philosophical investigation is required before the erection 
of any artificial barrier between domains would be defensible, and we have seen 
that no natural barrier is evident where it is suggested that it might be placed. 
 
Secondary outcome: The term 'supernatural' does not belong in 
rigorous discourse  
 
A secondary argument that I am forwarding is that the term 'supernatural' is, at least 
within the context of rigorous debate, unhelpful to the point of damaging.  This 
secondary point is argued much more weakly, and a greater deal of work is required 
in order to defend it, but I raise it as a potentially important outcome of the 
discussion, and also as a theme that has caused consistent difficulty throughout. 
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We have seen that there is little consensus as to what the term 'supernatural' 
actually covers.  Without appeal to circular notions regarding "that which is not 
natural" there is little, if anything, to pick it out.  Moreover, where a more promising 
definition is articulated, it bears little resemblance to common usage, nor offers 
much in the way of practical import.  Definitions which limit focus to the non-
physical render countless examples of commonly conceived supernatural entities 
(such as vampires, unicorns and werewolves) natural, whilst potentially rendering 
the human mind supernatural.  Definitions which focus on externality to nature, 
even if rendered coherent, potentially add even further examples to the natural 
world (for example ghosts and spirits, though this is somewhat complex), whilst 
rendering certain interpretations of multiverse theory supernaturalistic, or at least 
non-natural.   
 
While definitions which focus on violations of natural law might seem more 
promising in terms of correspondence to common usage, upon closer inspection 
they barely achieve coherence, let alone offer us a legitimate category about which 
we can make comment, or regarding which we can draw inference.  If any 
supernatural phenomenon actually occurred, then on many accounts it would no 
longer be coherent to discuss a 'law' that existed for it to violate.  Or, at minimum, 
we would no longer be epistemically justified in believing that the law it was said to 
violate was, in fact, a law.  Although there are some accounts which may admit of 
such violations, notably Ramsey-Lewis' systems approach and accounts which take 
natural laws to describe tendencies, these rely on an understanding of violations as 
being the kind of non-repeatable events we commonly understand as 'miracles'.  
While this is a potentially viable definition of 'miracle', it would not seem to include 
other phenomena such a ghosts or vampires which, if existent, would not fit into 
such a definition.  Moreover, as we have seen in the example of the Catholic church's 
investigations for the purposes of beatification and canonisation, it is not obvious 
that such 'miracles' could never be approached scientifically. 
 
Ironically, one of the most plausible definitions of the supernatural might be "that 
which science cannot investigate".  Clearly, this is of no use whatsoever in the 
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demarcation debate, but it would at least plausibly offer us a set of entities about 
which we could make interesting claims.  Unfortunately, as with other definitions, it 
bears little resemblance to common usage of the term, and also appears troublingly 
relativistic.  Were distant stars 'supernatural' prior to the development of telescopes 
powerful enough to see them?  Would ghosts be 'natural' if they appeared with a 
frequency conducive to scientific study?  Intuition seems to suggest that the answer 
to both of these questions is "No".  Regarding the status of theoretical entities, 
Grover Maxwell argues that our ability to observe them "at any given point is an 
accident and a function of our physiological makeup, our current state of knowledge, 
and the instruments we happen to have available and, therefore [...] has no 
ontological significance whatever" (1998: 1061-1062).  
 
Indeed, it seems that much of the commonly held supernatural pantheon would be 
rendered 'natural' should they actually be discovered to exist.  In tales of myth and 
fantasy, supernatural phenomena are often described as entities with predictable 
and testable behaviour: a vampire will die if exposed to sunlight; ghosts cause 
people to feel cold upon contact, or leave behind an ectoplasmic residue; removing 
the head of a hydra will cause two to take its place.  Seemingly outlandish as all of 
these claims are, they are all open to empirical testing.  Should vampires, ghosts, or 
hydras be observed in the natural world, then it seems implausible that scientists 
would make no efforts to investigate them, and presumptuous of philosophers to tell 
them they would not be allowed to do so. 
 
One might be inclined to find discussion of such examples too fantastical for serious 
discussion.  However, I would argue, this actually serves to emphasise the point.  I 
have selected here some of the most recognisably 'supernatural' phenomena we can 
think of in terms of the popular discourse, and even here in the most outlandish of 
areas the label seems to be a poor fit.  While one might argue that there is no place 
for discussion of such entities in serious academia, what academic function then can 
the term 'supernatural' reasonably be thought to serve?  The less fantastical the 
types of entities we attribute it to, the closer to the 'natural' they become.  Thus the 
more one is inclined to think that there is no place for serious discussion of any 
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particular supernatural entity, the more difficult it becomes to retain any semblance 
of meaningful content for the term.  This is particularly problematic for the 
separationist who wants to assert that "science cannot investigate the supernatural", 
as this proposition relies on the latter category actually having at least intensional, if 
not extensional, meaning. 
 
With that said, while I am arguing for the exclusion of the term 'supernatural' from 
academic and legal deliberation – at least in regards to its relationship with science, I 
am not arguing that it should be excluded from common parlance.  Clearly, as we 
have seen over the preceding chapters, we are capable of employing the term in 
some kind of communicative capacity.  That there is no plausible philosophical 
understanding which could capture common usage does not undermine the fact that 
such common usage does occur.  If I am told that a book contains 'supernatural 
elements', then I am able to make some sense of that claim through familiarity with 
the way the term is usually employed.  Whether or not the magic or goblins or 
ghosts featured in the story should be 'naturalised' in a sense which could be more 
rigorously defined is not something which need concern a general audience and 
need not undermine the practical usefulness of the term. 
 
The ghostly elephant in the room  
 
There is, I think, one issue relating to this debate which is avoided in many 
discussions and which requires some attention.  This is, however, an issue that will 
need to be treated with some care.  Consider, as we saw in chapter one, that the 
following two facts obtain: 
 
(i) Belief systems featuring supernatural claims are frequently placed into 
the category of 'pseudoscience'. 
(ii) The term 'pseudoscience' is a pejorative term. 
 
Consider furthermore, Pennock's comments on geocentrism and creationism from 
chapter two: 
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Take the geocentric view of the world, which is still advanced by some 
creationists.  While one may say that such a claim was historically scientific or 
even that it remains scientific in the abstract sense that it is testable, it would 
nevertheless be fair to conclude, because this claim has been decisively 
disconfirmed (at least under the assumptions of MN), that it is unscientific to 
continue to hold and teach it today.  The scientific picture of the world does not 
include claims that have been decisively refuted and effectively relegated to the 
dustbin of scientific history.  (2009: 557) 
 
Given this attitude from Pennock, and the acknowledgement that pseudoscience is 
indeed a term of criticism, we are I think justified in thinking that in some cases the 
inability of science to investigate the supernatural is defended on the basis that the 
supernatural is assumed to be nonexistent.  Obviously however, as we have seen 
many examples of pro-supernaturalists advocating separationism, this is not always 
the case. 
 
Compounding this suspicion is the fact that, from a practical perspective, the 
separationist position allows for significant benefit to naturalistic members of the 
scientific community.  Or, to return to our parlance from chapter one, to anti-
supernaturalistic opponents of creationism.  Put simply, the separationist position 
allows for anti-supernaturalist scientists to go about their work without having to 
risk offending supernaturalists by openly stating that their views (for example 
creationism) are false.  In a world where concerns of funding in science are highly 
important, and a large proportion of taxpayers are supernaturalist, this is no trivial 
concern.  As we have seen, these concerns are also highly relevant within education, 
where the separationist position offers a convenient method for keeping creationism 
out of science classrooms, without having to present it as false. 
 
In order to address this issue, let us consider an extreme example, distinct from any 
religious connotations.  We have occasionally touched upon examples of this sort 
throughout our discussion, such as ghosts and goblins.  These kinds of phenomena 
are distinct from other examples, such as miraculous healings, in that there is little 
controversy over whether or not they are to be considered 'supernatural'.  In the 
case of supposedly miraculous healings, it is the supernaturality of the phenomena 
we question, whereas in these examples it is the existence of the phenomena itself.  
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As we have not arrived at any useful definition of the supernatural, we shall have to 
rely on intuitive or common usage, though I do not think this will pose a problem for 
the purposes of discussion here.  Imagine that in the room in which you are currently 
sitting, and in rooms around the world, there stood the ghost of an elephant: how 
would scientists respond to this phenomenon? 
 
Given our prior discussion, there seem to be four main possibilities: 
 
1) Separationism would be insisted upon, and scientists would ignore the 
ghostly elephants entirely.   
2) Separationism would be maintained as a principle, but the ghostly 
elephants would be declared 'natural' and investigated. 
3) Separationism would be abandoned, and the ghostly elephants would 
be investigated, despite being regarded as supernatural. 
4) The separationist principle would be rearticulated in terms of religion, 
rather than supernaturalism, thus allowing for investigation of the 
elephants, but without abandoning separationism entirely. 
 
There may of course be alternative responses (surprise and fear notable inclusions), 
but I think these represent the significant approaches for our purposes.  Let us 
consider them in turn. 
 
The first option is, I think, highly implausible.  If I am correct, then this seems fairly 
telling regarding the separationist position.  This is of course entirely speculative, but 
I leave it up to the reader to decide if this view is controversial.  I follow Boudry in 
suggesting that: 
 
[I]f supernatural forces were operating in the natural world, producing tangible 
empirical effects, as many theists maintain, nothing would prevent scientists 
from empirically investigating those [...] narrowing down the scope of science 
by excluding all supernatural claims from its purview is unfeasible and 
historically inaccurate, given that many such claims have in fact been subjected 
to empirical investigations (e.g., the healing power of intercessory prayer, 
clairvoyance, communications with angels).  (2013: 85) 
 
The second option is significantly more plausible, and as indicated by Boudry, 
perhaps historically justified.  If we accept the history of science in which lightning 
and earthquakes went from being considered acts of deities to naturally occurring 
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phenomena, then it seems that this approach has in fact been adopted many times 
over the centuries.  To quote Pennock: "If we could apply natural knowledge to 
understand supernatural powers, then, by definition, they would not be 
supernatural" (1999: 290).  However, this approach pays no more than lip service to 
separationism, and returns us to our definition of 'supernaturality' in which the 
supernatural is understood simply as that which science cannot investigate.  
 
The third option, which I am arguing for in part, would hopefully be adopted by 
many, though historically it is perhaps less likely than the previous alternative.  It 
should be noted though that when I describe this situation as occurring "despite 
being regarded as supernatural", I mean this in the colloquial sense, rather than in a 
way that attributes proper meaning to the term 'supernatural' itself.  I concur with 
the notion that ghostly elephants, if existent, would not be meaningfully distinct 
from the natural world, as advocates of option two would argue.  Where I disagree 
with those advocates is that I reject the notion that we can understand a meaningful 
demarcation between the natural and the supernatural, where ghostly elephants 
currently belong on one side, but would move to the other side upon actually being 
observed. 
 
The final option is one which, although I favour complete abandonment of 
separationism, I think represents a reasonable compromise position, and one which 
will be further articulated later in this chapter.  As well as being more in line with the 
NOMA principle, and involving a greatly reduced limitation on scientific investigation, 
it also alleviates a further problem with the term 'supernatural'.  We have focused in 
our discussion primarily on the difficulty in the relationship between science and the 
supernatural, but in arguing that the term should be abandoned we can also appeal 
to the relationship between religion and the supernatural, which as we have seen 
are often conflated in the literature on demarcation. 
 
Although I do not wish to engage in a prolonged discussion on the relationship 
between religious claims and supernatural claims, I will simply note here that 
pursuant to the difficulties we have already encountered, it seems absurd, perhaps 
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even offensive, to attempt to utilise the same term to pick out the God of Western 
theism (or the sacred beliefs of any religious person) as is used to pick out vampires, 
unicorns and elephantine spectres.  That there is no useful purpose from a scientific 
perspective in employing the term only serves to reinforce the redundancy of 
appealing to the 'supernatural' rather than the 'religious', if any concession is to be 
made to separationism at all. 
 
 
Limitations  
 
While I have argued for the rejection of the separationist position, and to a lesser 
extent the rejection of the term 'supernatural' from academic discourse, these 
arguments do come with some qualification.  Although there should be no rejection 
of a hypothesis from science on the grounds of 'supernaturality', that is not to say 
that any and all phenomena to which we might commonly ascribe the term 
'supernatural' will be susceptible to scientific investigation. 
 
Any impediment to scientific investigation that can be applied to 'natural' 
phenomena may also be applied to the supernatural.  While I do not think that the 
property of being supernatural is in itself an inherent obstacle to a phenomenon 
being scientifically investigable, nor do I think it removes more mundane obstacles 
that might impede investigation.  The unpredictability, or disconnection from the 
causal nexus we have seen forwarded as defences of the separationist position, 
whilst ineffective in that regard, may indeed prevent scientific investigation of a 
supernatural, or natural, hypothesis.  As we discussed in reference to the multiverse, 
if we reject the kind of abductive reasoning that might lead us to infer a causally 
disconnected set of universes as scientific, then we would also be bound to reject 
the same kind of reasoning in inferring a deity.  That the former is more intuitively 
'natural' than the latter has no bearing on the discussion and, as we have seen, it is 
unclear that either can be confidently categorised as natural or supernatural in 
anything more than a loose sense. 
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The impediments to scientific investigation may well be more prevalent in the case 
of supernaturalist hypotheses, especially if we consider the kind of supernaturalist 
claims discussed in chapter six whereby the supernatural is thought to be 'beyond' 
the natural world.  In an interesting argument defending the verifiability of God's 
existence, Hick has argued for the possibility of attaining certainty of His existence 
post-mortem by appeal to specific confirmatory experiences in the afterlife: namely, 
"an experience of the fulfillment of God's purpose for ourselves, as this has been 
disclosed in the Christian revelation, and [...] an experience of communion with God 
as he has revealed himself in the person of Christ" ([1957] 1988: 187). 
 
What is surprising about Hick's example is that, even in as outlandish and non-
naturalist a context as this, the apparent impediments to considering this situation 
scientific are highly mundane.  Most notably, no one would be able to communicate 
their findings back to the scientific community and, as Hick himself argues, the 
experience could offer only verification for, but not falsification of, the claim that 
God exists. 
 
While it is true that the inability to communicate findings, and the inability to falsify 
the claim, are both caused by the supernaturality of Hick's scenario, it is not the 
supernaturality itself that renders God's existence unamenable to investigation by 
science.  This can be seen by taking the scenario even further.  Imagine, rather than 
the God of Christian theism, that some other deity were hypothesised.  This deity, 
rather than taking the dead to an afterlife for any extended duration, did so only for 
a very temporary period, and then only if that person was a professed believer.  
Upon returning a believer to life, their body would be restored to its state prior to 
whatever fatal incident had caused them to die.  Moreover, any person who died 
would be returned to life with an intricate and complete knowledge of the holy texts 
relating to that deity. 
 
This adapted situation would lead to remarkable, but highly testable results.  
Believers and non-believers in the deity could be lined up and, permitting a 
sufficiently amoral ethical code, be executed in the most categorical of ways.  Shortly 
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after, those who had professed belief could be observed to return to life, regardless 
of whatever horrific state they were put in during their execution.  They could then 
be tested on their knowledge of the religious texts in question, and this knowledge 
compared to their prior understanding.  Those who did not profess their belief, 
assuming any non-believers actually existed in such a world, could be observed to 
remain deceased. 
 
This scenario can be adapted and adjusted further to accommodate any objections 
that it is not 'scientific' enough, or that alternative naturalistic explanations could be 
put forward.  The knowledge gained could be rendered more specific to the 
circumstances of the death.  The duration of the time pre-resurrection may be 
similarly alterable in a way that submits itself to a greater degree of prediction and 
falsification.  What is relevant here is that the supernatural nature of the scenario, 
assuming we grant that Hick had described a scenario which could accurately be 
described as supernatural in the first place, would not inhibit scientific investigation. 
 
It is interesting to note here that one cannot object to this new scenario on the 
grounds that, unlike in Hick's set-up, scientists are only able to observe the 
resurrection from 'within' the natural world.  In Hick's example the observer only 
received confirmation of the supernatural hypothesis once they entered a 
supernatural realm themselves, but the scientists in the adapted scenario are able to 
view humans dying, resurrecting, and presenting increased knowledge without ever 
themselves leaving the natural world, or without ever observing any supernatural 
entity at all.  While this is indeed a difference between the examples however, it 
does nothing to undermine the anti-separationist case.  If Hick's scenario is 
supernaturalistic in any meaningful sense, then surely so is the adapted version.  But 
if both scenarios are supernaturalistic, then the difference in scientific investigability 
is not related to the supernatural nature of the situations involved.  Hick has 
presented us an example of a supernatural situation in which scientific investigation 
may not be possible, but there are many equally plausibly supernaturalistic scenarios 
in which such investigation seems entirely reasonable.  Again, we discussed just such 
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a scenario in chapter four when we touched upon the process of certifying a miracle 
for the purposes of beatification and canonisation. 
 
Of course, whilst the deity in this new scenario might be amenable to scientific 
testing, the more traditional theistic picture is not always one of a God who is so 
open to investigation.  Looking to the atheistic side of the debate, we saw in chapter 
one Dawkins' scepticism that theists would accept categorical evidence that God 
does not exist, and later arguments from both Pigliucci and Pennock regarding the 
unfalsifiability of creationism due to the possibility that God merely created the 
world with the appearance of age.   
 
This scepticism echoes earlier positivist arguments for the meaninglessness of 
theistic claims.  One famous example forwarded by Anthony Flew, in an adaption of 
work by John Wisdom, relates God to an "invisible gardener".  In Flew's version of 
the story, two explorers encounter a clearing in a jungle filled with flowers and 
weeds.  One of the explorers believes that there must be a gardener who attends the 
clearing, whilst the other disagrees.  After waiting at the clearing for some time, the 
first explorer postulates that the gardener might be invisible.  In order to test this, 
the explorers set up various traps in order to detect the gardener, but once again 
they find no evidence for such a presence.  This leads to the following exchange: 
 
Yet still the believer is not convinced.  "But there is a gardener, invisible, 
intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes 
no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he 
loves."  At last the Sceptic despairs, "But what remains of your original 
assertion?  Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive 
gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even no gardener at all?"  (Flew 
et al. 1955: 96) 
 
Flew may or may not be correct in this assessment that God is unfalsifiable on a 
traditional, or at least common, theistic conception.  If he is, then this would indeed 
place claims about the traditional theistic God outside of the scope of scientific 
investigation.  Though it is worth noting that the traps set up by the two explorers 
serve at least as provisionally scientific, even if not amenable to a definition of 
science that is reliant upon falsification.  Moreover, if the gardener in question had 
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possessed at least one of the qualities that would have activated their detection 
mechanisms, despite still being invisible, or possessing any of the other ethereal 
characteristics we might conceive of, then it would seem at least plausible that it 
might still be considered 'supernatural' despite its detectability.  Indeed, returning to 
non-theistic examples, ghosts and poltergeists are thought to behave in exactly this 
fashion. 
 
Granting though that Flew's gardener is indeed undetectable and unfalsifiable, then 
this would present us an example of a supernatural entity that was not scientifically 
investigable.  What makes this a more pressing concern, and one that is perhaps 
more informative of the state of the debate, is that this conception of God is also 
forwarded by those who consider belief in His existence to be reasonable.  Turning 
then to the theistic side of the debate, as we saw in chapter one, Rowan Williams 
and Jonathan Sacks were quick to object to Hawking's conclusion that God was not 
required to explain the existence of the universe.  As with Dawkins' approach, this 
position echoes earlier philosophical work, particularly those that have emphasised 
the role of faith in religious belief.  As Kierkegaard suggested: 
 
If I can grasp God objectively, then I do not have faith, but just because I cannot 
do this, I must have faith.  If I wish to stay in my faith, I must take constant care 
to keep hold of the objective uncertainty, to be ‘on the 70,000 fathoms deep’ 
but still have faith.  ([1846] 2009: 172) 
 
This sort of approach has also been proposed in a more specific form of response to 
Flew.  As Henry Allison argues: 
 
Religious belief, with its requirement of total commitment and complete trust in 
God, is in its very nature not because of but in spite of the facts, and thus the 
believer unlike Flew's theologian or explorer, will neither qualify his belief out of 
existence, nor admit that it is falsified.  (1969: 501) 
 
For Allison, it is not that religious beliefs do not involve propositions that can be true 
or false, but rather that they cannot be falsified in terms of 'quasi-scientific' analysis.  
Expressions such as "God loves mankind" do not serve as a basis for prediction as to 
how we can expect God to act, in the sense of allowing for only a certain degree of 
215 
 
evil or suffering before being falsified, but rather an expression of faith and trust that 
if we could understand the 'big picture' then we would see that whatever suffering 
or evil that exists serves some function or purpose (1969: 518).  Similar reasoning can 
be seen in the free will or soul making theodicies already mentioned. 
 
Of course, as we have discussed previously, there is a distinction to be drawn 
between what a particular person believes and what follows from their belief.  Just 
because Allison does not consider the existence of suffering or evil to weigh against 
the proposition "God exists", this does not mean that we must agree with him.  
However, I would argue that, unlike with our discussion of creationism in chapter 
five, this is an area where one might legitimately argue that the belief in question is 
unfalsifiable.  Whereas creationism, and especially Young Earth creationism, makes 
claims which are open to scientific appraisal, it is more of an open question as to 
whether or not Allison's views are similarly investigable.  As we discussed in chapter 
five, there is a difference between the claim "an omnipotent being exists" and the 
claim "there exists an omni-attributed being whose existence is incompatible with 
both evil and the appearance of evil".  
 
With these limitations in mind then, we can clarify the position being argued for.  We 
have seen that the separationist position divides religion and science into two 
distinct spheres.  In other words, they accept these limitations outlined above, and 
extend them from a limited set of specific unfalsifiable claims to the entirety of 
supernaturalist thought.  While I concede that these limitations exist, I do not extend 
this concession to the whole possible realm of entities or phenomena which might 
be considered 'supernatural'. 
 
Partially Overlapping Magisteria  
 
If separationists hold to the position that science and religion occupy different 
domains, with no overlap whatsoever, then the opposing view to separationism 
would be the view that science and religion occupy identical epistemological space.  
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Such a view would suggest that there are no questions, or meaningful statements, 
which fall within only one of these magisteria, but not in the other.  Perhaps the 
most obvious, and common, example of such a view is what Dupré critically referred 
to as "scientism". 
 
Even if one does not accept the limitations outlined in the previous section, I feel I 
should stress here that despite arguing that there are supernaturalistic, and 
religious, claims that are investigable by science, I am emphatically not endorsing 
scientism.  Even within the sphere of askable scientific questions, there is no 
guarantee that an answer could be found, nor that science provides the best method 
for arriving at it.  If the claims of creationists are indeed scientifically investigable, 
and also happened to be true, then quite clearly theology got there first.  Moreover, 
there are many question types which are not, at least without controversy, scientific.  
Many questions of morality, meaning, and purpose may well fall beyond of the scope 
of science, yet still be both meaningful and answerable.  Such questions may even 
relate to explanations regarding the universe if Lennox's arguments from chapter 
one regarding Aunt Matilda and Henry Ford are to be taken seriously.  An important 
thing to note though is that, again, the divisions drawn here do not fall along the 
borderlines between the natural and the supernatural. 
 
The position I am outlining is thus a rejection of both scientism and separationism.  If 
separationism reflects a position of no overlap between science and the 
supernatural, and scientism represents complete overlap (or rather complete 
subsumption of supernaturalist beliefs by science) then the position I am forwarding 
is, ironically, an actual middle ground between the two.  In terms of religion, rather 
than supernaturalism in general, this would be akin to what Alister and Joanna 
Collicutt McGrath term "Partially overlapping magisteria (POMA)", namely the 
"realization that science and religion offer possibilities of cross-fertilization on 
account of the interpenetration of their subjects and methods" (2007: 41). 
 
Though I think that considerations of the role of faith in religious belief warrant at 
least grounds for tentative support for this more moderate view, and the arguments 
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I have outlined throughout this thesis warrant similar support for the view that some 
religious claims might be testable, the position that I am forwarding is slightly 
humbler than POMA.  Unless one argues for the position that all supernaturalist 
claims are religious, which given the breadth of putative supernatural phenomena, 
as well as the employment of the term 'supernatural' over 'religious' in the literature, 
seems both untenable and confusing, then there are some supernatural claims which 
are not religious.  If this is the case, then even if there were complete disconnection 
between science and religion, then still the separationist position may turn out to be 
unjustifiable.  There may be hypotheses which are investigable by science, are not 
religious, and yet are still 'supernatural' under some conception of the notion.  The 
existence of ghosts, the efficacy of dowsing, or the reliability of astrological 
predictions all seem plausibly to fall within this category. 
 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to outline exactly which phenomena may or 
may not be investigated by science.  I only intend to argue that there is no good 
reason to suppose that the entirety of the supernatural realm be excluded from such 
investigation.  I have laid out here what I consider to be the basis for further 
investigation into outlining a more complex and integrated relationship between 
both science and the supernatural and science and religion.  Hopefully this is a 
position which can be accepted by those on both sides of the supernaturalist divide, 
and allow for fruitful cooperation and discourse between these domains. 
 
 
Relationship to the demarcation debate and moving forward  
 
Although we have touched upon many of the topics which arise within the 
demarcation debate between science and pseudoscience, I make no comment here 
as to whether or not the debate is, as Laudan (1983) famously claimed, dead.  It is 
worth noting that the relationship between the pseudoscience debate and our 
current discussion is, to some extent, due to semi-historical accident.  As we have 
seen over the course of this discussion, many putative demarcation criteria have no 
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bearing on supernatural phenomena at all.  Rather it is simply a common occurrence 
in the literature for creationism, astrology, and other supernaturalist ideas to be 
frequently referenced as paradigmatic examples of pseudoscientific enterprises. 
 
With that in mind, it is worth qualifying that I am not denying that creationism or 
astrology are, if such a category does in fact exist, obvious examples of 
pseudosciences.  Rather, what I am arguing is that whatever the ultimate outcome of 
the demarcation debate turns out to be, the divide between the natural and the 
supernatural does not seem likely to play a significant role in its resolution.  If Laudan 
is correct, and there are no valid demarcation criteria for differentiating between 
science and pseudoscience, then clearly no such criteria can apply to supernatural 
phenomena.  Conversely, if there are such criteria, then even if they apply to all 
supernaturalist activities, then it is not by virtue of supernaturality that they do so.  
There are many reasons to think that creationism is a pseudoscience, but the fact 
that it makes supernaturalist claims is not obviously among them. 
 
Note that I am not merely arguing against the idea that naturalism is a necessary 
condition for science which, in light of more recent philosophical trends, may in any 
case be rejected in favour a more subtle Wittgensteinian family resemblance 
approach to demarcation.  Under such a conception, science would be 
"characterized by a number of threads connecting instantiations of the concept, with 
some threads more relevant than others to specific instantiations, and indeed 
sometimes with individual threads entirely absent from individual instantiations" 
(Pigliucci, 2013: 21).  Regardless of whether or not one accepts the idea that there 
are necessary or sufficient criteria for science however, I am arguing that according 
to predominant understandings of the term, 'supernaturalism' is irrelevant to the 
scientific nature of an enterprise except, arguably, by the coincidence of lack of 
empirical evidence in support of such a position.  If there are necessary criteria for 
science, naturalism does not seem to be sensibly among them. 
 
Although I think a complete rejection of supernaturalism from demarcation criteria is 
justifiable, even if one does not accept this argument fully, then there is still a viable 
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compromise available.  Mahner (2013) argues for a cluster approach to 
differentiating science from pseudoscience.  Rather than strict necessary and jointly 
sufficient criteria, he argues for a system whereby only  a proportion of indicators of 
science need to be fulfilled in order to achieve scientific status.  Though he hints at 
appeal to natural law as such an indicator (2013: 38), this approach would allow for a 
rejection of the separationist position, without entirely abandoning the intuition that 
supernatural phenomena are not wholly comfortable within scientific discourse.  
Perhaps this intuition can be satisfied tentatively, with supernaturalism being 
indicative that a hypothesis or activity is unscientific, but without it being a sufficient 
criteria for non-science.  What proportion of indicators might be required to justify 
accepting an investigation into the supernatural as scientific is something I do not 
intend to address here, though it is something that would need to be established in 
order to avoid science becoming vague-boundaried. 
 
Whether one accepts either a cluster approach, or a more restrictive approach that 
is reliant upon necessary and sufficient criteria, the notion that science adheres to 
strict methodological naturalism should, I think, be abandoned.  Instead, if 
demarcation is deemed desirable, then other criteria should be relied upon in order 
to determine whether or not a hypothesis or activity is scientific.  Most simply, 
regarding hypotheses, would be the suggestion that a better supported, more 
parsimonious or more commonly observed explanation is to be preferred over a less 
well supported, less parsimonious, or more exceptional one.  As the oft referenced 
medical adage goes: "when you hear hoofbeats, think of horses not zebras" (Sotos, 
[1989] 2006: 1) 
 
This approach has the benefit not only of avoiding the imposition of scientific 
blindness to truth, should it happen to be the case that any supernatural 
phenomenon actually exists, but also philosophical practicality.  For example, by 
ignoring the natural/supernatural dichotomy, we are able to apply the underlying 
principles of how we arrive at understanding laws of nature, whatever they happen 
to be, without engagement with questions over their ontology.  We should seek 
explanations, hypotheses, and laws, which are experientially (or theoretically) well 
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supported, not those which happen to fall on one side of a delineation so unclear as 
the distinction between the natural and the supernatural.  As Laudan put it: 
 
Rather than taking on the creationists obliquely and in wholesale fashion by 
suggesting that what they are doing is "unscientific" tout court (which is doubly 
silly because few authors can even agree on what makes an activity scientific), 
we should confront their claims directly and in piecemeal fashion by asking 
what evidence and arguments can be marshalled for and against each of them.  
The core issue is not whether Creationism satisfies some undemanding and 
highly controversial definitions of what is scientific; the real question is whether 
the existing evidence provides stronger arguments for evolutionary theory than 
for Creationism.  (Laudan, 1982: 18) 
 
I am not arguing for something as strong as Laudan's rejection of pseudoscience as a 
term outright, though some may consider my rejection of the term 'supernatural' 
equally, or perhaps even more, controversial.  Instead, at least in my primary 
argument, I am suggesting that regardless of whether or not the terms 
'pseudoscience' and 'supernatural' pick out any actual kinds it is not at this point in 
the history of science justified, or beneficial, to attempt to pre-emptively exclude 
supernaturalist claims from the domain of science. 
 
Of course, Laudan's suggestion, and by extension my defence of it, has not been 
without controversy.  James Ladyman has responded to Laudan's position on three 
points: "confronting pseudoscience in this way is problematic: it consumes too much 
time and too many resources, is not useful when engaging in public debates that 
operate at general level, and is too detailed for scientifically nonliterate audiences" 
(2013: 49-50). 
 
Rejecting supernatural phenomena from science by default is certainly easier in 
principle than a more nuanced approach.  However, I would argue that the history of 
creationism, and its widespread acceptance in the public sphere, suggests that 
Ladyman's objections do not hold up to historical scrutiny.  This is especially true in 
the case of religious claims, where already the public image of a 'war' between 
science and religion is further fuelled by wholesale, and seemingly unconsidered, 
rejection of claims like those made by creationists by science.  Surely it is far more 
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persuasive in the public sphere to say that creationism is not scientific for any of the 
multiple alternative reasons to which we might appeal (lack of falsifiability, lack of 
testable predictions, overwhelming support for an incompatible and opposing 
account and so on), than to attempt to convince a largely supernaturalist public to 
accept that science adheres, for purely methodological purposes, to the assumption 
that supernaturalist phenomena do not exist. 
 
What is key, and striking, about an approach of partially overlapping magisteria, 
combined with an emphasis on evidence-based criteria for science, is how 
remarkably unrevolutionary it actually is.  Discarding the separationist position, or 
the principle of methodological naturalism, implies no consequences whatsoever for 
the practices of science, nor the conclusions it draws.  Separationism only has impact 
if (i) naturalism is false and there is evidence to that effect, or if (ii) some 
supernatural claim is false and there is evidence to that effect (as seems plausibly 
the case with creationism).  In neither of these scenarios however, is methodological 
naturalism desirable. 
 
If the world is naturalistic, then methodological naturalism will have no effect 
whatsoever.  While we might posit supernaturalist hypotheses, as creationists have, 
then those hypotheses will have to be put under exactly the kind of scrutiny that any 
other hypothesis would.  Creationists would need to engage with the scientific 
community, submit their ideas to peer-review, present falsifiable predictions, and 
support their claims with evidence.  Given that we are assuming naturalism to be 
true, they will fail in this endeavour, and creationism will be, assuming we can make 
sense of demarcation at all, deemed unscientific.  The separationist position adds 
nothing to this whatsoever other than to prevent scientific criticism of creationist 
claims. 
 
Conversely, if some supernatural phenomena exist, then creationism will still face 
exactly the same burden in order to be considered scientific.  Thus far, it has failed to 
meet that burden regardless of whether or not one thinks that science adheres to 
methodological naturalism.  However, if naturalism is false, then some supernatural 
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hypotheses may well turn out to be investigable in a manner that accords with 
scientific method.  By pre-emptively excluding investigation of such phenomena, the 
separationist has blocked off an avenue for truth-seeking. 
 
Creationism in its current form will no more be considered science tomorrow if 
methodological naturalism is abandoned than it is today if it stands.  Similarly, 
science will continue to investigate hypotheses based on the evidence and methods 
available to it.  These statements hold regardless of whether or not supernatural 
phenomena actually exist.  The separationist position offers no benefit to the 
scientific endeavour for the supernaturalist or their detractor, and may only serve to 
blind science to truths about reality for both.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the opening chapter of this thesis, we saw that the question of whether or not 
science can investigate the supernaturalis one which has had significant legal and 
cultural impact over the course of the last century.  In order to ease the perceived 
tensions between science and religion, notably in the context of creationism and 
evolution, some have argued that these domains should be considered separate.  
This position has been argued for as a cultural middle ground, allowing for respectful 
discourse between the supernaturalist and their detractors. 
 
Throughout this discussion I have argued that this separationist approach is 
misguided.  In the opening chapter I argued that separationism fails to properly 
locate itself within the discussion, occupying not a middle ground between the 
extremes of religion and irreligion, but rather placing itself in opposition to people in 
both camps.  This is easily seen when we view the debate not as a singular spectrum, 
but rather as a two-dimensional grid of beliefs. 
 
In addition to this issue with cultural context, I maintain that separationism itself is 
untenable.  Although this discussion is distinct from the wider demarcation debate, 
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all of the difficulties in defining science which arise in that discussion can be felt 
here.  Compounding this issue is that fact that a definition of the term 'supernatural' 
is similarly difficult to articulate.  We have discussed multiple definitions of both 
science and the supernatural in turn and found that in the vast majority of cases, it is 
impossible to coherently articulate any incompatibility at all. 
 
This difficulty in articulating a problem is perhaps most evident in our discussion of 
natural law, during which even when it became apparent that we might be able to 
identify an instance where a supernatural phenomenon 'violated' such a law, there 
was no reason to think that this precluded it from scientific investigation.  Similar 
results were seen in our discussion of scientific method and, surprisingly, even in our 
discussion of natural theology.  Of course, this investigation has not been exhaustive, 
and future research may identify areas of genuine incompatibility.  This is particularly 
evident in our discussion of multiverse theories, where we can see that much 
remains to be said on where exactly the bounds of science lie. 
 
While the separationist position is therefore something that should be abandoned, 
even in its weaker form, this is not to say that the demarcation debate at large has 
no merit, nor that creationism or any other specific supernatural position belongs 
within the domain of science.  There are many potential arguments we might give 
for excluding creationist ideas from science, and I only seek to argue that 
supernaturalism is not among them.  Outlining proper demarcation criteria for 
science remains a potentially interesting and fruitful avenue for research. 
 
Additionally, while there is no inherent reason to exclude the supernatural at large 
from science, this is not to say that there are no specific supernaturalistic claims 
which might fall beyond the scientific domain.  This is most plausibly the case when it 
comes to questions of purpose or meaning, but may well extend much further.  
Identifying the exact relationship between science and religion is an issue which will 
require careful philosophical attention.  I hope that this discussion has illustrated 
that simplistic delineation between the two is of benefit to neither. 
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